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NOTE ON THE INCLUSION OF PUBLISHED WORK 
 
Chapter 8 describes an empirical study of behaviour and decision-making in financial 
markets. This study was published in the Journal of Behavioral Finance (Taylor & Taylor, 
2016). 
In order to achieve a high degree of authenticity, a financial simulation platform was 
used for the study enabling access to actual historical market and other data. That platform 
had been developed by, and is the property of, Alpha-Q Investment Management (AQIM), an 
investment management company engaged in the development and application of quantitative 
techniques for asset management. The platform is used by that company primarily to test 
market trading algorithms and for general simulation. Considerable quantities of historical 
data are accessible via the platform, including historical closing prices for a large number of 
securities and asset classes as well as extensive fundamental data relating to companies listed 
on the major exchanges. This data, together will all of the simulation software used for the 
experiment, is the property of AQIM.  
 
The use of actual historical data, although anonymised in order to avoid easy 
identification, added richness to the study as the experimental environment reflected actual 
outcomes within markets. With the sophisticated software platform providing the mechanism 
through which the required data could be accessed and manipulated, the exact specification 
for the study, including its objectives and methods, were devised entirely by the author of this 
thesis. The same applies to analysis of experimental results data generated.  
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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the process of decision-making in relation to complex tasks and 
considers the important role which dynamic information and real-time feedback play in 
shaping response behaviour and adaptation within such environments. Through empirical 
studies, the thesis explores the extent to which decision-makers can be said to act rationally 
when challenged by complex decision-making environments. Evidence relating to demand for 
information and the impact of feedback on behaviour is provided with two studies: The first 
uses a simulated auction platform to examine behaviour within overlapping auctions of short 
duration with close-to-identical items and minimal participation costs.  Mouse tracking is 
used to capture data on relevant interactions of participants with the simulated online 
platform, including switching behaviour independent of bidding.  The resulting data suggests 
that participants did behave in a manner consistent with utility maximisation, seeking to 
acquire the item at the lowest possible price and showing no bias in terms of auction 
preference.  The impact of fixed-price offers in the form of a “Buy it Now” option is also 
examined with some evidence that participants again seek, and respond to, current 
information when deciding on their bidding strategy. 
 
The second study is a test of the impact of real-time feedback and demand for 
information within the context of financial markets. The study again uses a novel simulated 
environment which provides access to considerable amounts of relevant data which 
participants can choose to access.  In addition, participants are exposed to regular feedback 
with regard to their own performance.  Overall, demand for information is found to be 
dependent upon the type of feedback received and its context.  Decision-makers then appear 
to behave objectively, apparently seeking the latest available information to support current 
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decisions, although investor style is found to be important in determining overall trading 
propensity.   
 
The thesis starts by considering a number of the foundations and pathways which run 
through the judgment and decision-making literature. It is not a complete description, review 
or analysis of all of the prevailing lines of enquiry. Nevertheless, it seeks to achieve 
coherence in terms of bringing together some of the key themes dealing with risky choice 
under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity.  The field of judgment and decision-making is 
inevitably vast; its scope owing much to the fact that it transcends individual disciplines. The 
emergent behavioural sciences thus draw together important strands from various sources, 
notably Economics and Finance.  In many areas, psychological traits can be applied to 
explain inconsistencies which are found in classical theory of rational behaviour.  The 
recognition of behavioural traits has thus contributed greatly to the evolution of decision-
making theories under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity which are, in many cases, 
substantially more adaptable and robust than early normative theories of rational behaviour.   
 
The classical approach to rational decision making within Economics, together with 
some theoretical and empirical challenges to it, are considered in Chapter 1. It is here that we 
are introduced to the Rational Man. Like the mythical creatures found in Classical Antiquity, 
the Rational Man does not actually exist in the real world; he is nevertheless central to the 
concept of utility maximising rational choice which provided much of the foundation of 
Economics.   Developments of expected utility theory (EUT) are considered, including its 
replacement of expected value, and the formalisation of rational behaviour within the context 
of axioms.  When those logical axioms apply, decision-makers can be said to behave as if 
they are utility maximises.  The chapter ends with some empirical evidence, showing the 
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types of approaches often used to explore rational decision-making.  Some violations of  EUT 
are explored, both in relation to notional gambles and consistency with regard to revealed 
preferences.  Chapter 2 extends the narrative by considering rational decision-making in cases 
where there is no objective information about possible outcomes.  Subjective utility theory 
(SEU) is then introduced, describing objective functions based upon preferences derived from 
combined utility and probability functions.  The implications of the Allais’ and Ellsberg 
paradoxes are discussed, along with some possible solutions.  It is here that we explore the 
concepts of uncertainty and ambiguity in more details and consider some theoretical 
formulations for addressing them.  
 
Chapter 3 covers the significant contribution to decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty provided by Prospect Theory and, later, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT).  
Their evolution from the pioneering work of Markowitz is discussed within the context of 
reference points relative to which outcomes can be evaluated.  The significance of stochastic 
dominance and rank dependence are explored.  By this stage, we have examined numerous 
theories which have fundamentally transformed standard EUT into much more flexible and 
adaptable frameworks of rational choice.  The core concepts of utility maximisation remain 
yet the initial, strictly concave utility function describing diminishing marginal utility is now 
substantially replaced by more complex weighted preference functions.  
 
From this theoretical base, the process of choice reduction and the application of 
heuristics in decision-making are considered.  We again describe axiomatic behaviour 
compatible with rational choice.  Therefore, decision-makers faced with multiple choices 
about which there may be little or no objective information about likely outcomes can 
nevertheless develop rational beliefs and expectations which can then be applied to reduce 
xv 
complex tasks to more manageable proportions.  As well as considering these aspects from 
the point of view of actual choices, we also consider the processes by which decisions are 
taken.  Thus, process tracing methods are introduced into the discussion.   The chapter also 
explicitly considers the role of feedback in decision making.  This includes a consideration of 
Bayesian inference as a process for updating probabilistic expectations subject to new 
information. 
 
From considering theoretical formulations form which we can judge rational behaviour, 
Chapter 5 looks at evidence for sub-optimal decision-making and bias.  Bias with regard to 
probability assessments are considered along with empirical evidence of bias in relation to 
intertemporal discounting.  Sunk cost bias is also considered as a clear example of irrational 
behaviour, leading in to a specific discussion about a number of persistent behavioural biases 
identified within financial markets.  As an introduction to later chapters, this also covers the 
basic theoretical principles of market efficiency and evidence that real markets fail to adhere 
to those principles in important ways. 
 
Chapter 6 and 8 describe the empirical studies with Chapter 7 providing a more detailed 
introduction to the financial markets experiment, considering aspects of market efficiency, 
models of behaviour and other empirical evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
CHAPTER 1 
THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM 
 
 
1.1. Decision-Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty  
 
Decision making is a cognitive process of varying complexity usually conditioned by 
input signals interpreted and processed in accordance with internal cognitive perceptions of 
external interdependencies from which the set of perceived choices is derived. Usually, 
choices are made within a context of risk and uncertainty.  Certain decision tasks, such as 
choosing between a square of milk or plain chocolate, can be trivial, involving limited choice 
and offering very little variability in terms of perceived outcome. Such tasks may be 
considered by the decision-maker to be of marginal or transient consequence with little 
cognitive resource being applied actively to the choice selection. Many other decisions, while 
being commonplace or routine in terms of frequency, may carry far greater consequence and 
significance and offer many alternative choices which may, individually or collectively, 
involve much greater uncertainty with regard to outcome. Further, certain decisions may be 
unitary in terms of outcome and effect. For example, the decision to try a new brand of coffee 
is likely to have a limited, relatively transient and non-consequential future impact on the 
individual even if the brand, or even the product, is subsequently rejected. Neither the 
decision-maker’s overall state of well-being nor his scope for future action is necessarily 
compromised beyond repair. Other decisions, such as the degree subject pursued at university, 
can be far more significant in terms of enabling or precluding future potential options, for 
example, in terms of possible careers. Such decisions therefore feed, unwittingly or 
consciously, into a broader matrix of sequential decisions which then become interlinked due 
to their inter-temporal framing of available choice sets. Consequently, more complex 
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decisions usually impose much greater cognitive load, potentially influencing broader 
perceptions, uncertainty and ambiguity (Kirschner, 2002; Paas, Renkl & Sweller, 2004; 
Polisson, Quah & Renou, 2017). 
 
From these few examples alone, it may be inferred that certain decision-making tasks 
which many people face with some regularity can be perceived as complex and of significant 
consequence. Often, such tasks are associated with, and influenced by, various forms of 
feedback.  Feedback, in this context, relates to all data, stimuli and cues which inform the 
cognitive process, thereby contributing to the development of a perception of the 
environmental framework within which such decisions are made (Sterman, 1989; Wickens, 
1987). Therefore, from a cognitive perspective, how feedback is presented, framed, perceived 
and processed can shape decision bias and choice outcome (Isen & Means, 1983; Kleinmuntz, 
1993 ; Checkel, 2008). Consequently, it is apparent that assessing the degree and nature of 
uncertainty associated with higher level decision tasks might also be perceived as being a 
process of varying complexity. Even if risk and uncertainty are defined narrowly in terms of 
likely deviation of outcome from expectations, the range and scope of decision-making tasks 
obviously varies significantly and, in the complex form, stretches practical ability to make 
anything other than generic assessments of potential outcomes. Thus, while one-off decisions 
of transient importance may appear to be bounded in terms of the impact of potential ranges of 
outcomes, interrelated or interdependent choices are likely to be much less well defined, both 
in terms of scope for possible outcomes and the uncertain timing and variability of those 
outcomes (Chang & Kim, 2017).  
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1.2. Summary of Early Approaches to Decision-Making 
 
As a consequence of its fundamental importance to most areas of human endeavour, 
many disciplines have considered the process of decision-making and its implications for 
explaining and predicting behaviour. Quite naturally, economists have long embraced the 
study of individual and collective decision-making, developing models and theories largely 
compatible with other tenets of the discipline. Psychologists have also pursued the topic, 
originally in the form of learning and behavioural expression and, more latterly, through the 
lens of cognition and neuroscience.  Consequently, the processes through which decisions are 
made have enhanced the study of observable outputs, in the form of actual choices made, the 
two combining to make a significant contribution to current behavioural sciences.  
 
Essentially from its inception as a formal discipline, the concept of rational behaviour lay 
at the heart of Economics.  This advanced the proposition that various economic agents 
(consumers, businesses and governments) would pursue choices which maximised defined 
objectives.  From this basis, theories were developed designed to explain and prescribe the 
way in which these different agents functioned and inter-depended (Barber, 2010; Hunt, 2002; 
Screpanti & Zamagni, 2005). Yet, while early economists debated what was and what should 
be (a normative approach), it was largely left to mathematicians such as Fermat, Pascal and 
Bernoulli to consider what could be, the latter, in particular, prompting changes in the way 
economists thought by exposing contradictions and paradoxes arising from prevailing 
consensus, and laying at least some of the foundations for what has now become a more 
robust concept of judgment and decision making under conditions of uncertainty (Daston, 
1995).  It is, therefore, from within Economic doctrine, albeit influenced by and, to some 
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extent, responsive to developments and inputs from outside the discipline, that we find the 
most highly developed early models of rational behaviour and choice.  
 
In the earliest formulations, price was generally seen as a key determinant of rational 
economic behaviour (Friedman, 1953). Since income is the price of labour, and income 
provides the means to extend choice through selective consumption, monetary gain was 
initially proposed as the primary objective of a Rational Man, just as profit maximisation was 
seen as the only rational goal for private companies (Robbins, 1929).  From that basis, it 
appeared logical that early theories of decision-making in the face of uncertainty should be 
expressed and framed in the form of potential monetary pay-offs from various gambles with 
uncertain outcomes. Thus, rational consumers would seek to allocate their available resources 
in an optimal manner, maximising the expected pay-off from the choices made.  As a result, 
money would only be exchanged for goods if the perceived expected value derived from those 
goods was at least equal to the perceived value of the money expended on them (Marschak, 
1938). This concept of expected value can easily expressed mathematically in the following 
form; 
 
EV =      pixi,  Equation 1.
  
where pi and xi denote the probability and amount of money (value) associated with each 
available outcome i. Assuming an income constraint, the objective function is maximised by 
allocating available income in such a way that the aggregate independent payoffs (pixi) 
derived from the available range of options (i = 1………, n) is maximised. 
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This seemingly simple proposition implies some important tenets about rational 
behaviour:  Essentially, the Rational Man is assumed to behave in a manner consistent with 
objectively logical decisions based upon current expectations; past decisions and outcomes 
should not affect these current decisions other than through the shaping of probabilistic 
assumptions.  The rational decision-maker is essentially assumed to apply unbiased Bayesian 
(stochastic) principles in forecasting the outcomes of current choices.  Therefore, the assumed 
probability of the likelihood of an event derives from some past knowledge of conditions 
which may influence that event.  On this basis, decision-makers are expected to modify their 
expectations with regard to the likelihood of events as more evidence pertaining to those 
events becomes available (Anderson, 1998).  While rational decision-makers are therefore 
free to differ in terms of their expectations, they are nevertheless assumed to be motivated by 
the prospect of greater monetary wealth as it is through this route that greater consumption 
becomes possible (more is therefore always better than less).  
 
This apparently non-controversial conclusion nevertheless proved problematic when 
translated into the realm of games offering various uncertain or ambiguous potential 
outcomes. Even within very simply framed propositions, inconsistencies and paradoxes were 
found to exist. In essence, wealth expressed in monetary terms assumes a linear scale 
implying that equivalent differences between monetary amounts should be considered equally 
attractive by rational decision makers, regardless of their absolute magnitude and impact on 
total wealth. However, the proposition that an increase in total wealth from £50 to £100 is 
likely to result in the same sense of satisfaction as an increase from £1,000,000 to £1,000,050 
is open to challenge as the latter level implies some degree of existing comfort while the 
former represents an essential improvement in general subsistence levels of income or wealth. 
The impact on the change in quality of life from the same absolute increase in wealth of £50 is 
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therefore unlikely to be viewed equally across the two states. Similarly, based upon a purely 
numeric scale, a doubling of income implies a doubling of the satisfaction derived from that 
income. Such a proposition again ignores the existence of satiation, which implies that the 
desire to consume more of any particular product is both limited and finite.  
 
1.2.1. The St Petersburg Paradox 
 
A practical challenge to the prevailing theory of monetary return was expressed 
mathematically in the form of the St Petersburg Paradox. The Paradox, originally presented by 
Bernoulli (1738), proposed a type of lottery, or game of chance, using a fair coin. The game 
proceeded on the basis that a coin is tossed until a head appears. If the head appears on the 
first toss, the lottery pays 1 monetary unit and the game ends. Should a head be returned on 
the second toss, the lottery pays 2 monetary units, 4 monetary units if it occurs on the third 
toss, with each subsequent toss of the coin leading to a doubling of the lottery pay-out until a 
head is tossed, at which point the game ends and the lottery pays out its cumulated value. The 
question posed by Bernoulli related to the price which any rational person would be willing to 
pay in order to enter such a lottery.  
 
The Paradox derives from the fact that there is no obvious solution to the problem unless 
other assumptions are made.  In theory, the player’s expectations range from one monetary 
unit (a head is returned on the first toss, terminating the game) to infinity (no head is ever 
returned).  In between those extremes, the player faces the prospect of various payoffs with 
associated, albeit rapidly diminishing, probabilities determined in accordance with binomial 
theory. The prospects of substantial payoffs thus become vanishingly small, but not zero.  
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The response to the Paradox, proposed initially by Bernoulli himself in answer to his own 
question, involved imposing an effective upper boundary on the possible returns.  The 
apparent solution lay in the proposition that the broader value of money is derived not simply 
in accordance with its quantum but in proportion to the satisfaction or pleasure which stems 
from the uses to which it can be put (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002).  In effect, therefore, a 
psychological component to decision-making was being inferred.  The contention was that, 
just as satisfaction from consumption is subject to diminishing returns, so too is the change in 
satisfaction derived from ever increasing amounts of money. Therefore, while increasing 
amounts of money afforded greater choice, both in terms of absolute levels and breadth of 
consumption, there could only be a finite level of overall consumption which any individual 
could undertake (Brito, 1975). Consequently, since the psychological value of money is now 
measured not solely by its quantum, but on the basis of the satisfaction which can be derived 
from its allocation to consumption, the perceived psychological value of money must itself 
ultimately be finite.  This is nothing more than an extension of the economic “law” of 
diminishing marginal utility to money itself, an apparently reasonable transformation since the 
value of money depends directly upon its economic usage rather than its own existence as 
specie, especially in fiat form.  
 
Bernoulli’s concept of utility not only broke the dependence upon expected monetary 
value as the basis for rational decision-making under conditions of uncertainty but also 
replaced the assumption of linearity of effect by describing a concave utility function.  In 
mathematical terms, the Expected Value function described in Equation 1 was thus replaced 
by an Expected Utility function of the form; 
 
EU =      pixia,  Equation 2.  
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where the a term describes the marginal utility function of the decision-maker.  Values for a 
less than 1 define a concave utility function of the general form shown in Figure 1.  The 
objective measure of money, based upon its quantum, is now replaced by a subjective value of 
utility which changes according to levels of consumption.  In addition, the rate of decline in 
marginal utility per unit consumed, defined by a, can vary from one decision-maker to the 
next (Allen, 1933).   
 
 
Figure 1. A representative utility function, monotonically increasing with diminishing marginal utility 
 
 
Expected utility theory marked a significant advance in approaches to decision-making, 
not least in allowing both risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviour to be accommodated within 
the same framework.  The essential concept of rational behaviour is maintained with decision-
makers deemed to allocate their resources in such a way that expected utility is maximised; in 
general terms, more is still preferable to less.  With regard to the St Petersburg Paradox, the 
theory also provided the basis for a solution as it enabled an upper bound to be applied to the 
problem.  In essence, as marginal utility or the rate of increase in total utility, declines, a point 
is eventually reached at which marginal utility is close to zero.  Based upon that assumption, 
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the upper bound offered by the Paradox is no longer infinite but becomes, to all intents and 
purposes, a finite amount determined by marginal utility.  Within the parameters of the 
Paradox, this can then be translated in a straightforward manner to derive a maximum 
monetary amount a rational decision-maker would be prepared to pay to enter such a lottery.  
For example, if the threshold for maximum utility derived from any level of wealth is assumed 
to be £224 (£16.8m), with gains over and above this threshold deemed to be “meaningless” 
(close to zero in terms of marginal utility), then the solution to the Paradox becomes;  
 
 Equation 3. 
 
In this case, the player, possessing the required appetite for risk, expects to receive £13 from 
this lottery, which then becomes the rational breakeven price for participation (Shafer, 1988).  
 
 
1.3. Concave Utility Functions and Loss Aversion  
 
A concave utility function has important properties in relation to risk preferences.  
Essentially, the curve suggests generalised risk aversion; as consumption increases, the utility-
adjusted “value” of that consumption becomes increasingly discounted by diminishing 
marginal utility.  Consequently, it is perfectly rational for risk preferences to change at 
different point along the utility function (Friedman & Savage, 1948; Pratt, 1964; Rabin, 
2000).   
 
A further important property of a concave utility function is that it implies loss aversion 
whereby rational decision-makers do not view gains and losses of equal magnitude as 
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offsetting propositions.  This can be illustrated by considering a notional, fair gamble offering 
a 50% chance of a 10% gain or a 50% chance of a loss of 10%.  The expected payoff from 
such a gamble is, of course, zero (0.5 x £10 + 0.5 x -£10 = 0).  The ex post utility of a zero 
return is also zero. However, from the slope of the curve representing the utility function 
shown in Figure 1, it can be seen that the prospective impact on utility of the two possible 
outcomes is not equal.  From the chart, it is seen that a gain of 10% increases overall utility by 
1 utile while a 10% loss reduces utility by 3 utiles.  We are therefore faced with the following 
proposition based upon the respective probabilities of the outcomes and the change in utility 
implied by those outcomes; 
 
U = (0.5 x 1) + (0.5 x -3) = -1   Equation 4. 
 
From Equation 4, we see that the combined effect of the two potential outcomes is a 
decline in overall utility meaning that a 50:50 gamble with equivalent payoffs is a less 
attractive proposition than the certainty of losing and gaining nothing (i.e. rejecting the 
gamble and maintaining the status quo).   Therefore, while the expected monetary returns 
from the gamble and doing nothing are the same (zero), the combined expected utility is lower 
in the case of accepting the gamble.  
 
Loss aversion, as a rational psychological trait, also finds support from basic 
mathematical principles if outcomes are viewed as rates of return.  This stems from the fact 
that the compounding effect of a sequence of a gain followed by a loss of equal magnitude, 
with all gains and losses expressed in percentage terms, leads to degradation of the 
compounded sequence. For example, assuming base capital of £100, a repetitive sequence of a 
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10% gain followed by a 10% loss results in the following compounding sequence (t0 ……., 
tn); 
 
£100.00t0, £110.00t1, £99.00t2, £108.90t3, £98.01t4 . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
This result can be generalised to state that, the rational expectation of the residual return 
of a compounded series generated from a large number of trials with individual, independent 
returns drawn randomly from a normal distribution with the characteristics of MSD = x; 
x > 0,  is a value less than zero.   
  
 
1.3.1. Utility, Revealed Preference & Axioms 
 
Rational behaviour based upon utility maximisation enhanced the basic economic theory 
of supply and demand as consumers were assumed to rebalance choices based upon changes 
in income and / or relative prices in accordance with their marginal utilities (Allen, 1934).  
Nevertheless, practical issues remained in terms of objectively measuring the strengths of 
preferences.  Thus, while the  rankings of rational decision-makers could be determined by 
observation, there was apparently no cardinal scale which could be imposed upon these 
ordinal rankings.  As a result, it was not clear how comparisons could be made between 
consumers. Therefore, while it may be assumed that all consumers would pursue the same 
objective of maximising their individual utilities, the basic economic problem of satisfying 
infinite demand with finite resources in the most efficient manner remained unresolved.  
Essentially, given an existing allocation of resources in a resource-constrained world, 
aggregate utility is only maximised if there is no other allocation of those same resources 
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capable of increasing utility still further.  Unless there is a mechanism through which such 
reallocations can be measured with some degree of objectivity, it becomes impossible to 
compare alternative allocations across the whole economy. 
 
Samuelson (1938) attempted to deal with this problem through the concept of revealed 
preference and linking this with prevailing prices.  The concept postulated that relative 
preferences are revealed by the actual choices of rational decision makers. Therefore, if 
sufficient combinations of relative prices for two goods are presented to the Rational Man, it 
should be possible to develop an extensive locus of points at which he is found to be 
indifferent between the two goods. Such locus points can then be extrapolated to create 
continuous indifference curves (assuming perfect divisibility of goods). At each point along 
such a curve, the rational consumer derives equal levels of utility and so should be indifferent 
between the various combinations offered to him in accordance with the combinations 
represented by a particular indifference curve.  
 
In theory, consumers are assumed to face a range of indifference curves representing 
higher and higher levels of aggregate consumption as they extend outwards (more is again 
preferable to less).  Therefore, curves representing higher levels of consumption also represent 
higher levels of utility. If an income constraint is then applied to the indifference curve space, 
a single point of tangency can be established representing a position of maximum utility from 
the consumption of the two goods in that combination (Figure 2.).  
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Figure 2. Indifference curves with a fixed income constraint 
 
 
To illustrate; the indifference curves labelled a and b represent potential consumption 
combinations of goods x and y in relation to which the consumer is indifferent. In other words, 
a rational consumer would be equally happy to consume any combination of x and y shown on 
any indifference curve as each combination confers exactly the same level of marginal utility. 
When all marginal utilities are positive, higher levels of consumption result in higher levels of 
utility, shown by indifference curves expanding to the right. Therefore, indifference curve b is 
said to “dominate” indifference curve a as, at each point along the curve, it represents a higher 
level of absolute consumption, and hence utility, than any level or combination available from 
curve a. The straight line forming a point of tangency with indifference curve b represents the 
income constraint, the exact slope and position being determined by the relative prices of x 
and y.  Therefore, given that level of income and prevailing relative prices, the consumer can 
consume either 9 units of x and no units of y, or 9 units of y and no units of x. Any point along 
the income line represents possible combinations, assuming that consumption of the goods is 
perfectly divisible (i.e. fractional consumption is possible). Since the rational goal is to 
maximise utility, the consumer chooses the maximum level of consumption possible in 
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accordance with the highest indifference curve for his level of income (curve b). The point of 
tangency between the income line and the indifference curve b therefore represents the 
optimal level of consumption given that level of income. In this example, the consumer would 
choose to consume 4.5 units of x and 4.5 units of y.  By extension, utility can also be related 
directly to relative prices thereby enabling ordinal ranking preferences to be translated into 
monetary-equivalent values, potentially providing a basis to compare utilities across 
consumers. 
 
A further process whereby subjective utility could be transposed to objective values was 
explained in a seminal work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) based upon axioms 
which must hold if behaviour is wholly rational and consistent with maximising expected 
utility.  The result is that the strength of a rational decision-maker’s preferences with regard to 
“sure options” could be measured.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern thus defined the expected 
utility from one lottery Li selected from a set of lotteries L as follows; 
 
EU(Li) =      u(Oik).pik Equation 5 
 
where Oik is the outcome of lottery Li which has the associated probability, pik.  Based upon an 
assumption of consistency across preferences for all lotteries, Li derived from the set L, the 
full set of axioms then takes the following form: 
 
 Completeness: rational decision makers can express a clear preference across all 
paired comparisons such that A is preferred to B (A > B), A is inferior to B (A < B), or 
there is indifference between A and B (A = B).  
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 Transitivity: expressions of preference must be internally consistent. Therefore, if A ≥ 
B and B ≥ C, then A ≥ C (if A = B and B = C then A = C).  
 Continuity: given A ≥ B ≥ C, then there must exist a combination of A and C such that 
B is considered to be at least as attractive as the combination of A and C.  The 
continuity axiom implies that no potential outcome is so negative that a decision-
maker would not be willing to assume a gamble where that outcome was possible if a 
more favourable outcome could also be achieved with a sufficient level of probability.  
Decision-makers are therefore assumed to be sensitive to the probability profiles of 
various lottery outcomes from which they then develop orders of preference capable of 
being represented by a continuous, cardinal preference function. 
 Independence: given A ≥ B, and assuming a probability p  (0,1), then pA + (1 – p) C  
≥ pB + (1 – p) C. Therefore, in the event that two lotteries are combined with a third, 
the expressed preference between those two lotteries, when presented independently, is 
maintained.  Independence therefore implies that two lotteries with the same 
probability of an identical outcome will be evaluated independently of the decision-
maker’s opinion of that outcome; in other words, lotteries with some identical 
characteristics will be evaluated solely on the basis of the characteristics which differ. 
 
It is worth noting that some elements of this derivation of axiomatic behaviour were not 
entirely new. Completeness and transitivity had been referenced by Samuelson (1938), for 
example, who also proposed Non-Satiation, such that more consumption is always preferred 
to less and Convexity, a further mathematical expression of diminishing marginal utility. 
According to this axiom, combinations of any two goods would be preferred to the 
consumption of a single good. All such combinations, in fact, would be considered superior 
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since substitution of one good held in abundance would result in less of a reduction in 
marginal utility than the marginal gain in utility resulting from allocation to the new good.  
 
The axioms provide formal expressions for the conditions implied by utility maximisation 
as an objective.  It can be seen that certain axioms are logically conditional upon others. For 
example, without completeness, transitivity cannot be assumed. Similarly, continuity depends 
upon the validity and existence of the preceding axioms.  The important insight provided by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern lies in the recognition that Rational Man could order the 
probability combinations of all available states, making it possible to express utility in 
monetary form. For example, if a rational agent is found to be indifferent between a 50:50 
chance of winning £10.00 or nothing versus a guaranteed sum of £7.00, the following can then 
be derived: 
 
U(£7.00) = .5U(£10.00) + .5U(£0.00) = .5(10) + .5(0) = 5  Equation 6. 
  
The utility of £7.00 is therefore found to be the equivalent of 5 utiles.  Consequently, it is now 
theoretically possible to transform certain preferences and equivalences into cardinal form 
based upon the perceived value of money.  
 
Certain preferences may not, of course, be transformed directly with such ease in the 
absence of some objective equivalence in the choice set.  For example, a preference for tooth 
ache over back strain does not readily lend itself to such a transformation. Determining a 
monetary amount which provides compensation for either affliction, however, could solve 
such a problem. It is thus the reference back to the common scale which monetary equivalence 
provides which forms the basis for calibrating the utility scale, thereby transforming utility 
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itself into a cardinal measure. The result of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s formulation of 
cardinal utility meant that is was now possible to order risky preferences as easily as riskless 
prospects, at least in principle. Expected utility theory thus became more complete and, 
equally crucially, empirically testable within a coherent framework, an essential consideration 
from a behavioural perspective (Edwards, 1954).    
 
1.4. Empirical Evidence 
 
While theoretical discussions relating to the possibility of measuring marginal utility and 
divining utility functions remained extensive and robust (Friedman & Savage, 1948, op cit; 
Vickrey, 1945), various efforts were also made to investigate behaviour empirically. Such 
efforts naturally tested evidence for classical rational behaviour, revealed preference and the 
existence of behavioural consistency based upon the axioms of expected utility. Testing 
rational behaviour in simple choice tasks often employed series of gambles offering 
straightforward pay-offs defined by assumed probability distributions. Examples of such 
explorations were undertaken by Preston and Baratta (1948) and Mosteller and Nogee (1951), 
both of which are examined below. Choice consistency explored through revealed preference, 
a direct test of Samuelson’s (1938) concept for assessing rationality from observed behaviour, 
was in turn examined in an important paper by Sippel (1997), also considered below.  
 
While Preston and Baratta represents a seemingly straightforward experiment, its 
specification and interpretation of probabilistic choice is flawed. The data is therefore 
presented and interpreted in accordance with the original findings of the authors and then 
reinterpreted on the basis of the correct specification of the choice outcomes. The work is 
included here in order to illustrate how apparently simple propositions can be subject to 
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misinterpretation in terms of expected utility and expected payoff formulations if not correctly 
framed. Mosteller and Nogee pursued the same general theme but with a more robust 
specification.  
 
1.4.1.  Testing Mathematical Probability and Monetary Value: Preston & Baratta 
 
In an attempt to investigate consistency between the psychological interpretation of 
mathematical probability and monetary value, Preston and Baratta (1948) conducted an 
experiment using a purpose-built game of chance. The game was played by a total of 50 
participants, allocated to 20 groups, either in pairs or in groups of 4. Each group was 
presented with a pack of 42 cards with each card representing a unique opportunity to win a 
number of points (the prize) at pre-determined odds (declared probabilities). Six levels of 
prizes were offered (5, 50, 100, 250, 500 and 1000). These were combined with 7 unique 
probabilities of success (0.01, 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 and 0.99). Each individual prize was 
combined with each probability in the notional gamble. The 6 prizes times the 7 probabilities 
therefore made up the total of 42 cards presented to the players, each possible combination of 
prize and probability appearing exactly once in each pack of cards.  
 
Each player was awarded an ‘endowment’ of 4000 points at the start of the game. The 
packs of cards were sorted randomly using Tippett’s random sampling number tables1, with 
each pack used in the game sorted in an identical manner in order to ensure the same sequence 
was followed by each group. Players faced each other around a table and the experimenter 
turned over the first card from the pack, reading the contents of the card (the prize and its 
associated odds) aloud.  The opportunity offered by the card was then auctioned to the highest 
                                                 
1 For a description of Tippett’s random sampling numbers, see Gage (1943) 
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bidder from amongst the participants at that table. There could only be one winner at a 
particular table in each round, therefore2.  The successful bidder then rolled a dice in an effort 
to win a monetary prize equivalent to the value contained on the card. The dice score needed 
to win the prize reflected the probability associated with the gamble (again, the details of this 
were not disclosed).  If the roll of the dice were successful, the player won the value of the 
prize less the level of his bid.  If it were unsuccessful, the player paid for his bid from his pot 
of accumulated ‘funds’ comprising the initial endowment plus any cumulative gain, if any, 
from previous rounds. This procedure was repeated 42 times with every card in the pack 
utilised. The player with the highest cumulative gain at the end was declared the winner, 
receiving an actual prize of either candy, cigarettes or cigars. 
 
No formal statistical analysis was applied to the data with the authors relying primarily 
upon inspection. Unfortunately, the analysis conducted by Preston and Baratta was based 
upon an erroneous interpretation of the propositions contained in the game. Consequently, a 
number of the conclusions appear to be flawed. A reinterpretation of the main results, 
discussed below, does, however, shed some light upon issues relating to psychological 
interpretations of declared probabilities associated with risky gambles. Nevertheless, certain 
caveats remain due to the specification of the experiment itself.  
 
Preston and Baratta presented their findings by comparing mathematically based expected 
values for each of the 42 prospects along with mean winning bids from the 20 separate games. 
On that basis, average winning bids were found to exceed mathematically-based expected 
payoffs in every case where probabilities were low (< .25), regardless of the size of the 
                                                 
2 No details are given on the exact bidding process used, for example, open outcry versus single highest bid. 
Such specifications may have implications for sequential learning for the purposes of bidding strategies as well 
as gaming effects. Since this procedural information is not disclosed, no reliable conclusions with regard to 
possible behavioural impact or biases can be drawn. 
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potential prize. This was reversed for probabilities of .25 and over, where average winning 
bids were all below the applicable mathematical expectation. The size of the potential prize 
did not appear to affect ratios of mean winning bids to expected values, with the authors 
concluding that all prizes with small probabilities of success were psychologically overvalued 
while those with higher probabilities were systematically undervalued. They further 
concluded, based upon extrapolation of the data, that an “indifference point” exists at which 
the mean of successful bids would equate with mathematical expectations, which they inferred 
existed at probability levels at some level below .25. No detail is given on the distribution of 
winning bids as only mean data is used. Similarly, the distribution of non-winning bids and 
evidence for any competitive auction effects were not considered at all. In addition, since no 
statistical analysis was applied to the data, no significant conclusions could be drawn 
concerning any possible intra-group differences. The primary data on which the analysis was 
based is replicated in Table 1. 
 
 
As can be seen from the Table, for probabilities below .25, the ratios of mean winning 
bids to mathematical expected value all exceed unity. This is reversed for probabilities of .25 
and above, with all ratios less than one. There are no obvious, consistent differences in the 
data based upon level of the prize within each probability level. 
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Table 1. Replication of table of results reported in Preston and Baratta (1948) 
 
Mathematical Expectations (E), Mean Successful Bids (V), and Ratio of Bid to 
Expected Payoff (R), For Each Play 
 
Note: The data  is presented in the same format as that used in the original article by Preston and Baratta. 
The mathematical expected payoff (E) is shown for each combination of probability and prize along with 
the mean value of the successful bids (V). The ratio of mean value of bid to mathematical expected payoff is 
also shown (R) 
 
 
There is, however, a significant flaw in the presentation and interpretation of the results 
arising from an incorrect framing of the propositions on which mathematical expected values 
Probability Metric 5 50 100 250 500 1000
E 0.05 0.50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00
0.01 V 0.51 4.44 4.86 12.75 19.59 59.96
R 10.20 8.88 4.86 5.10 3.92 6.00
E 0.25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00
0.05 V 0.98 2.66 5.52 27.27 27.85 85.4
R 3.92 1.06 1.10 2.18 1.11 1.71
E 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00
0.25 V 1.06 10.21 14.74 35.53 114.95 231.25
R 0.85 0.82 0.59 0.57 0.92 0.93
E 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00
0.50 V 1.93 21.84 41.56 110.47 242.80 488.50
R 0.77 0.87 0.83 0.88 0.97 0.98
E 3.75 37.50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00
0.75 V 3.73 29.98 71.88 168.30 304.70 716.40
R 0.99 0.80 0.96 0.90 0.81 0.96
E 4.75 47.50 95.00 237.50 475.00 950.00
0.95 V 3.41 37.71 73.48 161.00 397.80 790.75
R 0.72 0.79 0.77 0.68 0.84 0.83
E 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00
0.99 V 3.67 41.72 84.25 226.35 384.20 913.18
R 0.74 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.78 0.92
Prize
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were derived. Based upon the description of experimental procedures, each card used in the 
experiment presented a single risky gamble. For example, one such gamble would have been 
presented in the following equivalent form: 
 
50% chance to win $500 
 
It is on the basis of that presentation that the mathematical expected value was then calculated 
as $250 (.50 x $500), as shown in the appropriate row and column of Table 1. However, the 
appropriate description of the probability distribution associated with that gamble, which 
follows the actual stated specification of the experiment, is as follows: 
 
50% chance to win ($500 - $Bid)  
50% chance of winning nothing; certain loss of $Bid  
 
The proposition therefore entails two prospects which, as described earlier, are deemed to be 
evaluated separately by the rational decision-maker. 
 
In the formulation presented by Preston and Baratta, the effects of bid costs are ignored, 
effectively assuming the equivalent of free plays with the game aspects and risks of 
competitive bidding removed. Allowing for the impact of bid costs, a bid made at the 
mathematical expected value would result in a combined expected outcome of zero form each 
prospect. Consider, for example, the prospect of a .75 chance of winning $500. This results in 
the following proposition, assuming a maximum bid equal to the mathematical expectation for 
the cost-free proposition: 
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Bid = .75 x $500 = $375 
 
The full, combined proposition can then be expressed as: 
 
($500 - $375) x .75 – (1 – .75) x $375  
 
= $125 x .75 - $375 x .25  
 
= $93.75 - $93.75 = $0 
 
The probabilistic expected net gain in monetary terms is therefore exactly equal to the 
probabilistic loss, making the overall mathematical expected return zero. It has been shown 
earlier that, given a concave utility function, the sum of the utilities associated with uncertain 
gains and losses of equal magnitude is less than zero. Therefore, the proposition that 
equilibrium bids should equate with mathematical expected values of a costless gamble 
would, based upon the parameters of this experiment, imply the assumption of linear, rather 
than concave, utility functions for the rational decision-maker over the specified range of 
values, making them effectively indifferent, or risk seeking, with regard to equivalent gains 
and losses.  
 
A more appropriate interpretation of expected value would assume that the maximum 
willingness to pay, and hence the highest rational bid, is the level which equates the overall 
expected return from the joint prospects with the bid level. Such a proposition conforms with 
the concept of equity within games of chance. This balance is achieved, in all cases, when the 
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maximum bid is equal to one half of the cost-free mathematical expected value. Again taking 
the example of a .75 chance of winning $500, the following example is derived: 
 
Bid = ଵ
ଶ
 ($500 x .75) = ଵ
ଶ
 ($375) = $187.50 
 
The full, combined proposition for expected value is then expressed as: 
 
($500 - $187.50) x .75 – (1 – .75) x $187.50 
 
= $312.50 x .75 - $187.50 x .25  
 
= $234.38 - $46.88 = $187.50 
 
Therefore, at that level of bid, the combined expected return from the two prospects is exactly 
equal to the level of maximum rational bid.  Maximum bids exceeding this level would result 
in an expected return lower than the level of bid submitted based upon the two separate 
prospects, consistent with risk-seeking behaviour, or some other bias. Maximum bids below 
this equilibrium level would provide a mathematical expected return greater than the bid level 
submitted, consistent with risk and loss aversion.  The effect of reinterpreting each of the 42 
propositions on the basis of the mathematical expected return from the evaluation of each 
prospect for each proposition is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Reinterpretation of the tabular results reported in Preston and Baratta (1948) 
 
Mathematical Expectations Assuming Zero Bid Cost (E), Maximum Willingness to Pay Based Upon 
Mathematical Expectation of Net Successful Bid Costs (Bmax), Mean Successful Bids (V) and the 
Ration of Maximum Expected Payoff to Bid (R) For Each Play 
 
 
Note: The data adjusts the original data shown in Table 1 to take account of the full probabilistic outcomes of 
the notional gambles, including bid costs. This creates a new mathematical net expected payoff (Bmax) 
which is then used to derive the ratio of mean bid to expected payoff (R). 
Probability Metric 5 50 100 250 500 1000
E 0.05 0.50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00
Bmax 0.03 0.25 0.50 1.25 2.50 5.00
V 0.51 4.44 4.86 12.75 19.59 59.96
R 20.40 17.76 9.72 10.20 7.84 11.99
E 0.25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00
Bmax 0.13 1.25 2.50 6.25 12.50 25.00
V 0.98 2.66 5.52 27.27 27.85 85.4
R 7.84 2.13 2.21 4.36 2.23 3.42
E 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00
Bmax 0.63 6.25 12.50 31.25 62.50 125.00
V 1.06 10.21 14.74 35.53 114.95 231.25
R 1.70 1.63 1.18 1.14 1.84 1.85
E 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00
Bmax 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00
V 1.93 21.84 41.56 110.47 242.80 488.50
R 1.54 1.75 1.66 1.77 1.94 1.95
E 3.75 37.50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00
Bmax 1.88 18.75 37.50 93.75 187.50 375.00
V 3.73 29.98 71.88 168.30 304.70 716.40
R 1.99 1.60 1.92 1.80 1.63 1.91
E 4.75 47.50 95.00 237.50 475.00 950.00
Bmax 2.38 23.75 47.50 118.75 237.50 475.00
V 3.41 37.71 73.48 161.00 397.80 790.75
R 1.44 1.59 1.55 1.36 1.67 1.66
E 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00
Bmax 2.48 24.75 49.50 123.75 247.50 495.00
V 3.67 41.72 84.25 226.35 384.20 913.18
R 1.48 1.69 1.70 1.83 1.55 1.84
0.75
0.95
0.99
Prize
0.01
0.05
0.25
0.50
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The Table is presented in the same generic form as that replicated from Preston and 
Baratta (1948) employing a similar layout and method. The original expression of 
mathematical expected value (E) is displayed along with the adjusted measure taking account 
of the joint probabilistic outcomes of the propositions (Bmax). The average of the winning 
bids is replicated for each prospect (V). In this case, however, that winning average bid is 
divided by the new measure, Bmax, in order to derive the ratio (R).   
 
Examining the data in Table 2 leads to some conclusions which differ from those implied 
by the original interpretation of the data. In each case, the highest winning average bids 
exceed mathematical expected values. While this effect is again more exaggerated for low 
probabilities (p < .25), the propensity to overbid is not reversed at higher probabilities but is 
present in every prospect. The findings are potentially consistent with the proposition that low 
probabilities are over-weighted systematically by a significant margin. This cannot, however, 
be generalised across all probabilities due to the likely presence of other behavioural effects 
and biases introduced into the experiment, some of which are discussed below. The tendency 
to overbid occurs regardless of the scale of the potential prize, as found originally. Overall, 
such behaviour is consistent with risk seeking rather than risk aversion, implying a convex 
utility function versus the concave function assumed by classical expected utility theory. The 
findings do not support the proposition that prospects were assessed separately with the 
possibility that the framing of the experimental presentation contributed to a general 
willingness to overpay. This would again conflict with the description of Rational Man in a 
close-to-perfect world, able to compute accurately all prospects presented to him. In fact, one 
possibility for the results is that the participants were actually relatively poor in terms of 
computational skills, tending to simplify the prospects to such an extent that they more closely 
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approximated the mathematical basis assumed in the original experiment, adjusted for some 
random bias.   
 
As mentioned before, further detailed analysis of the results is not possible as all of the 
data was not presented. In particular, it could have been informative to examine the 
distribution of all of the bid data in order to ascertain whether the tendency to overbid was a 
general trait attributable to the majority of participants. The more difficult proposition is that 
of disentangling apparent willingness to pay from effects and behavioural biases which may 
have been introduced as a result of the auction and gaming elements present in the experiment 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). For example, each player in each of the 20 groups would have been 
aware of the localised performance of their immediate competitors. Therefore, as the game 
progressed, there could well have been a tendency to bid more aggressively simply due to the 
competitive need to secure the chance of winning a prize, almost on any terms, while, at the 
same time, denying that same opportunity to the other immediate players. This effect could 
have been pronounced since there was a single ultimate prize with no penalty for losing the 
game by a narrow or wide margin. While the data do not suggest that competitive pressures 
varied by level of prize, it is not clear whether individual bidders who had failed to secure the 
opportunity of a prize in earlier rounds of the game became more aggressive in later rounds.  
 
While reservations exist in relation to the construction of the experiment and the 
interpretation of the data, some tentative conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. Regardless of 
causation of bias, the overall behaviour displayed by the participants cannot be considered 
objectively rational on the basis of classical theory which deems any and all biases to be 
irrational. Further, it does appear likely that psychological probability differs from its 
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objective mathematical equivalent, although this behavioural bias is far from proven due to 
the ambiguity associated with the meaning of the results.  
 
1.4.2.  Testing Utility-Based Consistency Across Risky Choices: Mosteller & Nogee 
 
A further experiment designed to measure utility, with some conceptual similarities to 
that of Preston and Baratta was undertaken by Mosteller and Nogee (1951). A small sample of 
15 participants, divided into 3 groups, took part in the experiment, which was conducted over 
a period of 4 months, comprising several sessions. Two-thirds of participants were students 
enrolled at Harvard University while the remaining 5 were recruited from the local National 
Guard. As might be expected, these two groups revealed markedly different characteristics in 
terms of income expectation, employment prospects, educational achievement and family net 
wealth. The game for the experiment was based upon the card game of poker but used dice 
instead of playing cards. Participants could generate their own poker hand by rolling 5 dice, 
the outcomes of which were translated into a type of poker hand.  
 
The game was played in multiple rounds. At the start of each round, participants were 
shown pre-prepared stimulus cards representing a hand of poker. In addition, a potential prize 
was displayed along with an associated cost for gambling against the declared hand. The 
lowest cost for playing the game was set at 5c. Mosteller and Nogee provided an example of 
such a stimulus card as follows: 
 
44441 
$10.00 : : 5c 
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The top line represented a hand at poker, expressed in numeric form. This was the target hand 
to beat for those deciding to accept the gamble. The second line indicated the prize on offer to 
successful participants along with the fixed cost of playing the game. All of the hands 
represented by the stimulus cards and the corresponding fair odds were selected by the 
experimenters from the full set of possible hands. Fair odds were computed for every hand in 
the set. Various offers were used in relation to each hand, ranging from attractive to very 
unattractive propositions based upon fair bets. The arbitrary groups of different hands and 
various different offers were combined to create the full series of games. The order of games 
within a series was randomised before the cards were presented to the participants. Play was 
then continuous with no time lags or intervals introduced between series. 
 
Once a card was presented, participants were asked if they wished to play against that 
hand on the basis of the terms shown; they could either accept or decline. All decisions were 
recorded. Unlike the Preston and Baratta experiment, there was no auction involved in order 
to determine the single player to pursue the gamble and hence no behavioural biases related to 
competitive auctions were introduced. All participants were free to decide to play or pass 
based upon the conditions presented.  
 
In the event that participants elected to play against the prepared hand, they would roll the 
5 dice. If the roll of the dice resulted in a poker hand superior to that of the stimulus card, they 
won the game, receiving the prize indicated. If the result were equal or inferior to the stimulus 
card hand, they lost, incurring a penalty of 5c. Participants accepting the gamble could roll the 
dice in any order. Once the first subject had rolled the dice, none of the decisions to play or 
pass could be revoked. At the start of the game, each participant was given a $1.00 
“endowment” as seed capital. This endowment was in the form of coloured poker chips, the 
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currency used for the game. Additional chips were passed to winning players, according to the 
prize won, with chips removed in the case of losses. In any single game, it was possible for 
any number of the participating players to win, or none at all, depending on the outcome of 
their rolls of the dice. At the end of the game, all of the chips held by players were cashed in 
for actual money.  
 
The experimenters structured the game in three parts. The initial 3 sessions were used to 
teach the participants about the game, with each group meeting after the third session in order 
to learn how to compute probabilities with regard to any hands. In addition, all participants 
received handouts containing all of the true odds which they were required to keep for all 
subsequent sessions. In addition, the participants were given important feedback on the 
collective outcomes from the previous sessions. They therefore saw how often particular 
hands had been played, the results from subsequent rolls of the dice and information on the 
expected number and percentage of wins. Participants then discussed these results with the 
experimenter and could also ask questions about the probability calculations and their 
meaning. This initial phase of the experiment, which Mosteller and Nogee labelled 
“Uncertainty” therefore performed an important educative role while also providing feedback 
on outcomes.  
 
The second part of the experiment proceeded with the participants now in full possession 
of information relating to probabilities for every hand they might play. The experimenters 
referred to this phase of the experiment as “Known Risk”. In each case, the series of hands 
used in the Uncertainty condition were repeated in the Known Risk domain. The experimental 
purpose was now to derive data from which utility curves could be estimated. This required an 
extensive array of propositions to be presented to participants, ranging from some so 
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unattractive that most players refuse to play most of the time to others in which most of the 
players are prepared to play. Since the propensity to play or pass is assumed to be individual-
specific, actual results from earlier sessions were used to tailor series offerings to each group 
to ensure that the maximum amount of information could be derived for each individual 
within the group. The data derived from the later series in the Known Risk phase then became 
the basis for deriving individual utility functions. 
 
The final phase of the experiment involved out-of- data tests of the derived utility curves 
in order to determine how well behaviour could be predicted. The Known Risk condition was 
therefore modified with the introduction of more complex propositions, in what the 
experiments labelled the “Doublet” situation. This entailed offering participants a choice of 
hands, for example: 
 
22263 : : 20c 
66431 : : 3c 
 
This proposition offered participants the chance to bet 5c to play. If the playing participants 
beat the first hand (22263), they received 20 cents; if they failed to beat this hand but 
outperformed the second (66431), they would receive 3 cents. In the event of a failure to beat 
either hand, they lost the stake of 5 cents. Despite the double gamble, a single roll of the dice 
was still employed. Again, in each case, the participants had sheets containing all of the fair 
odds information for each proposition. 
 
Mosteller and Nogee attempted to create utility curves for each subject by extrapolating 
points of indifference with regard to identical hands with varying risky propositions. It might 
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normally be expected that most participants would decline to play very unattractive offers but 
would play attractive ones. By presenting a sufficient array of risky prospects, it should then 
be possible to identify a general area, in terms of risky proposition, in which the decision to 
play or decline is likely to be close to 50:50. Based upon the individual data points for each 
subject, this indifference point was extrapolated.  
 
Significant behavioural bias was found in the data. One subject exhibited such erratic 
behaviour that it proved impossible for any utility curve to be derived while a function 
covering only a limited span of values was possible for two students. Interestingly, all 
participants participated in the gambles, essentially rejecting the certain alternative of $1 
which would have been received simply by doing nothing (other than attending the 
experiment). Differences were observed between the student and National Guard groups, with 
the former showing general risk aversion, consistent with diminishing marginal utility, while 
the latter were strongly risk seeking, consistent with increasing utility from monetary return. 
Performance in the Doublet sessions indicated a high level of confusion resulting in 
inconsistent behaviour versus that predicted from utility curves. Although not part of the main 
experiment, participants were also presented with paired choices, comprising two gambles, 
from which they had to indicate which gamble they would prefer, thus providing a test of 
utility versus monetary value. In this regard, estimated utility curves proved more reliable 
predictors of choice for risk averse participants (the student groupings) than the more risk 
seeking participants.  
 
Overall, Mosteller and Nogee concluded that the derivation of utility curves from simple 
experimental gambles was possible and that these curves could be translated into cardinal 
functions based upon reference points. However, considerable individual differences were 
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found with divergent behaviour between students and National Guards. Students, exhibiting 
general risk aversion, behaved more in accordance with classical expected utility theory, while 
the National Guard group clearly did not. Such findings therefore provided some support for 
the proposition of Friedman and Savage (1948, op cit) that utility curves could exist with 
inflection points, although no such individual examples were observed from the participants 
studied in this experiment. In aggregate, the derived utility curves proved not to exhibit the 
accuracy of prediction which the experimenters had hoped for, although general behavioural 
biases were observed. However, no evidence for the Completeness axiom was found with 
participants making contradictory preference choices, particularly with regard to more 
complex choices. 
 
1.4.3  Testing Decision-Making Consistency Across Available Choice Sets: Sippel 
 
A direct examination of consumer behaviour and revealed preference was undertaken in 
two controlled experiments by Sippel (1997). These experiments, involving a total of 42 
university students, improved upon prior time-series studies which relied upon surveys of 
household weekly expenditure on consumption goods (Koo, 1963; Mossin, 1972). Such 
studies found inconsistent behaviour in terms of consumption patterns, although the 
significance of these findings is open to question as such outcomes could simply be the result 
of changing tastes over time. In contrast, Sippel’s experiments tested choice behaviour at a 
single point in time, thereby eliminating the problem of potentially changing tastes. In 
addition, participants were tested in terms of their individual preferences, thus eliminating any 
group effects, with decisions observed and recorded, hence avoiding potential data bias as a 
result of inaccurate reporting.  
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Participants were presented with a list of 8 consumer goods, comprising various food and 
drink items as well as other goods of a recreational nature (magazines, video clips and a 
computer game). The goods were selected so as to appeal to a wide range of tastes but also to 
enable as fine a division of available notional income as possible, thereby enabling clear and 
precise preferences to be expressed in terms of quantities chosen. The non-food and drink 
items had time-related levels of consumption associated with them. For example, the video 
clips and magazines had implied consumption times of between 30-60 minutes, while the 
computer game had a running time of between 27.5 and 60 minutes. Participants were able to 
divide their income freely meaning that they could purchase a fraction of a video clip, if they 
so desired.  
 
In order to derive meaningful data on preferences and to analyse the internal consistency 
of choices made, 10 different schedules were presented to the participants. The same 8 items 
were used in each schedule but the prices of the items and applicable income constraints were 
varied substantially. All prices and incomes were expressed in terms of nominal monetary 
units, with prices unrelated to those found in actual retail environments. Participants were 
required to select their 10 preferred baskets conditional upon the relative prices presented and 
within their income constraints.  
 
The first experiment, comprising 12 participants, was structured to test homogeneity of 
preference. The approach adopted was to make 2 of the 10 choice sets identical in terms of 
relative price structure across all items. The two sets differed, however, to the extent that all of 
the prices in the second set, as well as the income constraint, were 15% higher than in the first 
set. This replication was made less obvious by varying budget constraints across all 10 series 
and separating the similar sets in the presentation sequence. The expectation, based upon 
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rational behaviour, was that participants would be consistent in their choices across the two 
similar sets by declaring the same preferences in each, both in terms of items included and 
their relative weightings within their respective consumption baskets. 
 
The specification of the first experiment had two income effects. The first resulted 
naturally from varying income constraints across the 10 series. The second, more subtle, 
income effect resulted from the changes in relative prices. Such an effect arises if, for 
example, for any given fixed level of income, the price of one item falls while the prices of all 
other items are held constant. Since the consumer now requires less income to purchase the 
same quantity of items as before, the effect is equivalent to that of an actual increase in 
income with no prices changing and is therefore termed an income effect. In order to eliminate 
this income effect, the second experiment, comprising 30 participants, was designed so that 
any changes in relative prices were completely offset by changes in the budget constraint. In 
order to then test homogeneity of preferences, the various series were presented to the 
participants in such combinations that the basket selected in series one would be affordable in 
later series and so should again be selected if the decision making process is rational. As with 
the first experiment, relative prices were varied across choice sets ensuring that participants 
were unlikely to spot any obvious patterns in the data, which may then have resulted in 
strategic choices in later sets based upon prior expressions of preference. 
 
Participants had unlimited time in the first part of the experiments during which they 
selected their preferred baskets. They could review and change selections as often as they 
wished, including returning to and modifying earlier baskets if required, the only exception 
being the first chosen basket in the second experiment which remained fixed as the reference 
point. In order to help the participants in their selection tasks, they were provided with 
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personal computers and software designed to aid their allocation process. Therefore, 
participants could select the required quantities of any item from the screen and their basket 
would update automatically showing income allocated, based upon prices and quantities, and 
residual income to be allocated. Should budget constraints be violated, a warning message 
would appear. As a further aid, the programme also informed the subject how remaining 
income could be allocated to various items in order to use up all available funds. The 
computational aspects of the experiment were therefore made much easier and less time 
consuming for the participants and also eliminated the possibility of arithmetical error. 
Changes to baskets could be made with ease, ensuring that participants were able to allocate 
most of their time to deciding their preferences rather than being side-tracked in terms of 
performing calculations. Once each of the 10 selections had been finalised, the experimenter 
selected the actual basket to be presented to the subject at random. The subject was then taken 
to the laboratory and invited to consume his goods.   
 
Sippel’s experiments provided a direct test of the practical feasibility of the axioms of 
expected utility as expressed through Samuelson’s concept of revealed preference. The tasks 
presented to the participants in the two experiments represented a typical decision-making 
scenario envisaged by expected utility theory. Obvious biases found in other experiments 
were largely eliminated, particularly in relation to time series impacts on taste shifts.  In 
relation to the first experiment, 11 out of the 12 participants violated the axioms of rational 
choice selection, implying that just one subject could be considered a utility maximiser. Each 
of the other participants showed inconsistency with regard to their choices of bundles in 
identical situations. The only circumstance in which such an outcome might be consistent with 
classical rational behaviour would be in the case of indifference between the chosen bundles. 
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In the second experiment, 22 of the 30 participants were also found to violate the strong 
axioms of revealed preference.  
 
The findings of the experiment directly contradict the assumptions of classical demand 
theory. Examination of the data found that participants were far from random in expressing 
their preferences, spending a considerable time engaging in the selection process. Each of the 
participants revealed strong preferences for certain goods over others, representing clear 
expressions of taste, such that some goods were not chosen at all even at low prices. In other 
cases, participants quite willingly substituted one good for another based upon changes in 
relative prices. On that basis, it is reasonable to assume that participants all selected the 
bundles they genuinely believed they preferred at that point in time. A number of participants 
made repeated changes to their chosen baskets before settling upon their final choices. Even 
when these prior choices were considered, before amendments were made, no improvements 
in overall consistency were found. Sippel thus concluded that, while all of the participants 
were clearly motivated by the experiment, the axioms of revealed preference were 
nevertheless violated by the overwhelming majority. 
 
1.5. Discussion 
 
Collectively, the concept of classical rationality built upon early models of expected 
utility theory faces some challenges based upon the studies referenced.  Indeed, a number of 
the apparent biases identified from the studies are consistent with evidence from other 
empirical investigations of behavioural biases (Hershey, Kunreuther & Schoemaker, 1982; 
Knetsch, 1989; Kühberger , 1998; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Perner, 1999; Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Payne, 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999) and psychological perception 
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(Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004; Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Lattimore, Baker & 
Witte, 1992; March, 1988; Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, 1980; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). In 
practice, decision-makers appear not to rank preferences consistently nor are they found to 
maintain internal consistency with regard to those rankings in accordance with expectations 
based upon the axioms of rational behaviour. Indeed, in both the cases of Preston and Baratta, 
and Mosteller and Nogee, participants appeared to have great difficulty in determining the true 
nature of risky outcomes when presented with more complex tasks. In addition, even when 
provided with objective odds, as in the Mosteller and Nogee experiment, decision makers still 
exhibited bias. Therefore, while general traits such as risk aversion or risk seeking could be 
inferred in some cases, these findings are so non-specific in terms of ability to forecast that it 
is unclear how much value they actually represent.  
 
There is support for the proposition that the psychological interpretation of probabilistic 
uncertainty differs from that of the mathematical measure. However, the empirical evidence 
presented by Preston and Baratta in that regard was somewhat ambiguous as it would appear 
that any such effect was indistinguishable from those of other apparent behavioural biases. 
While it appears possible to derive ex post utility functions based upon specifically generated 
data points derived from observed behaviour, the evidence suggests that subsequent behaviour 
is still likely to diverge from that implied by those functions in terms of future expressions of 
preference. Even allowing for changes in tastes over time, such variability within a relatively 
short testing span makes that presumption less viable. Simply adjusting for the impact of 
psychological interpretations of risk may not be sufficient, therefore, to explain observed, 
apparently inconsistent behaviour.  A similar challenge to the computational efficiency 
implied by basic utility theory is provided by the experiments conducted by Sippel.  
Collectively, therefore, the experiments suggest that decision-makers faced with uncertain 
40 
choices may be prone to error, bias and inconsistency.  Notwithstanding, the next chapter 
considers some major advances in decision-theory including approaches to modelling 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXTENDING RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
 
2.1 Subjective Expected Utility 
 
The axiomatic approach to evaluating preferences across risky options considered in the 
previous chapter represented an important development in the proposition that rational 
decision-makers behave in a manner consistent with utility maximisation.  Essentially, when 
these axioms remain intact (are not violated), the decision-maker can be said to act as if they 
are applying expected utility functions as described by classical rational behaviour (there is, 
however, no assumption that they are actually doing so).  Nevertheless, while the theorems of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) dealt with “sure options”, or “choice under risk” 
(lotteries over which objective probabilistic outcomes are assumed to be known), many 
uncertain choices inevitably require the decision-maker to make assumptions about probable 
outcomes.  Therefore, when there is no objective information about the likelihood of 
particular outcomes, preferences are assumed to be determined based upon paired utility and 
belief-based probability functions.  This proposition forms the basis of subjective utility 
theory (SEU), describing an environment in which choice under uncertainty is resolved by the 
rational decision maker on the basis of their own desires (as defined by their own utility 
function) and beliefs about the likelihood of particular desires being realised (their self-
determined probability function).  On this basis, rational behaviour stems, in part, from the 
consistent application of a decision-makers probabilistic beliefs. 
 
While the proposition of subjective expected utility had been advanced elsewhere 
(Ramsey, 1931, de Finetti, 1937), Savage (1954) provided the most robust and formal 
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manifestation of the theory, again developing axioms of behaviour which, if complied with, 
would be consistent with rational utility maximising objectives.  In accordance with this 
theory, decision-makers face options, similar to prospects or lotteries as described by vNM.  
However, these possible options are not assumed to have assigned objective probabilities but 
are framed on the basis that the likelihood of a particular outcome, or consequence, is 
conditional upon a particular state of the world.  Consequences, can therefore be positive or 
negative from the perspective of the decision-maker while the state of the world which brings 
those consequences about is uncertain and beyond the control of the decision-maker (the 
decision-maker’s choice should not, therefore, have any causal impact upon state).  Savage 
described the various sets of states as events.   On the basis of paired utility and probability 
functions, a decision-maker is then faced with a number of options in relation to which 
preferences are to be distilled.  This is achieved by considering the full set of acts which 
describe all possible consequences as determined by all possible states of the world.  From 
this it may be deduced that acts are functions which map the set of states to the set of 
consequences determined by those states.  The rational decision-maker is assumed to resolve 
all dimensions of the problem, including evaluating all possible combinations of states and 
their associated consequences, resulting in final preferences, based upon desires (utilities) and 
beliefs (self-defined probabilities), which maximise utility.   
 
The process can be summarised as follows:  If we define S as the set of possible states of 
the world and C as the set of possible consequences, we can define f as a function mapping 
elements of S to elements of C.  Therefore, f (si) represents the consequence of f given state si 
where si  S and si  actually occurs.  The subjective expected utility of f is then given by; 
 
SEU(f ) = i u(f (si)).P(si) Equation 7 
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The decision-maker’s confidence in states contained in S is represented by a probability 
function P while the strength of desire for each consequence in C is determined by the utility 
function, u.  The probability and utility function pair (P,u) create the subjective expected 
utility function SEU which defines preferences for all possibilities in F.   
 
Given acts f and g together with an event, E, we can define the act as comprising the 
following payoffs; 
 
 𝑓𝐸𝑔(𝑠) = ൜
𝑓(𝑠)  if 𝑠  𝐸,
    𝑔(𝑠) otherwise  
 
Therefore, the act pays off in accordance with the event f, 𝑠  𝐸, else in accordance with g. 
 
A strict preference order ≥ is identical to a vNM order if acts are ranked on the basis of 
expected utility.  This is the case if there exists a general payoff function across all acts such 
that; 
 
 
f  ≥ g  iff  s u(f (s)).p(s) ≥ s u(g (s)).p(s)  
 
 
Similar to the axiomatic approaches of vNM, Savage derived a number of axioms, 
including the equivalent of completeness (the ability to rank preferences across all choices, as 
in equation 9 above), transitivity and continuity, defined in the previous chapter.  The 
equivalent of the independence axiom was captured by a “Sure-Thing Principal”, stating that 
if a decision-maker would make the same choice regardless of states, then the state becomes 
irrelevant and dominance applies.   Therefore, even if the decision-maker has full knowledge 
of prevailing states, his “Sure-Thing” preferences will proceed in the same manner as if he has 
no information, or expectations, about the states at all.  Just as with the independence axiom 
assumed by vNM, preferences between choices are thus assumed not to be affected by an 
irrelevant third option. 
 
From the overall formulation, Savage contended that determining the preferences of 
decision-makers enabled their beliefs to then also be derived. Therefore, if preferences 
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become known in relation to a sufficiently rich set of choices, actual bets on events indicate 
which event the decision-maker considers to be more likely.  Therefore, any ordering in which 
a preference X >Y is revealed implies that the decision-maker believes that X is more likely to 
pertain than Y.   
 
A simpler method of deriving subjective probabilities was proposed by Anscombe and 
Aumann (1963) using a lottery with an objective probability distribution together with a 
subjective, uncertain lottery.  The former could be any unbiased mechanical device which 
would return independent, random results within a finite domain; they suggested a roulette 
wheel.  The second lottery was framed as a horse race with no a priori information about 
likely outcomes.  This is therefore a compound lottery in which an outcome of one results in 
entry into the other which determines the ultimate prize. Anscombe and Aumann showed that 
the subjective probabilities adopted in relation to the horse lottery could be inferred from the 
preferences derived from the dual lotteries.  As a result, the subjective expected utility 
function reflects combined expectations with regard to the objective probabilities of the 
roulette lottery, with different consequence functions, and the subjective probabilities 
associated with different states (the outcomes of the horse lottery).    
 
The formulations of subjective expected utility provided an essential contribution to the 
understanding of decision-making under uncertainty as they addressed the wide range of 
practical choice problems about which there is no objective probabilistic information.  The 
significant contribution of Savage lay in the extensive development of specific axioms, similar 
to those developed by vNM, enabling metrics for rational behaviour to be established.  As we 
have seen, SEU maximisation requires that decision-makers derive preference orderings over 
all consequences of acts in all cases where acts are not equivalent (“non-null”).  In addition, 
preference orderings must satisfy Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle, the equivalent of the 
independence axiom within vNM expected utility theory.  Only when the full axiomatic 
conditions hold, the final necessary condition for SEU maximisation applies whereby 
preferences over contingent consequence functions induce an ordering of events based upon 
their perceived likelihood.   
 
The existence of axioms, of course, allows normative assumptions to be tested 
empirically thereby addressing the issue of whether decision-makers really do behave as if 
they adhere to utility-based rationality.  Perhaps inevitably, the axiomatic approaches to 
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expected utility and subjective expected utility have been subject to challenge based upon 
both empirical observation and paradoxes.  Two well-known paradoxes are discussed briefly 
below. The first is the Allais’ Paradox, implying violations of the core independence axiom, 
while the second Ellsberg Paradox presents an apparent violation of the axioms of SEU as 
decision-makers appear to prefer risk in situations where probabilities are objectively 
knowable over situations in which they are wholly ambiguous.  The Sure-Thing Principle, in 
which equivalent components of choice options are disregarded, therefore proves somewhat 
problematic. 
 
 
2.1.1 Challenges to Axioms (Allais’ Paradox) 
 
A challenge to the validity of the independence axiom stems from the Allais’ Paradox 
which presents combinations of notional risky gambles in the following form;  
 
A: receive £1,000,000 with certainty. 
 
B:  receive £5,000,000 with probability .1, 
 receive £1,000,000 with probability .89, 
  receive nothing with probability .01. 
 
A further proposition is then presented: 
 
C: receive £1,000,000 with probability .11, 
 receive nothing with probability .89. 
 
D: receive £5,000,000 with probability .10, 
 receive nothing with probability .90. 
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Allais conjectured that the majority of decision-makers preferring option A to B were also 
likely to prefer option D to C.  
 
If it is assumed that decisions relating to risky gambles are made on the basis of 
probability weighted final outcomes, rather than the manner in which those outcomes are 
generated, then these respective choices are in conflict and are inconsistent with expected 
utility theory. This can be shown as follows: 
 
The preference for option A over B implies: 
 
U(£1m) > .1U(£5m) + .89U(£1m) + .01U(£0) 
 
adding [.89U(£0) – .89U(£1m)] to both sides results in: 
 
U(£1m) + .89U(£0) – .89U(£1m) > .1U(£5m) + .89U(£1m) + .01U(£0) + .89U(£0) – 
.89U(£1m) 
 
 reducing to: 
 
.11U(£1m) + .89U(£0) > .1U(£5m) + .9U(£0m) 
 
The expression immediately above is, of course, the equivalent representation of prospects C 
and D. Therefore, anybody preferring option A to option B should also prefer option C to 
option D if they are acting in accordance with expected utility theory. Empirical tests of the 
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Allais paradox were found to support the proposition of preference reversals, although the 
strength of the effect was found to be influenced by context and framing (Burke, Carter, 
Gominiak & Ohl 1996; Camerer, 1989; Conlisk, 1989; Huck & Müller, 2012; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Machina, 1987; Morrison, 1967; Moskowitz, 
1974; Oliver, 2003; Slovic & Tversky, 1974).  
 
The Paradox violates the independence axiom of expected utility due to the assumptions 
regarding common consequence. According to this construct, it is assumed that equal 
outcomes added to two initial prospects should have no effect on original preferences as the 
equal outcomes must also be equivalents in terms of utility and therefore offset one another. 
Independence therefore implies that differentiating components of prospects should be 
evaluated independently of the other common prospects available. This proposition can 
perhaps be explained more clearly by decomposing and reformulating the original 
propositions as follows: 
 
A: receive £1,000,000 with probability .89, 
 receive £1,000,000 with probability .11. 
 
B:  receive £1,000,000 with probability .89, 
  receive nothing with probability .01, 
 receive £5,000,000 with probability .10. 
 
Expressing the second propositions in a similar way, we derive: 
 
C: receive nothing with probability .89, 
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 receive £1,000,000 with probability .11. 
 
D: receive nothing with probability .89, 
 receive nothing with probability .01, 
 receive £5,000,000 with probability .10. 
  
If the common consequences (outcomes) are removed, as assumed by the independence 
axiom, option A reduces to a prospect of winning £1,000,000 with a probability of .11 (£1m, 
.11), which is identical to proposition C. Similarly, both B and D reduce to (£5m, .10). Both 
combinations can therefore be seen to offer the same choices. On that basis, the only rational 
combinations of preferences across both propositions are A:C or B:D, assuming any 
preference at all can be expressed in relation to options A and B .   
 
A similar analysis to that described above was performed by Birnbaum (1999) showing 
that constant consequence paradoxes could also be decomposed on the basis of transitivity, 
coalescing and restricted branch independence. If all three of these properties remained 
inviolate, there would be no inconsistences with regard to outcomes predicated upon expected 
utility theory.  
 
Coalescing assumes that, for any gamble with two or more prospects (probability 
outcomes or branches) yielding identical outcomes, those branches can be combined by 
simply adding the associated probabilities. Therefore, the following option: 
 
A: receive £100 with probability .20, 
 receive £100 with probability .20, 
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  receive £0 with probability .60. 
 
coalesces to: 
 
A1: receive £100 with probability .40, 
 receive £0 with probability .60. 
 
A1 can therefore be termed the coalesced equivalent of A, hence the decision maker 
should be indifferent between A and A1. Assuming that transitivity applies, a circumstance in 
which A1 > A is termed event-splitting (or branch-splitting), and is a violation of coalescing.  
 
Restricted branch independence assumes that, in the case of two gambles with one 
identical probability outcome within one branch of each of the two gambles, those common 
outcomes can be changed in each gamble in an identical manner, thereby keeping the original 
preference unchanged. Therefore, given: 
 
A: receive £100 with probability .10,  > B: receive £200 with probability .10, 
 receive £500 with probability .60,  receive £500 with probability .60, 
  receive £250 with probability .30.  receive £0 with probability .30. 
 
Applying the assumptions of restricted branch independence to eliminate the second branch 
common prospect then implies: 
 
A1: receive £100 with probability .10,  > B1: receive £200 with probability .10, 
 receive £0 with probability .60,  receive £0 with probability .60, 
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 receive £250 with probability .30.  receive £0 with probability .30. 
 
Applying these concepts to the original Allais paradox, and assuming no violations of any 
of the components, results in: 
 
A: £1,000,000 with certainty. > B:  .10 to win £5,000,000, 
 .89  to win £1,000,000, 
  .01 to win £0. 
 
Applying coalescing with transitivity gives: 
 
A1: .10 to win £1,000,000, > B:  .10 to win £5,000,000, 
.89  to win £1,000,000, .89  to win £1,000,000, 
.01  to win £1,000,000,  .01 to win £0. 
 
From restricted branch independence, the following can then be derived: 
 
A11: .10 to win £1,000,000, > B1:  .10 to win £5,000,000, 
.89  to win £0, .89  to win £0, 
.01  to win £1,000,000,  .01 to win £0. 
 
Again applying coalescing with transitivity implies: 
 
C: .11 to win £1,000,000, > D:  .10 to win £5,000,000, 
.89  to win £0, .90  to win £0, 
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Therefore, since A and A1 are equivalent, a rational individual is assumed to be 
indifferent between the two. Therefore, given A > B, then A1 > B is also implied. The 
transition from A1 to A11 together with the transition from B to B1 merely applies an 
equivalent transformation to each of the second branches. Therefore, due to restricted branch 
independence, it is expected that A11 > B1. Finally, coalescing branches with equivalent 
prospects on both sides results in the expectation C > D. Clearly, since the latter was found to 
be violated by the majority of participants, the implication is that one of the three assumptions 
regarding transitivity, coalescing or restricted branch independence must be incorrect.  Such 
decomposition of risky propositions into axiomatic states serves the useful role of enabling 
specific tests to be applied under experimental conditions.  
 
2.1.2 Ambiguity and the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
The Ellsberg Paradox challenges the assumptions of axiomatic behaviour contained with 
subjective utility theory.  According to the latter, decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty assumes that relative preferences between lotteries are uniquely determined by an 
individual’s utility function combined with beliefs in relation to events (represented by a 
subjective probability function). The Ellsberg Paradox instead suggests that most decision-
makers prefer gambles where objective probabilities are known to alternatives where there is 
genuine ambiguity. 
Two problems are presented to illustrate this: In the first problem, two urns contain a 
known number of balls. In urn I, we are told that there are exactly 100 balls which are either 
red (R) or black (B), the actual mix is unknown.  In urn II, we are told that there are exactly 
50 red and 50 black balls.  For a particular lottery, Ci, a ball is drawn at random from urn i,  i  
= I or II.  The player receives $100 if the ball selected at random is one of the two possible 
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colours.  Ellsberg predicted that, since nothing is known about the number of red and black 
balls in urn I, most decision-makers would be indifferent with regard to their choice of colour. 
Since the number of red and black balls in urn II is the same, decision-makers should again be 
indifferent as to their choice of colour since there is an equal probability of returning either a 
red or a black ball.  In other words; 
RI ~ BI and RII ~ BII.   
However, while Ellsberg expected most decision-makers to be indifferent as to colour choice, 
he did not expect them to be indifferent regarding the choice or urns, instead preferring RII to 
RI and BII to BI.  This is clearly contradictory since RI ~ BI implies equal subjective 
probabilities of 0.5, while the suggested preferences with regard to urns would imply a 
probability of less than 0.5 in relation to one colour. 
In the second problem, there is a single urn containing 90 balls.  Exactly 30 balls are red 
(R) while the remaining 60 balls are either black (B) or yellow (Y), the precise number of 
each being unknown.  One ball is to be drawn at random from the urn.  There are four 
lotteries offered; 
 
A1: Receive $100 if R, otherwise $0 
A2: Receive $100 if B, otherwise $0 
B1: Receive $100 if R or Y, otherwise $0 
B2: Receive $100 if B or Y, otherwise $0 
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30
R B Y
A1 100 0 0
A2 0 100 0
B1 100 0 100
B2 0 100 100
60
Ellsberg predicted that most decision-makers would express a preference for A1 over A2 but 
would prefer B2 over B1.  Such behaviour contradicts Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle, shown 
as follows; 
Assume:  f,  f ~,  g,  g ~ are lotteries and S is an event.   
Then if, given S,  f = g and f ~ = g ~ and, in the case  ~S (not S), f = g and g = g ~, then f is 
preferred to f ~ if and only if g is preferred to g ~. 
The contradiction perhaps becomes most easily apparent if we represent the lotteries in 
tabular form; 
Table 3. Representation of the Ellseberg Single Urn Lotteries 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability associated with R is of course known (1/3). The probability of any positive 
payoff associated with either B or Y is ambiguous and could range between 2/3 to zero for 
either (there are either 60 black balls and no yellows or vice versa).  A rational decision-
maker will therefore only prefer A2 to A1 on the basis that his subjective probability for B is 
higher than the known probability of R, meaning that he considers the likely number of black 
balls to be higher than the known number of red balls.  If that is the case, he should then also 
prefer B2 to B1 since the aggregate of black and yellow balls must be greater than the sum of 
red and yellows. By the same logic, a preference: A1 > A2 also implies B1 > B2.  The same 
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conclusion is reached if we consider the problem assuming S = R U B.  We then see that the 
outcomes for Y in the two paired lotteries represent common consequences. On that basis, the 
preference: A1 > A2 must again imply B1 > B2.   
The Ellsberg Paradox is not only inconsistent with the Sure-Thing Principle, but also 
violates First Order Stochastic Dominance. This axiom states that a random variable A is 
statewise dominant over another random variable B if, for any consequence or outcome x, A 
gives at least the same likelihood of achieving x as B, and a higher probability of achieving x 
in at least one state.  We may express this as:  
P[A ≥ x] ≥ P[B ≥ x] for all x and P[A ≥ x] > P[B ≥ x] for at least one x. 
Applying this to the lotteries, we know for certain that P(R) = 1/3 and P(B U Y) = 2/3.  
Choosing A1 over A2 implies P(R) > P(B).  Therefore, P(R U Y) = 1 – P(B) > 2/3.  A 
preference for B2 over B1 therefore violates the First Order Stochastic Dominance axiom 
given A1 > A2.  The violations of axioms in accordance with the Ellsberg Paradox imply that 
decision-makers display aversion to uncertainty and ambiguity; when faced with a choice 
between gambles with objective probabilities and those with ambiguity, they prefer to bet on 
the former.   
 
The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes challenge various axioms of normative theories of 
rational behaviour.  While both call into question the validity of the core independence 
axiom, the latter has important implications with regard to the presence of ambiguity in 
decision choices. Both imply biases in the decision-making process such that, under certain 
conditions, individuals may not apparently behave in accordance with utility maximising 
objectives.  Empirical evidence supporting the paradoxical outcomes inevitably led to 
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extensive reconsideration of the how decision-makers evaluated risk, ambiguity and pay-offs.  
In some cases, greater consideration was given to the process by which decision-makers 
arrived at choices. These efforts ultimately lead to even more robust theories of decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 
2.1.3.  Possible Explanations for Axiomatic Violations  
 
Violations of normative theories of utility maximising behaviour appear to suggest that 
behavioural factors influence attitudes to uncertain choices.  In effect, decision-makers appear 
to draw categorical distinctions between payoffs which are certain, possible, or highly 
improbable.  The concept of a continuous utility function able to differentiate objectively 
between payoffs across all levels of risk is therefore open to question.  The most obvious 
inconsistencies appear to lie at the extremes; either modelling potentially high, risky payoffs 
against certain alternatives or when considering potential outcomes with vanishingly small 
likelihoods.   
 
In practice, decision-makers appear not to evaluate risky choices in isolation but apply 
some context with regard to consequences.  The most obvious component of the latter appears 
to be related to changes in wealth states.  Therefore, many individuals are prepared to play 
objectively unfair gambles in the form of lotteries offering extremely low probabilities of a 
high return as that high return is likely to be transformative in terms of wealth state while 
refusing to accept even small risks with relatively insignificant payoffs (Baillon & Bleichrodt, 
2012).  Conversely, already wealthy individuals may place greater importance upon 
preserving that wealth state, leading to a subjective over-discounting of risk.  In such 
circumstance, risk preferences can be explained by the application of subjective functions 
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w(p) which weight the probability p of risky events.  The willingness to bet on a particular 
event E can then be defined by; w(p(E)), which may differ from p(E).   
 
Elements of this become clear if we re-examine the basic proposition advanced by Allais 
in which decision-makers are presented with the following paired choices; 
 
A: receive £1,000,000 with certainty. 
B:  receive £5,000,000 with probability .1, 
 receive £1,000,000 with probability .89, 
  receive nothing with probability .01. 
and 
C: receive £1,000,000 with probability .11, 
 receive nothing with probability .89. 
D: receive £5,000,000 with probability .10, 
 receive nothing with probability .90. 
 
A preference for option D over option C is, of course, consistent with probability weighted 
expected payoffs assumed by expected utility theory; the expected payoff associated with 
option C being £110,000 while that of D is £500,000. This is, however, reversed in the case of 
preferring A to B;  the expected monetary payoff from B is £1.39m (£500,000 + £890,000), 
while A guarantees a risk free return of £1m.  
 
Loss aversion and the certainty effect, overweighting certain outcomes relative to those 
which are considered only to be objectively probable (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), have 
been suggested as explanations for axiom violations.  Bell (1982) has extended this to include 
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regret. Thus, when comparing risky options with those with certain outcomes, decision-
makers consider the disappointment they might feel should the actual outcome from the risky 
choice fall short of probabilistic expectations. Both loss aversion and anticipated regret as a 
consequence of actual outcomes are thus assumed to apply a higher discount rate to risky 
prospects notwithstanding knowledge of objective probabilities.  Loss aversion can also 
appear to align with regret in the form of opportunity cost. Thus, given the propositions 
presented by Allais, while there is no possibility of an actual loss being incurred, there is a 
clear potential opportunity cost in relation to the alternative foregone. Consequently, 
accepting the gamble represented by prospect B involves the opportunity cost associated with 
rejecting the certain receipt of £1m represented by prospect A.  If the certain return of £1m is 
deemed by the decision-maker to be sufficiently transformative in terms of wealth states, the 
basis exists for the subjective preference for A over B notwithstanding the mathematically 
higher expected payoff associated with the latter.  An issue remains in relation to how such 
behaviour can be generalised in model form. 
 
One generalised framework for overcoming the restrictions of standard additive 
approaches has been proposed using a Choquet Integral to accommodate multi-criteria 
decision-making (Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant 2002).  The model involves applying a 
non-extreme-outcome (neo-additive) function to model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes 
towards uncertainty, overweighting best and worst outcomes, while also applying weights to 
interactions between decision-criteria.  The aggregate function (Choquet Integral) is defined 
with respect to a set function acting on all possible combinations of a set of criteria.  As 
indicated, weights (defined as fuzzy measures) are applied across explicit decision criteria and 
also interactions between combinations of decision criteria.  The latter provides significant 
flexibility when distinguishing between preferences.   
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Price Cleanliness Service
Hotel A 0.7 0.6 0.9
Hotel B 0.6 0.7 0.9
Hotel C 0.6 0.7 0.4
Hotel D 0.7 0.6 0.4
A practical example of the process is provided by Li, Law, Vu, Huy quan and Rong, 
(2013), explained briefly as follows: a traveller selecting a hotel has identifies a number of 
criteria which will be used to arrive at a preference ordering between the various options.  
Assume that three criteria are deemed the most important: price; cleanliness and service. On 
that basis, four possible hotels are identified and the traveller has assigned utility values 
against each of the three criteria for each hotel. This results in the following; 
Table 4. Hotel Choices With Utility Scores Assigned to Decision-Criteria 
 
 
 
It might be concluded straight away that; A > D and B > C.  In order to make a final 
decision, the pairs A v B and C v D must still be evaluated.  In order to achieve full rankings, 
preferences for combined criteria might be considered.  For example, assuming that service 
levels are high (A and B above), price may then be considered the most important secondary 
criterion.  On that basis, Hotel A would be ranked higher than Hotel B.  However, in the case 
where service is relatively poor (C and D), cleanliness may be considered more important 
than price.  Applying these filters, we would then find the following preferences; A > B > C > 
D.  Standard additive weighting models would not explain this outcome. For example, if 
wp,wc and ws are taken to represent unequal weights applied to each of the three criteria, the 
preference for A > B implies wp  > wc.  However, the order C > D holds only when wp  < wc.  
This therefore fails to explain the observed preference of the decision-maker. 
The failure of the simple additive model stems from the fact that it assumes that the 
criteria are mutually independent. If, however, we allow utility-deriving interactions between 
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Criteria Groups Weight
v ( ) 0
v ({price}) 0.4
v ({cleanliness}) 0.3
v ({service}) 0.75
v ({price, cleanliness}) 0.2
v ({price, service}) 0.9
v ({cleanliness, service}) 0.6
v ({price, cleanliness, service}) 1
Hotel A Hotel B Hotel C Hotel D
C( 0.73 0.7 0.59 0.58
the criteria, a solution can be found.  Given utilities associated with a set of N criteria, N = 
{x1, x2, x3}, a fuzzy measure, v, represents weightings across all criteria;  v({1}), v({2}) and 
v({3}) together with all interactions between the criteria; v({1, 2}), v({1, 3}),  v({2, 3}) and 
v({1, 2, 3}).   The discrete Choquet Integral (CI) for each fuzzy measure, v, is then given by; 
Cv(X) = ∑ 𝑥(𝑖)௡௜ୀଵ  [v({ j  xj ≥ xi }) - v({ j  xj ≥ xi+1 })] Equation 8 
where x(1), x(2),….. x(n) is an ordered (non-decreasing) permutation of the input x. 
Assuming the following with regard to fuzzy measures; 
Table 5. Fuzzy measures across all choice  criteria permutations 
 
 
 
 
Applying the weights above to the formula in Equation 8 gives; 
Table 6. CI-derived combined weight utilities for each option 
 
 
On this basis, the preference ranks: A > B > C > D is derived in accordance with observed 
preferences. 
Multi-criteria-decision models of the type described above are potentially promising 
approaches when clear decision criteria can be derived or inferred.  In particular, they offer 
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solutions to more basic additive models which can fail to explain preferences across choices 
with multiple utility-inducing attributes.  By allowing for the expression of general 
preferences within the context of ambiguity, the models relax Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle.  
By allowing greater probability weights to be applied to the best and least favourable options, 
CI-derived models enable potentially problematic behaviours at the extremes of normal utility 
functions to be more easily accommodated.   Similarly, a preference for certainty with 
minimum payoff over higher-potential payoff risky options can also be accommodated.   
Application of the models empirically is, however, a potentially complex task as, in many 
cases, attributes and criteria can be extensive. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to 
apply the approach to practical decision tasks (Büyüközkan, Feyzioğlu, & Göçer, 2018).  
 
2.2. Discussion 
 
The current chapter discussed significant advances to expected utility theory, describing 
some key approaches to modelling uncertainty and ambiguity.  Challenges to axiomatic 
approaches to behaviour were considered along with further developments of more complex 
models with elements relating in part to process as well as outcome.  In that regard, multi-
criteria-decision models were found to offer a flexible framework from which inferences 
about preferences relating to complex structures of criteria and their interdependencies could 
be derived.  Such models offer significant advantages over and above simple additive 
probabilistic models and provide a basis for resolving some of the more challenging 
paradoxes which had called into question key assumptions of axiomatic behaviour.  
 
Psychological explanations for apparently irrational behaviour and possible sources of 
bias were also considered.  Reference was made to the possible role which prospective 
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changes in wealth states might play when decision-makers evaluate uncertain outcomes.  The 
concept of changes in wealth, as opposed to its quantum, is present in the early literature, 
although it remained relatively underdeveloped for some time in terms of a robust framework.  
The concept itself implies that decision-makers may attach importance to reference points, 
evaluating preferences in relation to those reference points and more general goals.  This has 
significance in terms of how utility might be expressed.  The next chapter takes up this theme, 
covering one of the most significant advances in modelling behaviour in the form of Prospect 
Theory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROSPECTS, CUMULATIVE PROSPECTS & REFERENCE POINTS 
 
3.1. Markowitz Value Function 
In his seminal work on portfolio optimisation, Markowitz (1952) advanced the 
proposition that risky preferences should be framed not on the basis of total ending wealth but 
in relation to prospective changes from reference points. If starting levels of wealth are used 
as reference points then judgments about risky prospects would be made on the basis of 
expected outcomes in comparison with those points3.  In general terms, expected final wealth 
(F) is then a function of the starting reference point (r) plus a prospective change,  relative 
to that reference point; F = r + Expected utility theory would assume that rational 
decision-makers choose risky options which maximise the expected value payoff in , 
conditional upon the available choice set.  Assuming that r is a certain, risk-free alternative to 
any risky gamble xi; we can define the rational objective as maximising; EV(r + xi ) > r. In the 
event that r is not risk-free, but is independent in outcome with regard to xi, then a further 
term, ∆r~, can be added.  Expected ending wealth is then a function of expected payoffs to all 
xi plus the starting value and expected payoff in r.   
 
Markowitz proposed that loss aversion, risk-seeking and risk-aversion could be modelled 
within an overall value function.  This was achieved by replacing the standard utility function, 
predicated upon quantum states of cumulative wealth, with a loss-averse value function 
defined in terms of changes in wealth measured against a reference point.  This concept was 
                                                 
3 It is often assumed that reference points represent status quo positions, implying that they are certain 
alternatives against which risky choices are evaluated.  This is not a necessary assumption as other reference 
points can be assumed. Indeed, Markowitz highlighted the general lack of theory relating to the location of 
reference points. Furthermore, starting wealth levels may not be risk free to the extent that they may themselves 
be subject to various outcomes according to states.    
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illustrated using a four-segment value function defining changing risky preferences 
conditional upon the magnitude of risky prospects. Thus, when outcomes are large, it was 
hypothesised that individuals would be risk-averse with regard to gains but risk-seeking with 
regard to losses. These risk preferences were expected to reverse with small to moderate 
outcomes. The value function then increased monotonically with three inflection points, 
transitioning from concave and convex segments along the curve, reflecting shifts in risk 
preferences as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Markowitz four-fold value function, depicting transitions in risky preferences.  
 
Markowitz value functions are of course unique to individual decision-makers conditional 
upon their subjective probability beliefs which might render them either overly optimistic or 
pessimistic with regard to risky choices.  However, despite laying these foundations, 
Markowitz undertook no formal empirical investigation of the four-fold value function and 
provided no derivation of possible decision-weights to explain over- and underweighting of 
risk based upon preferences.  The role of subjective probability preferences was, however, 
discussed in general terms in a later work (Markowitz, 1968). 
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3.2. Prospect Theory & Rank-Dependent Utility 
 
The important foundations of Markowitz described above can be traced through to one of 
the most significant developments in approaches to behavioural decision-making in the form 
of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; for a comprehensive critique and review, 
see: Wakker, 2010).  Prospect Theory provides a systematic framework for describing 
decision-making under conditions of risk while simultaneously accommodating a number of 
observed behavioural biases with regard to subjective preferences.  The theory is based upon 
two primary tenets; reference dependence and subjective weighting (“probability distortion”).   
 
From a series of experiments, Kahneman and Tversky identified widespread violations of 
the axioms of expected utility theory, similar to those identified by Allais and others.  In 
addition, they noted that preferences between prospects were influenced by changes in wealth 
rather than simply its quantum, consistent with the proposals of Markowitz. Similarly, 
individuals were found to underweight outcomes which were only probable when a certain 
alternative was presented (the “certainty effect”), implying categorical differentiation of 
payoffs based upon their perceived degree of likelihood.  The same effect was found to trigger 
risk-aversion in relation to choices involving gains and risk-seeking behaviour in choices 
involving certain losses. Branch effects were also apparent as common components of 
prospects appeared to be ignored. Kahneman and Tversky termed this an “isolation effect”.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky formulated a two-stage model in relation to simple prospects 
involving monetary outcomes. The first stage related to the mental editing (framing) of 
prospects, essentially reducing the components of various branch options contained within 
prospects into simplified forms. Such editing was assumed to include the identification of 
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reference points against which gains or losses could be assessed along with coalescing, 
whereby the decision maker aggregates individual probabilities associated with identical 
outcomes. It was further assumed that risky components of prospects would be separated from 
any risk-free components. Finally, individuals were assumed to disregard (“cancel”) 
components common across all prospects, thus reducing choice to the subset of differences 
between prospects. This editing stage was then assumed to lead to a second evaluation stage in 
which the filtered prospects are considered and ranked.  
 
Similar to Markowitz, reference dependence is modelled formally by a monotonically 
increasing value function v : ℝ → ℝ defined on the basis of changes in wealth states in which 
v(0) = 0.  The function is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A representative prospect theory value function.  
 
Diminishing marginal utility applies to gains while diminishing marginal disutility applies to 
losses. Loss aversion is defined for all x such that: v(x) < -v(-x).   The function differs in the 
domain of gains and losses so that v (x) = v~(x) for all x ≥ 0 and v (x) = -v~(-x) for all x < 0.  
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The degree of loss aversion is therefore captured by and applies in all cases where 
Where general loss aversion exists, the slope of the value function is steeper in the 
domain of losses than for gains.  Consequently, no rational decision-maker with loss aversion 
should accept a gamble offering (x, p = 0.5; -x, p = 0.5) over (x, p = 1) when x ≠ 0.  Similarly, 
if 0 < x < y, then decision-makers should typically express the following preference: (x, 0.5; 
-x, 0.5) > (y, 0.5; -y, 0.5), implying that overall aversion to risk is greater than that implied by 
the concave utility function alone.      
 
In addition to a value function, Prospect Theory incorporates a weighting function which 
is assumed not only to reflect the perceived likelihood of an outcome but also the perceived 
impact an outcome might have on the desirability of prospects.  Framed in this manner, 
weights are not necessarily assumed to obey probability axioms nor are they simply an 
expression of belief as to the likelihood of outcomes.  The weighting function serves, 
however, to distort any underlying probability function so that; w(p(X)) ≠ p(X).  The shape of 
the value function shown in Figure 4 above is then consistent with the proposition that low 
probabilities are overweighted (w(p) > p, for low p), while moderate to high probabilities are 
underweighted (w(p) < p).  The overall weighting function is assumed to be an increasing 
function of p with; wand wssuming regular prospects, neither strictly 
positive nor strictly negative in outcome, the overall value of a prospect can then be shown as; 
 
V(x1, p1,……….. xn, pn) =     wpi) v (xi) Equation 9 
 
The original formulation of Prospect Theory found considerable empirical support (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985; Budescu & Weiss, 1987; Chang, Nichols & Schultz, 1987; Elliott & 
Archibald, 1989; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Gregory, 1986; Meyer & Assuncao, 1990; 
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Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, 1984; Loewenstein, 1988).  Nevertheless, under certain 
circumstances, preferences may violate the First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) axiom.  
For example, if we are presented with two prospects: (10 + x, 0.5; 10, 0.5) and (10, 1), where 
x > 0, the former must dominate the latter assuming FOSD.  The rational decision-maker 
should therefore always express a preference for the risky gamble over the certain alternative 
since the risky gamble is guaranteed to return at least the same amount as the certain 
alternative while offering the potential of a higher return in at least one state.  However, in 
accordance with Prospect Theory, the prospects are evaluated as follows: w(0.5)v(10 + x) + 
w(0.5)v(10) and v(10).  If the weighting function is such that w underweights objective 
probability (w(0.5) < 0.5), then it is possible to find a value for x small enough that: 
w(0.5)v(10 + x) + w(0.5)v(10) < v(10), thereby violating FOSD.  
 
Birnbaum & Navarrete (1998) confirmed the violation with an experiment offering the 
following prospects: 
 
A : = (96, .85; 90, .05; 12, .10) 
B : = (96, .90; 14, .05; 12, .05)  
 
Rational decision-makers would be expected to prefer B, (EV(B) = 87.7) over A,  (EV(A) = 
87.3).  In the event, it was found that 70% of participants preferred A to B.  However, it 
appears that the apparent “decision-errors” stemmed primarily from the framing of the 
prospects as the percentage of choice violations dropped to almost zero when the same 
prospects were subsequently presented in the following form, making comparisons easier; 
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A : = (96, .85; 90, .05; 12, .05; 12, .05) 
B : = (96, .85; 96, .05; 14, .05; 12, .05) 
 
Notwithstanding, potential violations of axiomatic behaviour caused by the weighting 
function remain possible.  In fact, the proposition holds whether w(0.5) < 0.5 or w(0.5) > 0.5.  
Therefore, monotonicity can only be guaranteed when w(0.5) = 0.5 or, more generally, w(p) = 
p for all p  [0, 1].  To that extent, the formulation of Prospect Theory allows for the 
possibility that FOSD will be violated in certain circumstances. 
 
A general solution to empirical axiomatic violations of Prospect Theory (and also those of 
EU and SEU theories) is provided by models of rank-dependent utility (RDU).  RDU assumes 
that the decision-weights assigned to prospects are a function of their ranking within the 
distribution of all feasible outcomes.  Quiggin (1982) applied such a model to show that 
FOSD was eliminated by transforming cumulative probabilities into a new rank-dependent 
cumulative distribution assuming that the sum of the decision-weights equalled 1.  One of the 
major distinctions between Prospect Theory and RDU, therefore, is that the former implies the 
transformation of each probability into a decision-weight, whereas the latter transforms the 
complete cumulative distribution.  The process by which probability distortion occurs is 
therefore fundamentally different.  
 
This can be explained by considering a lottery, L, paying prospects xi with probability pi. 
We assume a strict order such that x1 < x2 < x3 < ……., and all pi ≥ 0, subject to  ∑ 𝑝𝑖ஶ௜ୀଵ  = 1. 
We then define a strictly increasing utility function as: u : ℝ → ℝ along with a weighting 
function w, leading to the following general expression for decision weights; 
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i =  w(           pj)  - w(            pj)  ,  i = 1, 2, 3,……… Equation 10 
 
The rank-dependent utility of the lottery L unique to the deicion-maker can then be expressed 
as; 
 
RDU (L) =           i u (xi) Equation 11 
 
Given that w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is strictly increasing, a rank-dependent cumulative distribution 
then exists which allows decision-weights, i, to be treated in the same way as probabilities. 
The result is a value function which reflects preferences across all prospects according to the 
weights assigned on the basis of the salient features of those prospects.  Therefore, 
disproportionate weightings on the lowest and highest outcomes can be accommodated along 
with general preferences relating to risk aversion or risk seeking across the value function. 
RDU is therefore capable of accommodating behavioural biases without violating the axiom 
of FOSD.   
 
3.3. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
Evidence of potential axiomatic violations of Prospect Theory (PT), along with the 
practical solution proposed by rank-dependence models, led Kahneman and Tversky (1992) to 
develop a more refined model of PT based upon the two elements.  Therefore, Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT) emerged as a more robust framework for analysing decisions under 
risk and uncertainty.  As with the original formulation, prospects are assumed to be evaluated 
relative to a reference point.  Consequently, the normalisation of a reference point to zero 
enables losses to be defined as any negative outcomes relative to the reference point and gains 
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as positive outcomes against the same benchmark.  Prospects are rank-ordered across a value 
function such that; 
 
f  : = (x1, P1; ….. xk, Pk; xk+1, Pk+1;…; xn, Pn) Equation 12 
where;  x1 < …… <  xk+1  < ……. < xn 
 
As with PT, individuals are assumed to hold different preferences with regard to gains 
and losses.  Negative and positive domains of f can therefore be represented as: 
 
f +  : = (0, P1 ∪ … ∪ Pk ; xk+1, Pk+1;…; xn, Pn) 
f -  : = (x1, P1;…; xk, Pk ; 0;   Pk+1 ∪ … ∪ Pn) 
 
 where;  P1 ∪ … ∪ Pi  defines a prospect with an outcome equal to or less than Pi. 
 
The assumption of sign dependence means that independence can only be satisfied within 
each preference-ranked sign set.  The preference weightings with regard to the positive and 
negative components of a prospect can be represented as; 
 
i+ = W+(Pi ∪ … ∪ Pn) - W+(Pi+1 ∪ … ∪ Pn), for i = k+1, …….., n, and; 
i- = W-(P1 ∪ … ∪ Pi) – W-(P1 ∪ … ∪ Pi-1), for i = 1, …….., k 
 
W+ and W- are the separate weighting functions applied to prospective outcomes in the 
domains of gains and losses relative to the reference point.  Sign dependence then implies that 
decision weights relating to purely positive or negative prospects sum to one. Therefore; 
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         i =     [W(Pi ∪ … ∪ Pn) - W(Pi+1 ∪ … ∪ Pn)] =  Equation 13 
 
W(P1 ∪ … ∪ Pn) = W(S) = 1 
 
However, such a summation of decision weights across mixed prospects does not necessarily 
hold meaning that, in such cases, the sum of weights can be less than one (termed 
subcertainty).  Nevertheless, monotonicity is preserved by the strict rank-dependent ordering 
applied to each domain.  It is now possible to represent a prospect under CPT as; 
 
V(f) =      i - v(xi) +     i + v(xi) Equation 14 
 
where v is a strictly increasing continuous value function with v(0) = 0. 
 
The subjective value of a prospect described by the weighted probability measure p can then 
be shown as; 
 
V(p) : = ∫ 𝑣଴ିஶ (x)      (v(F(x))) dx + ∫ 𝑣
ାஶ
଴ (x)     (-v(1 - F(x))) dx Equation 15 
 
where v is a value function, w is the weighting function and ∫ 𝑑𝑝௫ିஶ  is a continuous, 
increasing cumulative distribution function for all values to x. 
 
3.3.1. Determining Reference Points 
 
While risk under CPT is derived from a combination of three elements: the individual’s 
basic utility function; unique decision-weights; and loss aversion, the weighting and 
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reference-dependent value functions are predicated upon the location and nature of the 
reference point. Determining the reference point is actually critical to the theory as it is that 
which, along with rank-ordering of prospects within the positive and negative domains, 
ensures that FOSD is maintained despite subcertainty (the sum of decision weights being less 
than one with respect to mixed prospects).  Yet, CPT, like its predecessor, PT, is silent about 
how reference points are actually derived.   
 
In his earlier work, referenced at the start of this chapter, Markowitz spoke of “customary 
wealth” as a potential reference point but had no method of deriving this in the case that it 
diverged from starting wealth.  For their part, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) also considered 
that a reference point would typically correspond with a “current wealth position”, although 
suggested that this could be modified by expectations or aspirations. In general, therefore, 
reference points were largely assumed to default to a status quo position or were considered to 
be psychological in nature. This lack of clarity clearly hinders empirical testing of a reference-
dependent theory such as CPT as it allows too much latitude in terms of specification; the 
theory might be adapted to fit most observed outcomes.   
 
In practice, there is ample scope for decision-makers to set single or even multiple 
reference points and to shift or modify them over time. Similarly, while CPT appears to imply 
that a status quo reference point is a certain alternative to risky prospects, there is no reason to 
assume that they cannot be stochastic. Indeed, stochastic reference points are assumed when 
those reference points involve expectations (Koszegi & Rabin, 2006).  Since expectations can 
be assumed to involve uncertainty, prospects can then be considered as elements within 
lotteries offering an array of potential payoffs.  The comparison can then be made with an 
alternative lottery which provides the relative reference points.  Therefore, if we define a 
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lottery, L, offering N possible outcomes with associated probabilities, p; L = (x1, p1, …. xn, pn), 
subject to ∑ 𝑝௡௜ୀଵ i = 1, there exists a reference lottery, R, with M potential outcomes; R  = (r1, 
q1, …. Rm, qm), subject to ∑ 𝑞௠௝ୀଵ j = 1.  Decision-makers then evaluate the prospects contained 
in L against those found in R in the following manner; 
 
U(L | R) = ∑ 𝑝௡௜ୀଵ i [u(xi) + v(xi | R)] Equation 16 
 
where, u(xi) is the expected utility from outcome xi and v(xi | R) measures the utility 
(subjective value) associated with the gain or loss from outcome xi measured relative to 
the outcome distribution in R. 
 
Loomes and Sugden (1986), modelling disappointment aversion, applied such a model 
whereby xi was assumed to be compared with a summary statistic from R such that; 
 
v(xi | R) = (u(xi) – ( ∑ 𝑞௠௝ୀଵ , u(xj)) Equation 17 
 
Koszegi & Rabin (2006) proposed a more general model in which each xi is compared with 
every prospect in R; 
 
v(xi | R) =  ∑ 𝑞௠௝ୀଵ j  u(xi) – u(xj) Equation 18 
 
Therefore, xi > xj represents a gain over all such elements in R, while; xi < xj represents a loss. 
The assumption is that lottery L is then viewed on the basis of an assessment of all gains and 
losses relative to the elements in R. 
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Note that, while both approaches combine classic utility from consumption with utility 
associated with a gain or loss, they make different predictions based upon an individual’s 
preferences relating to gains and losses.  This becomes apparent if, for example, there is an 
increase in risk associated with R which does not affect the decision-maker’s utility with 
regard to R. Assuming the prospect comparisons in Equation 17, a change in risk in R should 
have no impact on overall expected behaviour.  However, under the broader formulation of 
comparisons in Equation 20, an increase in the risk of R should make the decision-maker 
correspondingly more willing to accept risk in L, creating a type of endowment effect with 
respect to risk.  
 
Koszegi & Rabin further suggested that reference points are likely to be transient in 
nature, shifting over time and when actual choices are made.  Therefore, given the lottery L is 
actually chosen, at some point that lottery replaces R as the reference benchmark against 
which actual outcomes are judged in accordance with gains or losses relative to expectations 
for L.  Koszegi and Rabin (2007) applied this concept more formally defining a “choice-
acclimatising personal equilibrium”.  Essentially, if a decision-maker commits to a choice, 
such as lottery L, well in advance of realising the actual outcome, expectations about L will 
become established as the new reference point by the time the outcome becomes known. He 
and Strub (2019) extended this within a mental-adjustment model with loss version, finding 
shifts in both exogenous and endogenous reference points over time.  
 
Approaching the issue of how such expectations are formed, the process can be slightly 
simplified if we assume that expectations are either exogenous or endogenous to the current 
choice.  In the examples above, the primary reference set defined by R was exogenous to 
choice L.  If reference points shift after choices have been made, such that R is replaced by L, 
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expectations are then endogenous to choice L.   From Equation 16, we see that the individual’s 
utility would then be given by; U(L|L).  Rational behaviour would then require selection of 
the lottery which maximises that term.  
 
There is ample scope to assign psychological traits with regard to the treatment of 
reference points.  For example, disappointment aversion can apply as decision-makers are 
likely to develop prior expectations with regard to a lottery which may not be realised.  If we 
apply the two alternative methods of comparison described above in relation to 
disappointment aversion (DA) and the Koszegi & Rabin (KR) formulation, we find the 
following interpretations with regard to gain-loss utility; 
 
DA: U(L|L) = ∑ 𝑝௡௜ୀଵ i [u(xi) +  u(xi) – ∑ 𝑝௡௝ୀଵ j u(xj)] Equation 19 
KR: U(L|L) = ∑ 𝑝௡௜ୀଵ i [u(xi) + ∑ 𝑝௡௝ୀଵ j  u(xi) - u(xj))] 
 
It may be noted that the KR model implies that deviations from EU are based upon 
subjective assessments of gains versus losses, although there is no equivalent of a value 
function to specify this process.  Nevertheless, there is implied information regarding a 
prospect’s ranking as, under this formulation, an outcome’s rank depends upon the number of 
gain/loss comparisons made with the reference set.  This has some obvious similarities with 
rank-dependent probability weighting models which transform the cumulative probability 
distribution.   
 
Bhatia and Golman (2015) presented a model of reference dependence extending the 
concept that the choice of reference points is influenced by particular attributes of those 
reference points.  Behaviours such as the endowment effect and status quo bias, for example, 
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have been explained on the basis of attention towards attributes or reference points (Ashby, 
Dickert & Glockner, 2012); the decision-maker then places a greater weight on key attributes 
when determining preferences.  Therefore, while reference points are not assumed to affect 
perceptions regarding gains and losses, they do impact choice through a search for, and 
comparison of, similar attributes.  As a result, changing reference points might result in 
changes in the weights assigned to particular attributes, perhaps modifying choices. The result 
is a model of attention-biased utility based upon subjective valuations of key attributes.  On 
this basis, and assuming that attributes are considered to be mutually independent, attribute-
biased utility maximisation can simply be defined in the standard way as; 
 
U(x) = ∑ 𝑉௡௜ୀଵ i (xi) Equation 20 
where V is the decision-makers subjective value function with Vi (xi) then denoting the 
valuations of attribute i with regard to option x. 
 
The weighting of specific attributes is accommodated by applying a non-negative, strictly 
increasing attention function, a = a(r) which defines the individual’s attention weight given a 
particular reference point r.  Choice is then made according to the following weighted 
attribute utility function; 
 
 U(x|r) = ∑ 𝑎௡௜ୀଵ i (ri) -  ai(ri) · Vi(ri) Equation 21 
 
Note that no assumptions are made about the nature of the value function, V; utility maps 
according the value function regardless of the reference point.  In addition, there is no 
assumed divergence in terms of the assessment of gains or losses relative to a particular 
reference point.  Instead, preferences are derived in accordance with a prospect’s primary 
77 
attributes defined according to the subjecting weighting function.  The attribute utility model 
is consistent with evidence that salient choice options affect an individual’s attention to choice 
characteristics (Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012) and hence preferences.  The model is therefore 
capable of explaining a number of observed behavioural anomalies, including a reversal of the 
endowment effect for negative attributes and the strengthening of the effect for more highly 
weighted attributes.   
 
Early approaches to modelling multiple reference points tended to assumed that decision 
makers reduced these points to a single composite (Olson, Roese & Zanna, 1996), although 
the proposition has been challenged by Ordóñez, Connolly and Coughlan (2000).  A typical 
assumption is that decision-makers applying multiple reference points impose minimum goals 
which they strive to attain.  This has been found to elicit behaviour contradictory to Prospect 
Theory to the extent that risk aversion often does not appear once performance exceeds the 
status quo (Sullivan & Kida, 1995). Thus, while business managers have been found to exhibit 
risk aversion when confronted with the possibility of losses sufficient to return performance to 
the prior status quo, they have also been found to be risk seeking in pursuit of higher goals 
once the status quo had been sufficiently exceeded. Sullivan and Kida concluded that each of 
the multiple goals could exert some influence of behaviour simultaneously.  
 
March and Shapira (1992) proposed a variable risk preference model such that decision-
makers could switch attention between multiple reference points and goals. However, they 
assumed that the influence of each was mutually exclusive, implying that decision-makers 
adopt either a fully risk averse, preservation strategy or an active risk seeking strategy in 
pursuit of goals. This approach has some similarities with Lopes’s “surviving and thriving” 
models (Lopes, 1987), although the latter focussed more on transposed decision weights rather 
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than reference points. The effect of multiple reference points on strategic behaviour has been 
considered with regard to interactive, mainly bilateral, negotiations (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; 
Neale, Huber & Northcraft, 1987). In relation to real estate purchases, White, Valley, 
Bazerman, Neale & Peck (1994) found that reservation prices tended to act as dominant 
reference points along with the maximum willingness to pay of the buyer. Kristensen and 
Garling (2000) found that initial offers could affect prior reference points, leading to 
modification in anchors. Within this process, a distinction is normally drawn between anchors 
and reference points (Kahneman, 1992). Thus, anchors are perceived to exist in terms of offer 
and counteroffer levels whereas reference points determine whether those offers and 
counteroffers are perceived as gains and losses. A reference point may therefore influence 
counteroffers depending on how the new anchor point is perceived. Kristensen and Garling 
(1997) found that proposed selling prices acted as anchor points for basing counteroffers.  
 
A further interactive approach to multiple reference points was provided by Wang and 
Johnson (2009) using a model with three separate reference points; the status quo, a coalesced 
multiple reference point and aspirational goals. By cross-referencing outcomes with these 
triple “areas of outcome”, decision-makers could experience success (gain) or failure (loss). 
Wang and Johnson argue that each of the outcome regions (staying above the status quo, 
exceeding reference points or exceeding a goal) could have different decision weights 
associated with each. Therefore, a salesperson exceeding a base target level may derive no 
increase in overall utility in the event that such performance falls short of a higher goal which 
would have triggered a financial bonus. This conflicts with Prospect Theory’s assumption 
regarding relative insensitivity to small changes in outcomes since, in this example, a 
potentially modest increase in sales performance could potentially result in a tangibly superior 
outcome by triggering the bonus threshold. In such cases, great importance is likely to be 
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attached to achieving that small additional gain. It might therefore be assumed that such 
reference points will reflect critical levels of perceived utility outcomes, in which case the 
overall value function is likely to exhibit a greater slope in the neighbourhood of such critical 
reference points rather than the status quo point. Consequently, decision-makers might be 
expected to accept higher risk gambles in the neighbourhood of such reference points if the 
risky prospect offers the chance of exceeding a certain threshold.  
 
The tri-reference model of Wang and Johnson was tested in two experiments by Koop 
and Johnson (2010). In the first experiment, participants were presented with a number of 
risky gambles within the broader context of three reference points; a minimum requirement 
(MR), the status quo (SQ) and a goal (G). Based upon prospective payoffs, various return 
outcomes were possible with respect to individual reference points. Consequently, a general 
outcome space could be mapped as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Table 7. Outcomes from risky gambles relative to objective reference points ‘mapped’ into a general 
outcome space. 
 
Outcome of Gamble x Classification of Outcome 
x <  MR Failure 
MR  ≤   x  <  SQ Loss 
SQ <  x < G Gain 
G  ≤   x  Success 
 
A total of 12 notional risky gamble pairs were then prepared for presentation, as shown in 
Table 8. In each of the gamble pairs, explicit values (expressed in lira) for reference points 
were assigned such that MR = 1000, SQ = 2000 and G = 4000. In each case, the probability of 
outcomes associated with each of the risky gambles was declared to be equal, meaning that 
Pr(a1) = Pr(a2) = p = .5. It will be noted that each return pair, a1 and b1, resides in the same 
outcome space (which then describes the common outcome relative to the identified reference 
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point). Therefore, in the case of Pairs 1, 5 and 9, the associated outcomes for a1 and b1 
represent failure (outcomes below MR). The a2 and b2 binary outcomes were set so that they 
resided in adjacent outcome spaces thereby straddling a defined reference point. For example, 
in the case of Pair 9, a2 represents a gain (SQ <  x(a2)  < G) while b2 represents success (x(b2) > 
G), using the previously defined outcome descriptors.  
 
Table 8. Paired risky gambles with common outcomes relative to specified reference 
 points. 
                  
Pair 
Number 
Gamble A  Gamble A  Common outcome Reference point 
a1 a2   b1 b2   (a1, b1) involved (a2, b2) 
1 940 960  580 1220  Failure MR 
2 1880 920  1600 1100  Loss MR 
3 3840 760  3300 1200  Gain MR 
4 4900 600  4220 1180  Success MR 
5 880 1920  620 2080  Failure SQ 
6 1720 1880  1420 2080  Loss SQ 
7 3700 1800  2820 2580  Gain SQ 
8 4600 1800  4200 2100  Success SQ 
9 760 3860  400 4120  Failure G 
10 1800 3700  1160 4240  Loss G 
11 3100 3600  2360 4240  Gain G 
12 5060 3680   4400 4240   Success G 
        
Note: The data shows pairs of gamble outcomes which are assumed to have equal probabilities (.5) of success. 
The gambles are notionally evaluated against pre-defined, fixed reference points representing a minimum return 
requirement (MR), the status quo (SQ) or a gain (G). Paired outcomes are then categorised on the basis of 
outcomes versus the various reference points such that an outcome, x, below MR is defined as “Failure”, x > SQ 
denotes “Loss”, x > SQ < G defines “Gain”, x > G = “Success”.  
 
By varying the values of a1 and b1 while maintaining the reference points straddled by a2 and 
b2, three sets of gamble pairs (4 x 3) were presented to each subject representing differing 
possible outcomes across the entire outcome space. In the case of each gamble, the values of 
a1, b1, a2 and b2 were chosen so that A always had a higher expected return than B, whereas B 
offered the prospect of a superior functional outcome as it allowed the possibility of exceeding 
a specific reference point.  
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In order to test the strength of any reference point effect on behaviour, two conditions 
were defined. In the first, strong (certain) condition, each of the three reference points was 
disclosed to participants as a single value. In the second, weak (uncertain) condition, SQ 
remained fixed while MR and G were described in terms of symmetrical probability 
distributions around a mean equal to the value declared in the strong condition. Participants 
were incentivised in terms of both instant monetary reward, based upon achieving certain 
benchmarks, and the prospect of entry into a future bonus draw with its own payoff.  
 
Results from the experiment indicated that participants generally preferred gambles 
associated with achieving reference points as opposed to seeking the highest expected payoff. 
This was most marked under the strong condition where reference dependent gambles were 
chosen in preference to higher payoff gambles over 78% of the time. The same propensity for 
reference point dependence was also found for the weak condition, although the level of 
significance was lower than that found in the strong condition. The effect was, however, 
particularly strong around MR. Preferences for gambles around SQ were equally significant 
for both the strong and weak conditions. Unlike MR and G, SQ was fixed under both 
conditions and therefore not subject to the degree of uncertainty found within the weak 
condition with regard to other reference points, defined by their distribution of outcomes 
rather than a single value. It would appear, therefore, that the introduction of a degree of 
uncertainty had some impact upon strength of preferences over and above simple risk aversion 
around reference points.  
 
The effect of multiple reference point dependence differentiable from simple risk 
aversion, expected utility and SQ dependence implied by Prospect Theory was investigated 
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explicitly in a second experiment. Koop and Johnson employed a similar methodology in 
terms of selective gambles defined precisely across a reference dependent outcome space. A 
number of the gambles applied in experiment 1 were restated in experiment 2 in order to 
create a more effective delineation of expected outcomes based upon the various possible 
objective functions (reference dependence, risk aversion, expected utility and prospect 
theory). The new values used are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Paired risky gambles with common outcomes relative to specified reference 
points used in experiment 2. 
 
Note: Modified data used in experiment 2 designed to test behaviour in relation to behavioural objectives 
(reference dependent, risk aversion, expected utility and prospect theory). 
 
The values assigned to explicit reference points, denominated in lira, were; MR = 1000, SQ = 
2500 and G = 4000. The common outcome and reference points were as described in the prior 
experiment. Similar incentives were offered to participants in terms of final entry into a draw, 
although in simplified form; once MR was exceeded, participants were awarded 5 entries into 
the final prize draw rising to 10 entries should G be exceeded.  
 
Common outcome Reference point
a1 a2 b1 b2 (a1, b1 ) involved (a2, b2 )
1 940 960 580 1220 Failure MR
2 2000 920 1720 1100 Loss MR
3 3650 750 3300 1200 Gain MR
4 4050 950 4300 1100 Success MR
5 880 1920 720 2680 Failure SQ
6 1900 2200 1420 2580 Loss SQ
7 3700 1800 2970 2580 Gain SQ
8 4600 2200 4200 2700 Success SQ
9 640 3980 720 4000 Failure G
10 1800 3700 1360 4240 Loss G
11 3300 3860 2560 4500 Gain G
12 5060 3640 4400 4200 Success G
Pair 
Number
Gamble A Gamble A
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In order to model expected utility with general risk aversion, a concave utility function of 
the form u(x) = x0.8 was applied to expected values from individual gambles.  Outcomes in 
relation to prospect theory preferences were modelled differently based upon their gain or loss 
domains relative to SQ. In the domain of gains (for all x > SQ), the utility from risky 
outcomes was defined by u(x) = x while in the domain of losses (for all x < SQ), the 
following expression was applied; u(x) = -((SQ – x)). The parameters were set in 
accordance with the median exponent (of the value function and loss aversion 
(coefficients  derived by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), specifically, and 
the latter indicating pronounced loss aversion. Based upon these definitions, it is 
possible to evaluate each risky outcome on the basis of risk aversion4, expected value (again 
assigning a probability of .5 to each event within each paired gamble), expected utility and the 
value function central to Prospect Theory. Table 10 replicates these values, as derived by 
Koop and Johnson. 
 
Overall, results once again indicated a statistically significant preference for gamble B 
over A. This preference was apparent around each of the reference points. Isolating results 
based upon divergent predictions based upon choice preference characteristic again showed 
behaviour consistent with reference point dependence. Thus, taking the cases in which 
reference point dependence predicted an outcome different from that of either risk aversion, 
EV, EU or PT, reference point dependence was found to have significantly greater 
explanatory power with regard to actual outcomes.   Therefore, the inclusion of additional 
reference points over and above SQ was found to affect overall behaviour. The collective use 
of multiple reference points proved superior to a single reference point in explaining the data. 
                                                 
4 Risk is defined simply as the absolute numerical difference between binary outcomes within each paired 
gamble. The lower the dispersal of outcomes, the lower the perceived risk, with no weighting function applied. 
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Table 10. Risky gambles presented in experiment 2 evaluated using various objective functions.  
 
 
Note: For each gamble, the preferred option, based upon the specified objective function in each case, is denoted 
by emboldening in the Table. Therefore, both expected utility and Prospect Theory would predict the same 
choices in relation to the first five gambles shown.   
 
Close to reference points, participants were found to be risk seeking when they had the 
opportunity to exceed that point but became risk averse when they faced the prospect of 
falling below it. Importantly, participants exhibited a more complex understanding of the 
reference points and modified their behaviour systematically within those boundaries, 
suggesting that prospect theory’s status quo approach is too simplistic. Confirming Wang and 
Johnson’s hypothesis, the three reference points were found to exert differential impacts on 
behaviour, with a multiple reference point more significant that status quo.   
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The models of rational behaviour covered in this chapter considerably extend the 
framework of classical expected utility.  PT and CPT (along with SEU and vNM-expected 
utility) are normative, axiomatic models which define rational behaviour.  However, this 
description only goes sufficiently far to enable judgements to be made in relation to whether 
[a1 - a2] [b1 - b2] EV(A) EV(B) EU(A) EU(B) PT(A) PT(B)
1 20 640 950 900 241.09 228.48 -802.50 -820.49
2 1080 620 1460 1410 336.16 329.36 -569.76 -601.52
3 2900 2100 2200 2250 453.61 471.74 -301.71 -243.52
4 3100 3200 2500 2700 505.08 538.95 -222.92 -168.88
5 1040 1960 1400 1700 325.03 372.93 -598.45 -416.36
6 300 1160 2050 2000 445.88 434.35 -295.65 -283.88
7 2050 390 2750 2775 570.26 568.12 -52.76 85.30
8 2400 1500 3400 3450 661.77 673.90 119.52 226.67
9 3340 3280 2310 2360 467.09 477.30 -292.40 -274.50
10 1900 2880 2750 2800 558.71 559.52 -67.12 -118.20
11 560 1940 3580 3430 696.46 684.77 265.68 231.90
12 1420 200 4350 4300 812.57 806.78 405.89 401.89
Pair 
Number
Risk Expected Value (EV) Expected Utility (EU) Prospect Theory (PT)
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an individual is behaving as if they are wholly rational in their decision-making.  The models 
therefore consider the output of a process rather than the process itself, although there are 
clearly elements of the models which assume or imply process. Diminishing marginal utility 
and loss aversion are component of most decision-making models of this type, such behaviour 
captured by the concave shape of a standard utility function and made explicit in the case of 
domain-specific value functions.  While marginal utility models sensitivity to outcomes of 
differing magnitudes, the probability-weighting function within CTP is a purely subjective 
construct which transforms objective, cumulative probability distributions into decision-
weights; the curvature of this function then assumes diminishing sensitivity to probabilities 
over the course of the function.  The rank-dependence element of CPT is a further 
accommodation of behavioural traits allowing even more flexible individual-specific 
weighting functions to be assumed, thereby explaining a wider range of observed behaviours.  
As with PT, decision-makers can be both risk-seeking and risk averse depending upon the 
prospect and domain.  
 
The existence of reference points chosen by the decision-maker are key components of 
PT and CPT.  Both are formulated on the basis of a single, apparently risk-free reference 
point, an assumption relaxed by reference-dependent and attribute models.  Theories of 
general choice relating to reference points introduce additional elements which are essentially 
behavioural in nature.  Under these formulations, stochastic and multiple reference points can 
exist, changing according to subjective decisions of the individual.   
 
Axiomatic approaches to decision-making derive conditions under which an individual’s 
utility is maximised.  Implicit in this is the proposition that decision-makers consider all 
alternatives and, in the case of CPT and other rank dependent models, can order them 
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rationally by applying representative weighting functions which define preferences.  
Similarly, choice models based upon attributes or criteria assume a potentially complex 
process of comparison occurs in order to determine preferences.  Attribute attention and multi-
criteria templates may serve to focus the decision-making process yet the ability to perform 
such comparisons across a large number of possible options is somewhat taken for granted.  
The CPT editing phase assumes that prospects are filtered prior to an evaluation phase.  
Elements of that filtering phase are made explicit and are largely consistent with axioms of 
rational behaviour.  The assumption, therefore, is that this is a behaviourally efficient process 
not subject to fundamental bias.  Once again, therefore, decision-makers are assumed willing 
and capable to apply sufficient analysis to a range of options not matter the size of the choice 
set.  In the next chapter, a number of largely descriptive approaches to choice reduction are 
discussed.  The purpose of this is primarily to focus more attention on cognitive process rather 
than just outputs.  The chapter concludes by briefly considering formal models and 
approaches to process-tracing as well as more models derived from neurology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HEURISTICS, PROCESS TRACING AND THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK 
 
4.1. Choice Reduction 
 
In early work relating to choice reduction and filtering, a lexicographic rule was proposed 
whereby decision-makers were assumed to identify attributes of outcomes which are of 
primary importance. Individuals are then assumed to apply ranking rules to attributes which 
may be expressed in categorical form as; “good”, “neutral” or bad”.  Accordingly, such 
lexicographic rules are applied to determine the option which best fits the most desirable 
attributes (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Only in the event of indifference between 
competing choices is the decision-maker assumed to consider the second most desirable 
attribute, and so on, until a unique solution is found.   
 
This procedure was expressed more formally by Tversky (1969, 1972) using 
semiordering to impose thresholds on partial rankings.  Therefore, assuming a function f on a 
choice set X, we can derive an ordered sequence of dimensions based upon an individual’s 
preferences with regard to attributes,  f = (f1, …. , fn).  It is then assumed that there is a 
threshold, , which is required to distinguish between dimensions.  The preference, fi(x) > fi(y) 
therefore holds only in the case; fi(x) > fi(y) +  Since the dimensions are ranked in terms of 
order of importance, the decision-maker considers them in sequence; when a dimension i is 
found for which x > y + , the condition rule is satisfied given the threshold and x is 
considered preferable (superior) to y.  At this point, no later dimensions need be considered.   
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This process incorporates conjunctive and disjunctive rules proposed by Coombs (1951) 
and Dawes (1964).  Under the conjunctive rule, prospects which exceed all thresholds are 
considered desirable while under the disjunctive rule, a prospect exceeding any of the 
thresholds is potentially acceptable. Jedidi and Kohli (2005) provided generalisations of 
conjunctive and disjunctive rules by assuming that decision rules can be based upon a 
minimum number of possible decision-criteria being met.  Therefore, assuming that options 
must satisfy at least h out of n possible criteria, h = 1 would describe a disjunctive rule while 
h = n defines a conjunctive rule.  As h moves higher, more and more criteria must be fulfilled 
in order to be considered acceptable.  Jedidi and Kohli defined this as a “subset-conjunctive 
rule”, accommodating situations where there is incomplete information with regard to 
alternatives.  A probabilistic component was also added to the model, denoting a decision-
maker’s perception of the likelihood of finding a particular level of an attribute acceptable.  
Such probabilities can then be taken to reflect the importance attached to a particular attribute.   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers do indeed engage in considerable choice 
reduction based upon choice attributes. For example, studies have shown that consumers 
typically reduce consideration of packaged goods to a subset of 3 to 4 attributes out of a 
possible 30 to 40 (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Urban & Hauser, 1993). Various generic 
attributes have also been found to affect subset choice. Therefore, variability in the perceived 
brand quality across choice sets has been found to influence consumer subsets, with increasing 
variability in quality reducing the overall number of brands considered (Belonax Jr & Javalgi, 
1989). However, abundant choice of broadly similar goods can lead to weaker preferences, 
requiring greater cognitive effort (Chernev, 2003), although focusing upon unique, or 
distinguishing attributes of items on the part of sellers has been found to increase the 
likelihood of those items being included in consumer choice subsets  (Dhar & Sherman, 1996; 
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Kivetz & Simonson, 2000). This implies that consumers do indeed seek differentiating 
characteristics, on which they place more weight, when comparing broadly similar competing 
items.  
 
The lexicographic models described above suggest a framework for achieving choice 
reduction by matching alternatives to defined criteria.  It is assumed, therefore, that not all of 
the available information relating to competing choices is relevant to the decision taken.  The 
models thus have both decision and stopping rules; once sufficient conditions are met, there is 
no need to proceed further.  The process described therefore assumes a degree of economy 
with regard to cognitive resource. 
 
Heuristic decision rules similarly describe processes whereby choices are made on the 
basis of partial information and cues.  As task complexity increases, either based upon the 
number of alternatives or their salient characteristics, decision-makers seek to reduce that 
complexity by simplifying the dimensions of the task.  As with other decision-rule models, not 
all aspects of alternatives are assumed to be considered in a systematic manner.  Instead, 
decision-makers are deemed to be “fast and frugal”, undertaking an evaluation by applying a 
type of mental process whereby judgments about current events, objects or options are made 
based upon past knowledge or by reference to other known cues, events, objects or options 
which are considered to be sufficiently similar. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) considered 
heuristics to be “mental shortcuts” which often triggered biases and “errors” (violations of 
axiomatic behaviour).  They argued that each of the three main heuristics which they 
identified: representativeness, availability and adjustment and anchoring, often led to 
predictable biases in decision-making.  These heuristics can be summarised as follows; 
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 Representativeness describes a process whereby decision-makers evaluate A on 
the basis of the characteristics of B which is deemed to be similar and about which 
something is known. Therefore, the probability of event A is inferred to be similar 
to that of B.  Alternatively, individuals may classify A as similar to B based upon 
shared characteristics or may extend the characteristics of a small sample to 
assume they apply across a much larger sample. 
 Availability assumes that decision-makers make evaluations based upon 
immediate examples, recent events, experiences or observations.  The matching 
element of this heuristic can therefore be seen to reinforce representativeness. 
 Adjustment and anchoring describes a process whereby decision-makers assess 
probabilities intuitively, taking an anchor which acts as a reference point and then 
adjusting until a “reasonable” representation is found.  
 
Many other heuristics have been identified defining frugal mental processes (see Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011; Blumenthal-Barby, 2016).  Some, such as tallying and take-the-best can 
be seen to correspond closely with sequential decision models as described earlier.  Tallying, 
for example, is a process whereby class objects are compared one to another; one option may 
therefore be found to dominate another based upon a cumulation of comparative measures.  
For example, if asked to judge whether the UK or Germany would achieve a stronger rate of 
economic growth over the next twelve-months, we may consider a number of primary 
indicators to help us make that judgment (for example; recent GDP growth, labour 
productivity, unemployment, inflation and interest rates, debt levels and relative exchange 
rates).  The decision-maker applying the tallying heuristic would then evaluate the two 
countries based upon each metric with the one scoring higher cumulatively then being 
favoured as the higher growth economy. Whereas a formal model, such as regression analysis, 
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would derive weights via regression coefficients for each of these variables resulting in an 
equation providing a numerical forecast for growth in each country, the heuristic approach 
assumes that the various factors are equally weighted in the tallying process (although there 
would appear to be no reason why the decision-maker could not mentally apply some sort of 
weighting procedure).  This replicates the conjunctive and subset-conjunctive rules outlined 
above. The take-the-best heuristic more closely aligns with the disjunctive rule whereby a 
decision is made based upon a primary characteristic or metric.  Therefore, in the case of 
economic growth comparisons, a decision-maker might rank the factors in terms of 
importance.  Once a difference is found between two options, the preference is made without 
any further consideration.    
 
Heuristics and choice reduction models typically involve trade-offs between cognitive 
effort and decision-accuracy; they are not utility maximising strategies as prescribed by the 
axioms of rational behaviour as those models assume full comparison of available options.  
Instead, choice reduction is more closely aligned with satisficing behaviour and bounded 
rationality. Satisficing behaviour exists when decision-makers seek acceptable outcomes 
considering all costs including those of information gathering, search and cognitive effort; 
bounded rationality exists when rational agents are constrained in their ability to formulate 
and solve complex problems (Simon, 1956).   
 
In general terms, satisficing can be described as a type of decision-optimising process 
whereby individuals seek to maximise an objective function subject to constraints.  The 
objective function can be defined in terms of utility which is maximised subject to constraints 
in the forms of cognitive and other costs.  If we assume a decision-maker faces a number of 
choices represented by a consumption set ℝ+n, preferences with regard to the consumption set 
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can then be expressed by a utility function defined on the choice set.  Assuming a general 
constraint the optimising objective function can be expressed as; 
 
Maxxϵ ℝ+n  = u(∑ 𝑥𝑖௡௜ୀଵ )    subject to;   ∑ 𝑥𝑖௡௜ୀଵ  ≤  Equation 22 
where ∑ 𝑥𝑖௡௜ୀଵ  ≤ represents the overall “resource” constraint condition of the decision-
maker; constraints may be cognitive or due to a limit on the amount of effort the decision-
maker is prepared to undertake and can be thought of in the same way as an income 
constraint in a normal consumption setting. 
 
Maximising this function is consistent with bounded rationality.  Satisficing behaviour does 
not require the objective function to be maximised but presumes that the decision-maker 
achieves at least an acceptable payoff from their choices. We can express this by assuming 
that individuals aspire to achieve a minimum payoff sufficiently close to the constrained 
optimum.  Therefore, if the difference between the optimum payoff and aspiration level is 
denoted as  = Umax – A, where A is the minimum required level of utility, satisficing can be 
defined as the choice set s which satisfies; 
 
U(s) ≥ Umax -   
 
Satisficing heuristics and bounded rationality are examples of non-axiomatic decision-rules 
which diverge from the as if framework of the various iterations of expected utility theory. 
They describe an adaptive process whereby decision-makers pursue a method of information 
acquisition designed to match the complexity of a task.  While inherently suboptimal and 
potentially prone to bias and error, heuristics have been found to perform well in relation to 
choices with binary attributes (Katsikopoulos, 2013) and have, in some cases, outperformed 
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formal regression models (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999).  By taking an 
algorithmic approach to decision-making, such rule-based models go some way to looking at 
process rather than simply output.   
 
4.2. Process Tracing 
 
Process tracing is a direct attempt to determine cause and effect in terms of decision-
making. The methodology covers an array of techniques used to make judgmental 
determinations of the causes of particular behaviour based upon observations of how data and 
information are acquired prior to a decision being made.  Whereas formal multivariate 
techniques, such as regression analysis, attempt to measure the importance of causal variables, 
deriving numerical values in the form of coefficients in the case of regression analysis, 
process tracing makes more general inferences about the variables which influence a 
particular choice (Bennett and Checkel, 2015).  The approach therefore focusses upon the 
process which occurs between the introduction of information and the steps then taken before 
final decisions emerge.   
 
Numerous methods have been used to determine how information is acquired by 
decision-makers, including verbal protocols and information boards.  Verbal protocols are 
derived from explanations provided by decision-makers recorded as they perform a particular 
task; a technique popular in relation to problem-solving research (Lin & Yu, 2015). 
Information boards are designed to provide hidden information, requiring search effort from 
the decision-maker.  Technology has naturally been applied increasingly to the task, with eye-
tracing and mouse tracking providing more extensive information logging based upon the 
actions of the target agent.   
94 
Various process tracing methods naturally require differing levels of search effort on the 
part of the decision-maker; for example, physical information boards, which might present 
information in an envelope, require an overt act which typically takes longer to execute than 
mouse clicking to reveal the same information.  Indeed, computerised process tracing (CPT) 
environments often improve the efficiency of information gathering relative to a manual-task 
environment, leading some to question whether the level of effort itself might affect the 
decision process and choices made (Russo, Johnson, and Stephens,.1989). Mouse-tracing 
techniques have, for example, been applied in a similar manner to information boards, with 
decision-makers required to move the mouse pointer to a particular part of a computer screen 
in order to reveal information (Norman & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2010).  Eye-trackers have 
also been used, often in combination with mouse tracking, to elicit yet more precise 
information.  For example, Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011) employed eye-trackers to 
measure attention-processing; by allowing information to appear only when the decision-
maker looked directly at a specific part of the computer screen and disappearing when the eye 
move away, the length of time information was accessed could be recorded precisely.  In 
comparison, while a mouse pointer could determine whether the same information had been 
accessed, it would not be known at what stage attention to it ceased unless the mouse was 
simultaneously moved away.  In an experiment, Franco-Watkins and Johnson found that eye-
tracking data revealed a greater number of fixations of shorter duration in comparison with 
mouse-tracking data, the latter implying greater variability in attention duration.   
 
While process tracing can provide evidence of causation, it does so within certain 
constraints.  First, it should be possible to link behaviour to theories of cognition, for example, 
fixation and signal processing. Secondly, the approach is more case-specific than general.  
Process tracing views behaviour within the context provided by an environment where  
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decision-makers respond to cues.  Should the environment or the nature of the cues change, 
behaviour and choices may also vary.  This contrasts with many formal analytical models 
which test sampled data with the intention of generalising findings across states. 
 
4.3. Feedback and Beliefs under Conditions of Ambiguity 
 
An important aspect of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity 
relates to how decision-makers form beliefs in the absence of objective probabilistic 
information and how those beliefs might be modified on the basis of new evidence.  A widely 
applied framework for describing this process involves Bayesian inference.  Thus, decision-
makers are assumed to hold prior beliefs relating to the likelihood of particular outcomes.  
Probability can then interpreted as the level of belief or confidence which the individual holds 
in relation to that uncertain event, a type of subjective uncertainty.   
 
Individuals therefore form prior beliefs which are then subject to updating over time as 
new evidence pertinent to event likelihood becomes available.  Assimilation of that new data 
creates posterior beliefs.  Bayesian inference therefore contrasts with classical statistical 
inference as the latter assumes that probability beliefs derive from observed frequencies of 
random events occurring over the long-term and on the basis of repeated trials.  Classical 
theory therefore defines uncertainty by reference to objective probability distributions 
conditional upon the existence of long-run frequency information whereas the Bayesian 
concept modifies uncertainty within a framework of evolving beliefs conditional upon new 
evidence.   
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We saw in earlier chapters that classic EU theory assumed the existence of homogenous 
agents forming rational expectations on the basis of full knowledge of all relevant 
information.  This implies that rational decision-makers share the same probabilistic beliefs in 
relation to uncertain events.  In contrast, Bayesian beliefs are heterogeneous rather than 
homogenous meaning that decision-makers can hold different prior beliefs as they may have 
differing levels of access to information or they may interpret common information 
differently.  However, despite differences in prior beliefs, it is assumed that rational posterior 
beliefs undergo a process of convergence on the basis of new shared information.   In general, 
we may then assume that an individual, i, applies a weighting function in relation to an event,  
e, which reflects their degree of confidence or strength of belief such that; 0 ≤ i e ≤ 1.  
When ie = 0, the individual has no confidence that an event will occur while ie = 1 implies 
certainty. 
 
Bayesian rules can be described easily if we assume that rational beliefs are founded upon 
base-rate probabilities modified by particular evidence relating to conditions or states.  This is 
the equivalent of conditional probabilities in which the probability of event A depends upon 
the occurrence of another event, B, denoted as; 
 
P(A|B) =.  P(A ∩ B) / P(B) or P(B)P(A|B) = P(A ∩ B) Equation 23 
 
The probability of A occurring given that B has occurred therefore equals their joint 
probability relative to the probability of B.  The probability of B is known as the base rate 
probability which then affects the likelihood of the outcome A.  Since all events of A describe 
the complete partition sample space, we can define the following for the probability of B; 
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P(B) = ∑ 𝑃௔ఢ஺ (B ∩ A) = ∑ 𝑃௔ఢ஺ (B|A)P(A) Equation 24 
 
The Bayes’ rule applied in Bayesian inference is then defined as; 
 
P(A|B) =.P (B|A)P(A) / ∑ 𝑃௔ఢ஺ (B|A)P(A) Equation 25 
 
Models of Bayesian inference apply parameters representing weightings of beliefs.  
Therefore, the term, P(A), describes the decision-maker’s probabilistic beliefs regarding 
the likelihood of event A.  Assuming a random event with only two possible outcomes, the 
probability of one particular outcome can then be represented as; ϵ [0, 1].  Beliefs about 
different values of reflect rational expectations derived from a probability distribution 
resulting from observed data.  This can be represented by the likelihood function, P(|); 
note that P(|) would give the probability of observing  given a model parameter of   
P( ) is therefore the prior belief while P(|) is the posterior belief.  The term P(can in 
theory be calculated from a probability distribution based on a summation of all values of 
weighed according to the decision-makers beliefs with regard to  each value of  
 
Bayesian theory of subjective probabilities has been generalised in the Demster-Shafer 
theory (DST) of belief functions.  Bayesian and DST theories both assume that decision-
makers assign non-negative weights to uncertain and ambiguous events.  Whereas Bayesian 
theory assumes that each individual event from the set of possible events is assigned a weight 
reflecting the decision-maker’s belief with regard to the likelihood of each event,  DST 
describes a “frame of discernment”, Ωwhichincludes all possible combinations of events.  
Subsets of the frame of discernment are called weighted “masses”, (x). Masses satisfy the 
following properties; 
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 (x) ϵ [0, 1] for all x ⊑ Ω; 
(x) = 1 and  () = 0 
 
Masses can therefore be thought of as probability assignments; to this are added belief and 
plausibility functions which are defined as the upper and lower bounds of intervals.  Beliefs in 
DST are derived from a decision-maker’s interpretation of the source and represent the degree 
of support for a proposition. Therefore, the degree of belief for a set A is defined as the sum of 
all weights of a subset B which supports A.  This can be shown as; 
 
 Bel(A) = (B) where B ⊑ A 
 
Plausibility is defined as the sum of beliefs which support A (beliefs ≤ plausibility).   Belief 
therefore defines the lower bound and plausibility the upper bound of a general belief interval.  
Therefore, if there is a belief of 0.5 and a plausibility of 0.8 for a particular proposition, A, 
evidence against A, and hence the belief in “not A”, is 0.2 (1 – 0.8).   The difference between 
the belief for A and not A (0.3) denotes the level of uncertainty based upon available evidence 
(Shafer, 1990).  
 
DST implies that not every prospect can be completely encompassed by some measure of 
uncertainty as to its likely outcome since there may be no basis from which to determine that 
uncertainty.  Instead, many decision tasks include elements of ignorance.  Therefore, as 
opposed to decision-makers computing or assigning probabilities to the likelihood of an event, 
they assess the probability that available evidence supports the proposition of a particular 
outcome.  DST can therefore be applied to situations where there is insufficient data to 
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estimate priors as required by Bayes’ rule.  The use of belief intervals in DST also makes it 
possible to assess how close the evidence comes to establishing a hypothesis.   
 
Violations of axiomatic behaviour, such as the Ellsberg Paradox, suggest that beliefs 
cannot be fully encapsulated by single probability measure given the imprecision inherent in 
available information.  Therefore, updating with new information in the presence of 
indeterminate uncertainty can lead to inconsistent choices.  In terms of Bayesian theory, 
ambiguity might therefore not be accommodated fully by a single prior.  DST provides a 
generalisation of Bayesian theory enabling ambiguity to be more flexibly interpreted within 
belief intervals.  Further generalisations have been proposed based upon multiple priors and 
the concept of dynamically consistent beliefs (Epstein & Le Breton, 1993).   Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989) applied a multiple-prior model with preferences updated on the basis of 
maximum-minimum expected utility (MEU).  Thus, minimum expected utility can be defined 
as a function of levels of belief while maximum expected utility could be bounded by 
plausibility, the equivalent of DST “incalculable uncertainty”.   Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) 
explore the link between dynamic consistency and updated MEU preferences.  Decision-
makers are therefore deemed to update beliefs by adopting updating rules which depend upon 
prior choices or feasible sets defined by the problem.  The rules applied are consistent with the 
application of Bayes’ rule to the subset of measures represented by the decision-maker’s 
preferences.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BEHAVIOURAL BIAS AND ERROR 
 
5.1. Suboptimal Decision-Making and Bias 
 
In previous chapters, we traced the development of axiomatic theories which define 
objectively rational behaviour.  If those axioms are met, it is possible to conclude that the 
decision-maker is behaving as if they are wholly rational.  Axiomatic models with free 
parameters, such as CPT, are capable of explaining a range of behaviours relating to decision-
making under conditions of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity.  We have extended the discussion 
to look at non-axiomatic models assuming trade-offs between cognitive effort and decision 
accuracy; such approaches therefore consider the costs associated with making decisions. 
Certain models within this category can be described by an optimising process whereby a 
utility-based objective function is maximised subject to perceived cost constraints.  The 
assumption of bounded rationality is consistent with this; decision-makers are assumed to be 
wholly rational but operate within constraints which prevent the full evaluation of alternatives 
either due to cognitive limitations or incomplete data.   
 
Other models do not necessarily assume pure utility maximisation as the objective but 
assume that decision-makers apply aspirations to outcomes.   This is captured by satisficing 
behaviour under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity.  Algorithmic choice reduction models 
provide the framework from which this proposition can be developed.  Thus, decision-makers 
may be assumed to pursue a systematic process of comparison based upon attributes; 
alternatively, they may apply a range of heuristics which transform and reduce the choice sets.    
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Typical criticisms of non-axiomatic models relate to the biases or errors which they may 
induce.  For example, heuristics and other reduced-criteria decision models have an obvious 
potential to violate the axioms of dominance and invariance. Since all attributes of prospects 
are not considered, potentially superior choices may be overlooked, violating dominance.  
Similarly, the principle of invariance requires that the same information carry an equal weight 
with the decision-maker regardless of the order in which it is presented; reduced-criteria 
models may be unduly sensitive to the sequence ordering of information.  In the case of the 
representative heuristic, numerous biases may result such as recency bias (overweighting 
recent events) or availability bias (overweighting the importance of information which may be 
more readily recalled).  Decision models with stopping rules also promote anchoring bias as, 
once a satisfactory option is identified, additional cognitive processing terminates.  Such 
biases can therefore induce choice error and suboptimal outcomes, one side of the trade-off 
between accuracy and effort. 
 
Empirically, it is possible to compare the predictive performance of a reduced-set, or 
simple decision-rule model with that of more formal models.  In doing so, it is useful to 
“deconstruct” sources of error, essentially distinguishing between bias and variance. Using 
standard methodology, we can express a functional relationship between a dependent variable 
Y and an independent variable X as; Y = f(X) + whereis a normally distributed error term 
with mean = 0 (noise).  Given a model f~ (X) of f (X), the expected error for point x is then; 
 
Err(x) = E[(Y - f~ (x))2] 
which can be decomposed as; 
Err(x) = (E[ f~ (x)] - f (x))2 +  (E[( f~ (x) - E[ f~ (x)])2] + 2 Equation 26 
 
102 
Total error is therefore the sum of Bias2, variance and noise (an irreducible error which cannot 
be affected by changes in the model).  Bias arises when the process involved in decision-
making skews preferences due to a systematic over/under-weighting of particular criteria; 
variance relates to prediction error arising from the sensitivity of a model to different samples 
from the same population.   Bias is independent of variance meaning that a process subject to 
bias may result in lower total errors than a model with high variance.   
 
This proposition was illustrated by Wübben and Wangenheim (2008), comparing a 
Pareto/NBD model with a simple “hiatus” rule.  Pareto/NBD (negative binomial distribution) 
models have been widely used in retail settings to forecast likely customer purchasing patterns 
over time (Schmittlein, Morrison, & Colombo, 1987; Fader, Hardie, & Lee, 2005).  Following 
the procedure of Schmittlein et al, the model requires only two inputs relating to an existing 
customer (a customer who has made transactions in the past); how recently the last transaction 
occurred and how many transactions took place over a specified time interval.  This can be 
summarised as; X = x, tx, T, where x is the number of transactions which took place over 
period [0, T]  and; tx (0 < tx < T) represents the time of the last transaction within the 
interval,  [0, T].  From this, E [X (t)] denotes the expected number of transactions in 
period t; P (X (t) = x) represents the probability of x number of transactions occurring in 
time period t.   The expected number of transactions over the time interval [T, T + t ]  for 
an individual with a past transaction history of (X = x, tx, T) is then given by;  
 
E (Y(t)⎹ X = x, tx, T)  
 
The model estimates three parameters; a transaction rate, , a drop-out rate,  and an estimate 
of the “lifetime” of the customer (a point after which they become inactive),.  
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Using data for apparel, airline and music transactions, Wübben and Wangenheim found 
predictive accuracy rates of 75% &, 74% and 77% respectively.  This was compared with a 
simple “hiatus” rule in which customers who had made no transactions over a historic period, 
the length of which was suggested by managers, were deemed to be inactive.  This simple 
model gave accuracies of; 83%, 77% and 77% respectively, outperforming the formal model 
on two out of the three data sets while matching it on the third.   In essence, the Pareto/NBD 
approach, like many formal models, seeks to minimise bias whereas the hiatus rule is more 
likely to result in bias.  However, the latter only estimates one parameter (the length of time 
before which a non-transacting customer is deemed inactive) and therefore incurs low 
variance.  The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that apparently simplistic models have the 
potential to outperform formal models where data interactions are complex and there is a high 
degree of uncertainty or ambiguity (for further examples see; Wright & Stern, 2015). 
 
5.2. Error versus Systematic Bias 
 
While algorithmic decision models, judgment and heuristics may promote choice bias, 
they nevertheless have the potential to outperform more complex models in some cases.  
However, just as formal model builders seek to reduce variance in order to improve predictive 
power, so rational decision-makers should seek to reduce bias where it can be identified.  This 
proposition is perhaps most feasible if the source of bias can be appropriately described.  It is 
therefore useful to distinguish between simple error, due perhaps to misinterpretation, 
misunderstanding or lack of information, and potential sources of persistent psychological 
bias.  For example, descriptive explanations for bias inducing error include the effect of 
dissonance, or noise, arising from both internal (cognitive) and external decision making 
environments (cues, interpretation and feedback). Thus, uncertainty, lack of clarity, inaccurate 
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recall and mismatching have all been hypothesised as contributing factors (Griffiths, Chater, 
Kemp, Perfors & Tenenbaum, 2010; Lee, Amir & Ariely, 2009).  Decision-makers may then 
perceive a higher associated risk of error encouraging the selection of options which are likely 
to minimise any associated costs (Haselton & Galperin, 2012).  Empirically, noise has been 
shown to affect not only perception but also, within certain contexts, cognitive function and 
hence behaviour (Lupien, McEwen, Gunnar & Heim, 2009).  Systematic behavioural biases 
have also been identified in relation to two important areas of risky decision-making; 
probabilistic assessment and intertemporal choice.  The former is often attributed to the 
representativeness heuristic and confirmation bias and arises when decision-makers either 
understate or ignore information which should inform objective probability assessments.   
 
5.2.1 Base-Rate Error  
 
The majority of uncertain events carry a base-rate probability and an event-specific 
probability.  For example, we might assume a base-rate probability with regard to the 
likelihood of it raining today derived from knowledge of the general frequency and pattern of 
historic rainfall.   We may then modify this assessment depending upon the presence of dark 
clouds, the event-specific information.   The representativeness heuristic tends to overweight 
the event-specific information as it compares the current event (dark clouds) with other 
similar events, deriving a probability from those events alone ignoring the base-rate.  
Bayesian probability theory describes an unbiased approach to assessing likelihood as 
“degrees of belief” about certain outcomes which are expressed as probabilities based upon all 
available, relevant information (Geisser 2017).  We have previously see that the general 
expression for inferred probability given a base-rate and event-specific information is then; 
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P(A1 | B) = [P(A1) P( B | A1)]  /  [P(A1) P( B | A1) + P(A2) P( B | A2)] Equation  27 
where P(A1 | B) denotes the probability of A1 given B, P(A2) = 1- P(A1) 
 
This can be illustrated with regard to rainfall likelihood using the following assumptions:   
 
P(A1) = 55/365 = .15  (it rains 55 days per year on average) 
P(A2) = 310/365 = .85  (the average number of dry days per year) 
P(B | A1) = .7 (it rains 70% of the time when there is a dark cloud) 
P(B | A2) = .3 (it does not rains 30% of the time when there is a dark cloud) 
 
 therefore;  
 
 P(A1) P( B | A1) = .15 x .7 = .11 
P(A1) P( B | A1) + P(A2) P( B | A2) = [.15 x .7] + [.85 x .3] = .36 
P(A1 | B) = .11 / .36 = .29 
 
From this, we see that ignoring the base-rate probability would give an erroneous result as the 
decision-maker would assume P( B | A1), significantly overstating the actual likelihood of 
rainfall.  Similarly, the base-rate alone would understate the true likelihood.  Therefore, 
decision-making approaches which ignore relevant probabilistic information are likely to 
create bias. 
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5.2.2 Intertemporal Discounting Bias 
 
The second significant bias regarding intertemporal choice also appears to suggest 
cognitive error leading to apparent inconsistencies in relation to discount rates.  Early models 
of preferences over time simply adapted basic EU models to reflect the existence of multiple 
consumption streams over set time intervals (Samuelson, 1937).  Therefore, given a level of 
endowment, the rational decision-maker contemplates various consumptions streams over 
their lifetime (ct, ……., cT).  Applying the standard axiomatic assumptions of completeness, 
transitivity and continuity, a utility function then exists in relation to the  time-dependent 
consumption flows; Ut(ct, ……., cT).  Preferences relating to consumption in different time 
periods are assumed to be captured by a single discount rate.   This results in an intertemporal 
utility function of the form; 
Ut(c0, ……., cT) = ∑ 𝐷(𝑡)𝑢(்௧ୀ଴ ct) where D(t) = (
1/1 + p)t Equation 28 
Here, the component, u(ct) measures the individual’s utility in period t while D(t) reflects the 
subjective discounting function applied to that future consumption, the actual discount rate 
being represented by p.  Consequently, the Rational Man is deemed to plan his consumption 
efficiently over time based upon expected income, allocating in such a way that the present 
value of all utilities summed over each period of consumption is maximised (Koopmans, 
1960).  It is then clear that, given an initial level of utility derived from a particular outcome, 
there must be some future level of consumption such that the Rational Man would be 
indifferent between the two. Such a proposition made it relatively easy to determine individual 
discount rates from the ratio of the indifference values.  
 
There are two useful distinctions to be drawn with regard to intertemporal choices within 
the classical model of discounted utility. The first relates to the process of discounting itself, 
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which is considered to be a rational function of uncertainty, prospective changes in tastes or, 
in monetary terms, expected declines in the real value of money and purchasing power over 
time.  The second distinction concerns simple time preference, which promotes utility from 
consumption now over delayed utility from consumption sometime in the future. The two 
propositions, however, offer a degree of potential conflict which the decision-maker is 
assumed to resolve efficiently: Current consumption is subject to the law of diminishing 
marginal utility; as more of an item is consumed, so its incremental contribution to total utility 
declines. Conversely, deferring consumption to a later date by saving current income (or 
declining to borrow in order to finance future consumption, in an alternative case) incurs a 
time preference cost (and a future income cost in the case of borrowing). The rational 
decision-maker must therefore determine optimal consumption paths which resolve any such 
conflicts, resulting in the overall maximisation of utility; within classical theory, they are 
naturally assumed capable of doing so.  
 
While the proposition of discounted utility is essentially derived from pure economic 
doctrine, psychological effects were also recognised as motivating factors behind 
intertemporal choice behaviour. Thus, the early work of von Bohn-Bawerk (1890), later 
formalised by Fisher (1930), suggested that humans suffered from a systematic tendency to 
underestimate future consumption needs and hence had a natural bias towards current 
consumption. This built-in bias was assumed to manifest through the discounting process 
which then affects the perceived “value” of the future. Similarly, Rae & Mixter (1905) 
proposed that intertemporal choice was governed by a number of psychological factors which 
either promoted or constrained a desire to accumulate. They proposed both a bequest motive, 
the desire to defer or confer consumption capacity for the benefit of the future, and a tendency 
towards self-restraint. Essentially, however, all psychological and economic factors deemed to 
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affect intertemporal preference were assumed to be captured by the discount rate applied to 
each of the future utility streams.  
 
In effect, the seemingly straightforward model of discounted utility imposes some 
restrictive assumptions in order to ensure that classical axioms are maintained. Somewhat 
analogous to the independence axiom of expected utility theory, discounted utility theory 
assumes consumption independence whereby an individual’s utility derived from 
consumption in any period is deemed to be independent of consumption in any other period. 
By extension, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between two periods is also 
independent of consumption in all other periods. Thus, while the independence axiom of 
expected utility theory assumes that preferences with regard to uncertain prospects are 
unaffected by consequential outcomes which prospects share, so consumption independence 
assumes that preferences with regard to intertemporal consumption allocations are not 
affected by previous, identical consumption patterns.  
 
The discounted utility model further assumes that the discount function is identical across 
all forms of consumption regardless of source. Similarly, the assumption of constant, 
continuous discounting implies that time variability is monotonically compounded (the 
discount rate does not change). Consequently, varying two outcomes in time by the same 
duration (either bringing them forward to an earlier common date or delaying them to a later 
common date) should have no effect on preferences. Furthermore, the application of constant 
discounting implies that intertemporal choices must be ranked consistently over time such that 
the discounted marginal utility derived from future consumption is less than or equal to the 
discounted utility derived from consumption one period earlier (Albrecht & Weber, 1995). 
Such conditions must apply across all discrete decision timeframes. The essential aspect for 
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the purposes of the current discussion relates to the role of uncertainty of the timing of 
outcomes. Under discounted utility, this uncertainty is assumed to be captured fully by the 
discount rate while equal, prospective changes in the timing of outcomes do not affect 
intertemporal choice. In this manner, choices through time are ‘priced’ efficiently as all 
factors which can affect utility are deemed to have been correctly discounted based upon all 
available current information. 
 
In practice, the discounted utility model finds little empirical support. As opposed to 
constant compounded discount rates, observed discount rates have been found to decline over 
time, consistent with a process of hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997; Phelps & Pollak, 
1968).  A hyperbolic discounting model can be described by the general form, summing cash 
flows and utilities over time as shown in Equation 28.  However, the discount rate is no longer 
a constant but declines with time delay (t), giving; D(t) = 1/(1 + t).  Hyperbolic discounting 
implies that near-term prospects are discounted more heavily than later prospects, the discount 
rate declining as a function of the delay.  This was illustrated by and experiment conducted by 
Thaler (1981) in which participants were asked to specify the amount of money they would 
require; one-month, one-year and ten years in the future, in order for them to be indifferent to 
receiving $15 now. The median replies were $20; $50 and $100, implying annualised discount 
rates of 345%, 120% and 19% respectively. In addition, preferences between two delayed 
outcomes have also been found to reverse when presented within a more immediate 
timeframe. Therefore, decision-makers may express a preference for £110 in 31 days versus 
£100 in 30 days while simultaneously preferring £100 now to £110 tomorrow (Green, Fristoe 
& Myerson, 1994).  
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A similar temporal discounting bias has also been found depending on whether the timing 
of an outcome is perceived as an acceleration or delay in its receipt versus prior expectations 
Therefore, in empirical tests, participants who did not expect to receive goods for several 
months were found to be willing to pay extra to receive the goods immediately. Conversely, 
when goods intended for immediate delivery were delayed for an equivalent period, 
participants demanded a greater sum as compensation for the time delay (Loewenstein, 1988). 
Empirical evidence also suggests that individuals apply different discount rates to 
intertemporal gains versus losses; gains being discounted more than losses of equal nominal 
magnitude and delay. Equally, relatively small amounts appear to be discounted more than 
larger amounts (Estle, Green, Myerson & Holt, 2006; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).  
 
The cognitive biases with regard to probability and temporal discounting have been found 
to replicate with regard to subadditivity bias.  Therefore, a number of studies have shown that 
perceptions of both value and outcome probability differ according to whether a proposition is 
presented in its entirety or a number of constituent parts (Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter, 2010; 
Fox, 1999; Fox, Rogers & Tversky, 1996; Neil Bearden, Wallsten & Fox, 2007; Read, 2001; 
Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Wong, 2008).  In that regard, a substantial body of research has 
been conducted into perceived values of non-traded assets (Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & 
d'Arge, 1982; Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992). These are typically termed “public goods” and 
might include any source of general environmental utility or entity from which utility can be 
derived and for which there is no objective external market price.  Obvious examples might 
include assessments of the value of woodland or natural lakes for the purposes of cost-benefit 
analysis. The issue then might be to determine the potential loss in “social value” from any 
economic or other development which may adversely impact the integrity or enjoyment of 
that amenity. The same principle can be extended to environmental issues, such as the cost of 
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oil spills or other natural or man-made disasters. Discounting applies in such cases as, 
consistent with a number of financial theories relating to asset valuation, the current value 
assigned to public goods should, at least in part, reflect the perceived net present value (NPV) 
of future discounted utilities from enjoying that amenity unencumbered (Damodaran, 2012; 
Geltner & Mei, 1995; Lucas, 1978; Myers, 1984). 
 
Evidence of the impact of subadditivity of probability on valuation was provided by an 
experiment in which participants were found to prefer a prize conditional upon the outcomes 
of two independent events, each with a probability of  1/6, to an alternative proposition of an 
identical prize contingent on a single event, the probability of which was 1/3 (Starmer & 
Sugden, 1993). Read (2001), in turn, conducted experiments designed to test subadditivity 
versus hyperbolic discounting in intertemporal choices. Participants were offered smaller-
sooner versus larger-later monetary amounts. Once a choice had been made, the other value 
was adjusted until a point of indifference was established. Participants were presented with 
choices including amounts applicable over an extended timespan as well as interim amounts at 
stages throughout the entire timespan. The derivation of indifference points in each case 
enabled applicable discount rates to be calculated for each interval. Read found clear evidence 
of subadditive temporal choice but no evidence of declining impatience, as implied by 
hyperbolic discounting. The clear implication is that intertemporal choice is subject to bias but 
the process appears to be more complex than simplistic discounting models assume. Decision-
makers thus appear to be influenced by patterns of delay as well as the duration and frequency 
of intervals.  
 
As an extension to the previous analysis, Scholten & Read (2006) developed a 
discounting-by-intervals (DBI) model to explain observed patterns of intertemporal 
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discounting. The model hypothesised that discount rates are a function of how far outcomes 
are from the present and also the interval between future outcomes. Therefore, the outcome 
associated with a smaller-sooner outcome occurring at time t (tS)) is discounted on the basis of 
its own interval from the present (0  tS) whilst the larger-later amount is discounted over the 
interval from (tS  tL). In essence, therefore, the DBI model is structured in a manner 
compatible with the widely observed effects of subinterval discounting when outcomes are 
framed on the basis of defined, intervening stages. Based upon further empirical experiments, 
the DBI model again found that discount rates tend to be higher the closer an outcome is to the 
present; decision-makers therefore appear to attach greater importance to the prospect of 
receiving near-term gains. In addition, there appears to be an interval effect such that discount 
rates tend to be relatively higher when outcomes are close to one another, but sufficiently 
removed from the present.  
 
5.2.3 Sunk Cost Fallacy 
 
The sunk cost effect describes an adaptive bias in decision-making stemming from 
previous actions, choices, commitments, investment, cues or behaviour (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985, Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara & Miles, 2012). It is a bias which promotes a 
continuation of past behaviours and reinforcements of prior decisions to the exclusion of 
viable alternatives, directly violating axiomatic utility maximisation. Therefore, decisions 
based upon sunk costs rather than expected outcomes are necessarily objectively irrational. 
The fallacy implies an endowment effect, optimistic probability bias and loss aversion in 
relation to costs already committed.   
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One of the most familiar characterizations of the sunk cost effect comes in the form of 
physical capital investment decisions. Companies embarking upon major capital expenditures 
usually incur significant costs in terms of planning, consultation and time costs over and 
above simple monetary outlays (Somers & Nelson, 2001). These can be considered broad 
‘enterprise’ costs through which many layers within the decision-making structure of a 
company can become ‘invested’ in the outcome of certain projects. Most capital projects 
inevitably involve risks and uncertainty due to gestation periods, lead times, unexpected cost 
overruns and potential market shifts; certain risks may be quantifiable or identifiable at 
inception, uncertainties, such as a sudden shift in market environment, may be less so (Dixit, 
1993; Kardes, Ozturk, Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2013). One manifestation of sunk cost bias is 
that decision-makers appear to become less willing to explore other uncertain options once 
sufficient resources have already been committed to a particular course of action (Keil, Tan, 
Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen & Wassenaar, 2000; Kelly & Milkman, 2011; Staw, 1981). While 
there is evidence that sunk cost behaviour with respect to investments of time alone may 
differ from that involving tangible monetary outlays (Soman, 2001), once such financial 
commitments are made, the sunk cost effect appears to become robust (Garland, 1990).  The 
sunk cost effect can be observed more generally with, for example, a reluctance on the part of 
consumers to cancel a pre-paid holiday despite the prospect of  adverse weather or remaining 
with an energy or telephone service supplier despite objective evidence that a cheaper 
alternative is available. 
 
Empirical evidence reveals that the sunk cost effect is sufficiently strong to elicit 
escalation of commitment even when the outlook for prospects has deteriorated.  Thus Arkes 
and Blumer (1985) found that 85% of participants in an experiment were prepared to commit 
additional funds to a project, to which a commitment had already been made, even though a 
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competitor had just launched a superior offering.  When no prior investment existed, only 
17% of participants were prepared to commit funds to the same project.  Others have found 
similar persistence to projects despite evidence that they are failing, suggesting that a sunk 
cost effect can even overcome negative feedback (Arkes & Hutzel, 2000; Bragger, Hantula, 
Bragger, Kirnan & Kutcher, 2003). However, while there appear to be strong psychological 
factors promoting escalations of commitment, switching and de-escalation do occur under 
certain conditions. This is particularly the case once the prospect of failure increases 
sufficiently to raise the likelihood of the ultimate outcome underperforming expectations by a 
substantial margin; the more so if an attractive alternative becomes apparent (Garland, 
Sandefur & Rogers, 1990; Lee, Keil & Kasi, 2012). The presence of an attractive, viable 
alternative therefore appears to provide an important qualification to the sunk cost effect 
(Stray, Moe & Dyba, 2012). In extreme cases, strategic change is forced, such as when the 
likelihood of bankruptcy is perceived to be high if the current strategy is maintained. Under 
such circumstances, abandonment, even at a debilitating cost, has been found to occur (Ross 
& Staw, 1993).  
 
The sunk cost effect appears to elicit positive bias in relation to probabilistic assessments 
of outcomes once commitments have been made. Decision-makers thus appear to adopt a 
skewed optimism with regard to favoured projects. Arkes and Hutzel (2000) examined 
whether such a bias causes a sunk cost effect or is a consequence of it. Two experiments were 
conducted. In the first, some participants were presented with a scenario involving a sunk cost 
while the remaining participants read the same scenario but without a sunk cost element. Half 
of the members in each group were also informed of the objective probabilities associated 
with the project’s outcome, thus avoiding any impact from psychological “probability 
inflation”. Results indicated a sunk cost bias, implying that inflated probabilities are not a 
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necessary condition to create the effect (as probabilities were known). In the second 
experiment, participants provided their own probability estimates before and after a decision 
to invest. Participants making the decision to invest subsequently assigned significantly higher 
probabilities to the expected success of the project in comparison with those who declined to 
invest, thus implying that the inflation bias is a consequence of, or partial justification for, the 
decision to invest.  
 
5.3 Behavioural Biases in Financial Markets 
 
Financial markets have proved to be a rich environment within which to examine 
behaviour.  Rational behaviour can be described by the axioms of utility maximisation 
encapsulated by CPT, implying that investors discount information objectively in accordance 
with their individual preferences and beliefs devoid of cognitive bias.  Markets are thus 
assumed to be efficient discounters of information; differences in individual preferences 
being resolved through the distillation of equilibrium prices (price levels at which there is no 
incentive for any rational investor to buy or sell in the expectation of a risk-free gain).  The 
result is that the prices of financial assets are theoretically “efficient” meaning that they 
reflect all publicly available information subject to any limitations placed upon arbitrage5.  
Therefore, the early Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) derived a 
theoretical equilibrium price for risky assets based upon expected returns consistent with 
rational expectations with regard to risk.  The model takes the following form; 
 
E(ri) = Rf  + i (ERm - Rf) Equation 29 
                                                 
5 Arbitrage, in this context, refers to the ability of investors to make risk-free gains due to the fundamrntal 
mispricing of assets.  They are assumed to either buy or sell securities until the inefficiency in pricing is fully 
removed. If there are limits on arbitrage, either due to its associated costs ot imperfect information, mispricing 
can persist. 
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The expected return on asset i is therefore a function of the risk-free rate (Rf), the asset’s 
volatility relative to that of the market or benchmark (i)  and the expected excess return of 
the market or benchmark (ERm) over and above the risk-free rate (a market risk premium). 
Since investors expect to be compensated for the time value of money, they demand a return 
over and above that which is available risk-free (typically the return on secured savings or 
government-backed short-term paper).  They also expect to be compensated for the amount of 
risk they assume.  This is reflected in the beta term (i) which is calculated as the covariance 
of the asset return with that of the market or benchmark, divided by the variance of the 
market or benchmark return.  A beta > 1 therefore denotes an asset with greater price 
volatility than that of the market or benchmark.  In an efficient market, and consistent with 
the principle of stochastic dominance, the higher the beta, the greater the expected return in 
order to compensate for the higher risk. 
 
Fama and French (1996) developed the basic CAPM in the form of a three factor model, 
adding explicit variables of value and size to the market risk factor of CAPM.  The logic of 
the model derives from evidence that historical equity price data exhibits a long-term positive 
skew with regard to value and size factors.  Thus, value (defined as a high book value to price 
ratio) and smaller stocks appear to carry positive return premia over the long-term which 
cannot be explained solely by CAPM beta.  Therefore, the excess return of an asset can be 
expressed as; 
 
E(ri) = Rf  + i (ERm - Rf) + bs (SMB) + bh (HML) Equation 30 
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where; SMB refers to Small (market capitalisation) Minus Big and HML defines High 
(book-to-market) Minus Low. The sensitivities of the asset to the size and value factors 
captured by bs and bh. 
 
The CAPM and three factor models assume that significant information regarding a 
security’s risk can be subsumed into the market-related beta measure, the covariance of the 
security with the general market or benchmark.  This represents a major simplification of 
Markowitz (1954) whose derivation of efficient portfolios and quantification of portfolio risk 
require resolution of the full covariance matrix across all available stocks. While different in 
terms of computational effort, the basic assumption that covariance adequately captures risk 
remains.   
 
A more general model, and an alternative to CAPM, is found in Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(Ross, 1978).   The APT model generalises expected return and risk measures across common 
risk factors.  The model takes the form; 
 
E(ri) = Rf  + bi1 RP1 + bi2 RP2 + , ……… , + bin RPn Equation 31 
where RP  denotes the risk premium associated with a specific factor while bi measure 
the sensitivity of the asset to each risk factor or characteristic. 
 
It will be noted that APT does not rely upon any explicit market risk premium; instead an 
asset’s price derives from its expected return determined in accordance with its sensitivity to 
specific factors with their own expected payoffs.  The arbitrage element of the theory assumes 
that, should an asset be fundamentally mispriced, arbitrageurs will enter the market to either 
buy or sell the security until the equilibrium price is restored.   
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The models described here derive equilibrium prices for assets based upon risk 
characteristics.  They assume that market efficiency prevails as rational investors will act 
quickly to eliminate any inefficient pricing, realising a risk-free return in the process.  New 
information is incorporated into prices through risk premia coefficients for each security.  
This is based upon the assumption of wholly rational expectations consistent with the 
evolution of Bayesian probabilistic beliefs incorporating all relevant information. The 
challenge for models of financial market efficiency stems in part from evidence that stock 
price volatility is consistently far too high to be explained by information and news flow 
(Shiller, 1981) leading to the conclusion that, as opposed to being efficient discounters of 
information, investors systematically over-or underreact to news in part due to confirmation 
bias (De Bont & Thaler,1985; 1987).   
 
Numerous heuristics have been linked to biases in financial market behaviour.  Thus, the 
representativeness heuristic has been associated with skewed expectations as investors have 
been found to associate a good company, assessed in relation to reputation and past 
performance, with a good investment (Shefrin, 2000; Solt & Statman, 1989). In the same way, 
certain investors are predisposed to buy past winners on the basis that historic success is a 
good indicator of future success (Bailey, Nofsinger & O'Neill, 2003). Such behaviour appears 
to explain why some investors have a tendency to chase strongly appreciating stocks whilst 
ignoring underperformers (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985). Evidence suggests that such behaviour 
is influenced both by long- and short-term performance (Dhar & Kumar, 2001).  Similarly, 
anchoring and recency bias appear prevalent as investors tend to focus upon limited 
characteristics of prospects while placing greater emphasis upon recent information.  These 
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biases are particularly apparent with less sophisticated investors who often fail to undertake 
adequate research either due to its lack of availability or insufficient skill (Tan & Tan, 2012). 
 
An optimistic bias has also been identified in forecasts of financial analysts and investors 
when predicting future returns and outcomes (Barberis, Huang & Santos, 1999; Easterwood 
& Nutt, 1999; Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; Kacperczyk & Kominek, 2002; Malmendier, 
Tate & Yan, 2011), although the level of optimism can decline when feedback is anticipated 
(Carroll, Sweeny & Shepperd, 2006; Moore & Healy, 2008). Thus, expectations have been 
found to decline prior to imminent, relevant announcements (McGraw, Mellers & Ritov, 
2004; Narciss, Koerndle & Dresel, 2011; Shepperd, Ouellette & Fernandez, 1996; Sweeny & 
Shepperd, 2010; Van Dijk, Zeelenberg & Van der Pligt, 2003). In a further study, the framing 
of situations and risk attitudes have been found to influence levels of optimism (Balasuriya, 
Muradoglu & Ayton, 2013). The reverse effect has been identified by studies in which 
individuals have been found to overestimate the reliability of their knowledge and predictive 
powers resulting in the assumption of greater levels of risk (Heath & Tversky, 1991; Keppe & 
Weber, 1995; Krueger & Dickson, 1993; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). A number of studies 
have also shown that errors in risk perception can lead to the assumption of higher than 
expected levels of risk (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; 
Roszkowski & Davey, 2010; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Stone & Grønhaug, 1993).   
 
Overconfidence, often stemming from recent good performance, is a further behavioural 
bias which, in some cases, reinforces excessive optimism.  Thus, investment managers have 
been found to overestimate their own skill levels, a trait which has been linked with higher-
than-average trading volumes (Odean, 1998).  The assumption of above average skill appears 
in some cases to lead to a miscalculation of risk as decision-makers assume that their superior 
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skill mitigates any informational disadvantage which they may have, making them more 
prepared to accept higher risk in the expectation of greater payoff (Shefrin, 2000).  
 
Familiarity bias has been found to influence the stock selections of certain investors, also 
contributing to a home bias (preferring to invest in domestic stocks).  Familiarity bias appears 
to influence risk perception to the extent that some investors consider companies which are 
household names to be less risky than less familiar alternatives (Hiraki, Ito & Kuroki, 2003; 
Huberman, 2001; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010; Wang, Keller & Siegrist, 2011). The home bias 
effect arises as certain investors have a tendency to favour their domestic market 
disproportionately, in some cases missing out on potential diversification opportunities 
offered by international markets (French & Poterba, 1991; Graham, Harvey & Huang, 2009; 
Strong & Xu, 2003). Further, there is evidence that investors even favour local companies 
within the context of a domestic market (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999), although such effects 
appear to depend upon the level of investor sophistication (Karlsson & Nordén, 2007; 
Kimball & Shumway, 2006). The home bias may, of course, be prompted by perceived 
differences in levels of knowledge and information although opportunities for information 
gathering may not be adequately exploited (Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009). In that 
regard, language and culture bias have been found to play a role, such that investors favour 
companies (and markets) which routinely report in their native language (Grinblatt & 
Keloharju, 2000). Consistent with this, in certain markets, foreign investors also appear to 
skew investments in terms of broad characteristics, including industry and sector allocations, 
as opposed to widely diversified market exposures. For example, non-domestic investors in 
Japan have been found to favour manufacturing industries, large companies and those 
perceived to have adopted sound accounting practices (Kang, 1997). Perhaps confirming 
evidence of the impact of information cost, accounting preferences and familiarity bias, 
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domestic US investors have also been found, in aggregate, to concentrate overseas 
investments more in countries whose domestic securities are dual listed in the US, regardless 
of relative transaction costs and historic risk-adjusted returns (Ahearne, Griever & Warnock, 
2004). This appears to confirm that information costs are key determinants of collective 
investor preferences.  
 
A number of studies have highlighted status quo, or sunk cost bias. Thus, in a laboratory 
experiment, participants were found to favour holding investments which they had notionally 
inherited, rather than switching to alternatives (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). The 
tendency to persist with existing holdings was further confirmed via a simulated stock market 
experiment in which subjects were found to ignore information which could have enhanced 
performance, preferring instead to stay with existing investment holdings (Brown & Kagel, 
2009). The effect proved to be robust regardless of a stock’s performance, even when low 
transactions costs applied. Studies of actual portfolio data have found that holdings of retail 
investors in brokerage accounts change very little over time (Ameriks & Zeldes, 2004) while 
similar results have been found for the pension accounts of US investors (Agnew, Balduzzi & 
Sunden, 2003). The status quo bias has also been observed in purchase decisions whereby 
retail investors reveal a preference for adding to existing holdings rather than diversifying or 
switching elsewhere (Barber, Odean & Zhu, 2009a). The effect was further confirmed by a 
study examining the impact of the number of alternatives on status quo bias, finding that the 
greater the number of feasible alternatives, the stronger the likely status quo bias (Kempf & 
Ruenzi, 2006). Possible explanations for this bias could lie in a recognised lack of 
sophistication on the part of such investors leading to a belief that they lack the knowledge 
and conviction to identify potential alternatives. Similarly, individual investors may feel that 
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they lack the time or resources to acquire the necessary information to undertake such 
appraisals.  
 
5.3.1. The Impact of Historical Price Patterns on Expectations 
 
Numerous studies have sought to detect and explain patterns within markets. Thus, 
cycles of various forms and durations have been identified (Avouyi-Dovi & Matheron, 2005; 
Bolten & Weigand, 1998; Conover, Jensen, Johnson & Mercer, 2008; Granger & 
Morgenstern, 1963; Schwert, 1989). To the extent that investors impute signals from prior 
price patterns and behaviours, various biases may apply along with the potential for 
misinterpreting false patterns within noisy data. The impact of past trends on future 
expectations amongst non-expert investors was tested directly by De Bondt (1993). Using a 
technical analysis game, participants were presented with 6 graphs each comprising 48 
monthly price series. While anonymous to the participants, the data related to closing prices 
of the S&P 500 Index over various periods; three representing bull markets and three bear 
markets. The graphs were presented in random order but with values changed so that the 
source could not be identified. In addition, no actual dates were used although the graphical 
data contained monthly markers. The participants were then asked to predict future prices 7 
and 13 months into the future. In addition, they were asked to provide a range around their 
estimates, in the form of a high and a low point, such that there would be a 1 in 10 chance that 
the actual price would be higher and a 1 in 10 chance that it would be lower than their 
projected ranges. Results indicated that, on average, participants were more optimistic in bull 
markets as opposed to bear markets. However, while predicting a continuation of general 
trend in rising markets, forecasts tended to be somewhat muted in comparison with past, 
actual trends.  In bull markets, 50.6% of participants were found to be strong trend followers, 
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posting clearly higher expected future price estimates, while only 11.1% were deemed 
contrarian (expecting future declines in prices). In bear markets, participants were roughly 
equally divided in terms of future expectations in terms of gains and losses. In all cases, 
participants tended to hedge their forecasts by skewing their probability distribution data (as 
defined by their confidence ranges) in the opposite direction to that of the forecast. Thus, for 
strongly rising projected trends, confidence ranges would exhibit a negative skew around the 
forecast point, and vice versa for negative projections.  
 
A number of studies have addressed the issue of expectations based upon patterns or 
biases within broader categories of historical data. Thus, investors have been found to 
interpret strong historical earnings and sales momentum as evidence that a stock is currently 
cheap (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In the event that the stock price appreciates 
subsequently, investors then have a tendency to assume confirmation, thereby increasing 
optimism further (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Koehler, 1991; Nickerson, 1998). A virtuous 
loop can then be created in the event of continued positive earnings momentum with investors 
more likely to anticipate future positive earnings surprises (Carhart, 1997; Hendricks, Patel & 
Zeckhauser, 1993). Such positive feedback has been found to inform buy decisions 
significantly more than negative feedback (Shafir, 1993).  
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL TEST OF UTILITY MAXIMISING BEHAVIOUR 
 WITHIN COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Auction markets represent potentially rich environments within which to analyse 
behaviour. Classical auction theory rests on an assumption of Revenue Equivalence whereby 
rational sellers should expect the same average profits from all standard auctions, implying 
that buyers should also be indifferent between auctions of equivalent items (Vickery, 1962).  
Efficient auctions then exist when final sale prices converge with objective values as the 
number of bidders increases.  This is the case even if individuals only have partial information 
with regard to objective values as the actions of rational bidders are assumed to aggregate all 
available relevant information in the final price (Milgrom, 1979).  Rational bidders are 
therefore assumed to act in order to maximise their own consumer surplus, defined as the 
difference between their private market value (v) for an item and the price (p) which they have 
to pay to acquire it.  
 
 Early theory often described auction environments comprising a fixed number of risk-
neutral bidders each acting on the basis of independent information.  Whereas Myerson (1981) 
showed that optimal auctions which maximise the seller’s revenues could occur even in the 
absence of symmetry of information between buyers and sellers, Maskin and Riley (1984) 
found that the specific format of an auction could affect bidder behaviour, in some cases 
determining outcomes.  As a result, first-price sealed bid auctions were found to be generally 
more profitable to a seller than standard auctions.  Milgrom and Weber (1982) replaced the 
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assumption of independent information with the concept of “affiliated” information, which 
exists when one bidder has more optimistic information about an item’s value.  They suggest 
that such situations increase the average profitability of standard auctions as affiliated 
information tends to increase the optimism, and hence willingness to pay, of other bidders.   
 
Prior to the Internet age, auctions tended to be considered as isolated, standalone events.  
The advent of online auctions, through sites such as eBay, has dramatically changed this 
landscape to the extent that multiple, close-to-identical items are regularly offered.  Thus, 
online marketplaces are characterised by substantial competition between sellers, buyers and 
close-to-identical items.  In theory, such high levels of competition between buyers and sellers 
and low cost of access to relevant information should lead to efficient outcomes as implied by 
revenue equivalence.  Selling prices for identical items should therefore converge to “fair 
value” since rational bidders would compete for items currently priced below that equilibrium 
level.   
 
However, as opposed to being indifferent between auctions offering apparently identical 
items, numerous factors have been found to affect bidder preferences and resulting behaviour.  
Thus seller reputation has been identified as a significant factor affecting potential buyer 
interest (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2004).  Similarly, auction duration (Haruvy, Popkowski Leszcyc, 
2008), the presence of reserve prices (Katkar & Reiley, 2006), lot sizes and bid increments 
(Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994; Bapna, Chang & Gupta, 2009) have all been found to affect the 
relative attractiveness of particular auctions with bidders typically favouring more liquid 
auctions with smaller fixed bidding increments.  The presence of reserve prices has been 
found to act as a relative deterrent as highest bidders cannot be sure of securing an item in the 
event that the (undeclared) reserve price is not met.   
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The particular structure of an auction can also affect its relative appeal.  Thus, the 
presence of a “buy-it-now” (BIN) option, whereby buyers can purchase the item at a declared 
price, ending the particular auction, has been found to be significant.  BIN allows bidders to 
adopt an exit strategy based upon the posted BIN price rather than pursue the potentially 
riskier strategy of bidding to the conclusion of the competitive auction.  Such auctions have 
been found to improve seller outcomes when sellers already have high reputation scores 
(Anderson, Friedman, Milam & Singh, 2008; Hardesty & Suter 2013; Standifird, Roelofs, & 
Durham, 2005; Wang, Montgomery & Srinivasan, 2008;.Yoo, Ho, & Tam, 2006).  BIN 
options therefore appear to create differentiation between close-to-identical products which 
then improves outcomes for certain categories of seller (Ackerberg, Hirano & Shahriar, 2006). 
Auctions with this feature have also been analysed in relation to consumer traits with some 
evidence of impulse buying and risk aversion (Angst, Agarwal & Kuruzovich, 2008).  Other 
behavioural biases, such as herding, have also been identified (Ariely & Simonson, 2003; 
Bockstedt, Goh & Ng 2013); in aggregate, bidders appear to be attracted to auctions which are 
more active in terms of bidding activity, even though this would indicate higher potential 
competition (Dholakia, Basuroy & Soltysinski, 2002; Simonsohn, & Ariely, 2008). Similar 
evidence has been found for quasi-endowment and opponent effects leading to over-bidding 
(Heyman, Orhun & Ariely, 2004). 
 
In terms of the efficiency of outcomes, Sun (2005) found evidence of substantial price 
dispersion across 3,164 sequential eBay auctions of close-to-identical items, violating the 
assumption of revenue equivalence.  The degree of price dispersion is somewhat surprising 
given the relatively low cost of information acquisition within online auctions.  Bidders 
therefore appear to place substantial weight on non-item related characteristics which 
differentiate between auctions and adopt very different strategies as evidenced by level of 
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search effort.  In the case of concurrent auctions, evidence of cross-bidding and active 
switching between auctions in order to seek the lowest price has been found (Anwar,  
McMillan & Zheng, 2006; Rand & Jank, 2013; Liang, 2014), although not all participants 
appear to switch  between competing auctions, the resulting inertia contributing substantially 
to differentials in final price outcomes.  A further feature, peculiar to fixed-duration online 
auctions, is the prevalence of very late bidding, a process known as ‘sniping’ (Barbaro & 
Bracht, 2004; Borle, Boatwright & Kadane, 2006; Ockenfels & Roth, 2006).  Sniping 
represents an attempt to enter a sequentially higher bid sufficiently close to the end time of the 
auction to prevent a completive response from other bidders.  The strategy is not, however, 
entirely risk-free in terms of item capture as, should a competitor manage to place an even 
later bid, the original sniper may themselves run out of time to counterbid.   
 
While studies have examined bidding outcomes in contemporaneous online auctions, the 
behaviour of auction participants in terms of tracking overlapping auctions has been less well 
explored.  Haruvy and Popkowski Leszcyc (2010) did investigate switching between 
contemporaneous auctions of identical goods from a perspective of search cost using data 
from eBay.  Designed to examine the factors which contributed to price dispersion, the cost of 
searching was found to be a significant factor in explaining inertia amongst bidders.  
Lowering search costs, by offering financial incentives (the removal of shipping or postage 
costs), was then found to reduce inertia leading to greater switching activity and lowering 
price dispersion as a result.  The study used actual bids in the different auctions to represent 
the degree of switching; it therefore did not capture data relating to switches between auctions 
which did not result in actual bids.   
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An agent-based approach examining switching and bidding behaviour was employed by 
Rand and Jank (2013).  Actual bidding data was again taken from eBay relating to auctions in 
which equivalent, brand new Canon SD1000 cameras were being offered by different sellers.  
In each case, the cameras were offered without accessories, making the items close-to-
identical.  The data covered 1155 auctions producing 19,007 bidding records.  A total of 5849 
bidders participated in the auctions with 1554 bidding in more than one auction.  Based upon 
the empirical data, the authors constructed an agent-based model with switching and bidding 
rules in order to reproduce the price evolutions seen in the empirical data.  The model 
assumed that bidders behaved rationally in terms of item capture, and therefore sought to 
achieve the lowest possible winning bid across available auctions.  Since there were multiple 
overlapping auctions at any point in time, certain preferences were assumed based upon bid 
increment and relative ending times of auctions (lower bid increments and earlier ending 
times being preferred).  It was found that greater competition and price convergence could be 
achieved across competing auctions when active switching was encouraged through 
identification of the lowest priced auctions.  By identifying current low-priced auctions with 
near ending times, new bidders were attracted to those auctions while existing potential 
bidders remained on those auction platforms increasing competition and raising average 
closing bids.   The authors therefore concluded that lack of information is a prime driver of 
observed price disparity across multiple simultaneous or overlapping auctions of close-to-
identical items.  Even though physical search costs in online platforms are low, there is a 
tangible time cost involved which a number of bidders appear reluctant to incur resulting in 
inertia.  Similar to the findings of Haruvy and Popkowski Leszcy op cit, when the search 
costs are reduced, more active switching can result leading to greater competition and cross-
auction price convergence. 
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While empirical studies of switching between simultaneous or overlapping auctions 
make extensive use of the volumous data which is available from online commerce sites such 
as eBay, switching activity is largely inferred from actual bid patterns.  These approaches 
therefore fail to include data for auction switching which does not result in bidding activity.  
The study below makes an attempt to fill this gap by testing switching activity independent of 
actual bidding using a simulated platform with two simultaneous, short, fixed-duration 
auctions of identical items.  Mouse tracking is used to capture the relevant actions of 
participants, thereby recording all acts of switching from one auction to another.  As a result, 
the study generates more complete data on switching propensity in comparison with studies 
which rely solely on recorded bid data. 
 
 
6.2.  A Study of the Effect of Information on Switching Propensity in Simultaneous 
Auctions of Identical Items 
 
 
The study was undertaken to investigate the effects of information flow, including real-
time changes in prevailing bids, “live” bid differentials between auctions and in-auction 
bidding activity, on switching frequency in the case of directly overlapping, fixed duration 
auctions of identical items.   The study therefore examines the degree of active tracking 
across pairs of auctions independent of actual bidding or bidding strategy.  Simulating two 
auctions of identical items with equivalent start and ending times eliminates some of the 
factors found to explain auction preferences in studies of price dispersion, such as timing 
differences and duration.  In addition, the simulated environment provides “close-to-zero” 
physical costs of switching between auctions.  However, given that the two simultaneous 
auctions are competitive, there is a potential opportunity cost associated with not switching as 
bidders may then overpay in one auction relative to the other. 
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6.2.1. Participants 
 
A total of 180 participants, allocated equally and at random across 6 conditions, took part 
in a simulated, very short-term competitive online auction experiment of five minutes 
duration.  The short duration was chosen in order to keep participants engaged in the task.  By 
gender, 98 of the participants were males with 82 females. Ages ranged from 18 years to 62 
years (M29.69, SD = 8.96), as shown in Table 11.   Each participant was assigned a unique 
user ID relating to the experimental condition to which they had been allocated.  Participants 
had no prior knowledge of the item to be offered through the simulated auctions or any details 
regarding any of the conditions.  No significant difference between ages was found based 
upon gender; using the two-sample t-test for unequal variances, t(178) = 1.92, p = 0.057. 
 
Table 11. Breakdown of participants by age and gender 
 
 
 
Participants were informed that they were not participating in a real auction and that they 
were not entering into any form of actual or implied contract as a result of entering notional 
bids.  It was further disclosed that there would be no associated monetary commitment as a 
result of taking part in the auction and that no item would actually be received in the event of 
entering the highest closing bid. It must be acknowledged that this practical constraint 
represents an obvious limitation; in the absence of monetary cost and incentives, certain 
aspects of behaviour may be distorted or, in some cases, not even present. In essence, 
Male Female Total
Number 98 82 180
Average Age 28.53 31.09 29.69
Max Age 62 53 62
Min Age 18 18 18
SD (Age) 8.96 9.28 8.96
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participants could bid without consequence. Thus, while all participants were asked to engage 
in the auctions as if they were genuine bidders, taking into account their own valuation of the 
item concerned and any other factors they considered relevant, there can be no guarantee that 
this outcome was achieved.  This aspect will be discussed further when the results of the 
study are considered, although some evidence relating to hypothetical versus real rewards can 
be considered briefly here. 
 
The use of a simulated environment in the current study largely reflects its aims.  
Empirical studies of auction behaviour, such as those mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
typically use actual data collected by online site operators such as eBay.  While this data is 
extensive and deep, it relates overwhelmingly to actual bidding activity.  This proves useful 
in terms of testing models of bidder choice, such as those used by Haruvy and Popkowski 
Leszcyc (2010).  However, there is no equivalent data which is universal in terms of coverage 
relating to aspects of search behaviour and auction switching on their own.  Therefore, to the 
extent that it is considered, auction switching must be inferred from bid evidence.  The 
simulated environment provides a structure in which switching activity alone can be 
identified and captured independent of any other actions taken by participants in the study.  
While actual data relating only to general search behaviour from live auctions involving 
actual monetary commitments and potential rewards in the form of item capture is clearly 
preferable, acquiring such data would require an enormous undertaking which may not be 
considered economic.  To some extent, evidence from other areas might prove useful.  For 
example, studies of Internet browsing and search queries have been undertaken in order to 
evaluate consumer behaviour.  Thus, data logging searches for items on e-commerce sites 
have been undertaken (Eastman & Jansen, 2003).  However, while significant data is 
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obtained, the context and motivation for an individual’s search behaviour is typically not 
evident from that data (Jansen & Spink, 2005).   
 
A more direct comparison of the effect of a lack of actual monetary commitment is 
provided by studies of hypothetical versus real rewards.  A number of such studies have been 
undertaken in relation to risky choices within laboratory settings.  Thus, Irwin, McClelland 
and Sculze (1992) undertook a laboratory experiment testing the impact of hypothetic versus 
real rewards on bidding behaviour relating to insurance.  Based upon a notional gamble 
incurring losses with declared probabilities, participants were required to bid for insurance in 
order to protect themselves from those potential losses.  In the event that they were successful 
in obtaining insurance, they lost nothing in the event of a loss (but paid the insurance 
premium).  If no loss accrued, all participants received a fixed amount added to their starting 
cash balances. Certain participants were told from the outset that all monetary amounts were 
hypothetical while others actually gambled with real money, potentially receiving cash at the 
end of the experiment.  Results indicated that participants in the hypothetical return condition 
entered a slightly greater dispersion of bids, with more high and low bids than was the case in 
the real reward category.  A greater willingness to accept potential losses (bidding zero for 
insurance cover) was evident in the hypothetical reward group.   Those in the real reward 
condition exhibited greater risk aversion, more regularly seeking insurance in order to 
preserve their capital.  The authors concluded that the difference in behaviour was due to 
“decreased concern about the task” when returns were hypothetical.  Conversely, in a study of 
discounting associated with delays using real and hypothetical rewards, Madden et al (2003) 
found no significant effect of reward type on discount rates. 
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6.2.2. Materials & Procedure 
 
The simulated online auction platform was created and coded using Microsoft Visual 
Basic and compiled as a stand-alone executable application. The application interacted with 
the internal clock of the host machine in order to generate precise timings for the length of the 
simulated auctions, the triggering of pre-programed events (“competitor” computer bids) and 
the capturing of the timing of user interaction through mouse clicks. The visual display 
resembled that of a typical eBay-type auction with navigation buttons available to trigger 
switching between auctions and the generation of history views (a list of all bids to date in the 
auction by bid level together with the timing of the bids and the “identity” of the bidder).  It 
was therefore a very easy process to move from one auction to the other, a process which 
involved little cost in terms of time.  To this extent, switching costs are considered to be 
close-to-zero with neither auction being disadvantaged versus the other in that regard.  Each 
auction used identical formatting with the same buttons displayed for switching, viewing 
histories and entering bids.  Each page informed the participants that an additional auction of 
an identical item with an equivalent ending time was taking place. Participants could then 
switch from one auction to the other at the press of a button. Such switching was cost free and 
virtually instantaneous, implying no associated time cost (Appendix A).   
 
 
The key events of auction switching, generation of history views and bidding sequences 
were all initiated and triggered via clicking on appropriately labelled button controls clearly 
displayed on the screens. All mouse click events associated with these buttons were logged in 
real time, in accordance with the computer’s internal clock, with the corresponding data 
stored in dynamic data files. The data recorded in this way included the exact time of each 
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mouse click along with the nature of the function executed by the mouse click and the auction 
page from which the action was triggered.  At the conclusion of the auctions, all of the 
interactive data gathered during the course of the auction experiment and stored in the 
dynamic data files was automatically downloaded into a master file, named in accordance 
with the participant’s unique user id, and saved to the computer’s hard disk for subsequent 
analysis. 
 
6.2.3. Method 
Participants were presented with two simultaneous “online” auctions for an identical item 
(a car with an indicated “on the road” value of £5995). The auctions were conducted using 
custom-built software.  Participants could interact with the software in order to compare the 
items being offered, track “real-time” bids and to place their own (notional) bids.  In order to 
create a degree of realism, the software contained pre-programmed bids for each auction; 
there was no direct competition between participants in terms of bidding as the software was 
entirely standalone.  Pre-programmed bids would be triggered at set times measured in 
relation to the starting time of the auction.  All sequential pre-programmed bids complied 
with fixed bid increments for that auction, which remained static throughout.  Pre-
programmed bids became more frequent towards the end of each auction in order to reflect 
greater competition between bidders, consistent with observed data in online auctions 
(Shmueli & Jank, 2005).  While the frequency of pre-programmed bids changed over the 
course of the auction, the intervals between bids were irregular, ensuring that the next bid 
could not reasonably be anticipated in terms of timing.   
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All auctions ran for exactly five minutes.  The start time was triggered by a participant 
clicking a button to commence the auction.  This then set the ending time exactly five minutes 
after the triggered start time, measured according to the computer’s internal clock.  The final 
highest, pre-programmed computer bid for each auction was £3100.  Opening pre-
programmed computer bids were not identical across all auctions with fast auctions starting at 
lower levels than slow auctions in order to ensure that closing, pre-programmed bids 
converge with the desired end value. The structure of the auction pairs was varied based upon 
programmed bidding intensity, with one pair varying bid increment.  In total, six conditions 
were then created, involving differing combinations of auction styles.  These are summarised 
in Table 12.   
 
Table 12. Description of experimental conditions, including auction type and summarised 
programmed parameters . 
 
Note: The study defined six conditions using combinations of “Fast” and “Slow” auctions.  Fast auctions had 46 
potential computer bids while slow auctions had 23 such pre-programmed bids. The number of possible 
computer bids allowed the various individual auctions to converge to an identical final computer bid value. 
Opening bids were fixed and identical across all Conditions other than Condition 5. Closing computed bids were 
identical for all auctions. 
 
(Auction Type) Slow Fast Slow Slow Fast Fast Fast Slow Slow Slow Fast Fast
Computer Bids 
(Number)
23 46 23 23 46 46 46 23 23 23 46 46
Bid Increment 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50 50 50
Opening Bid 2000 850 2000 2000 850 850 850 2000 900 2000 850 850
Ending (Computer) 
Bid
3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100 3100
First Computer Bid 
(Secs from Start)
2.1 1.5 2.1 4.9 1.5 0.8 1.5 2.1 6.6 2.1 2.4 1.5
Final Computer Bid 
(Secs from Start)
299.2 299.6 299.2 298.9 299.6 299.0 299.6 299.2 299.8 299.2 299.7 299.6
Condition 6Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4 Condition 5
Auction Pairings by Type
Condition 1
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The conditions reflected varying paired combinations of single auctions categorised by 
overall bidding intensity (“fast” or “slow”), determined by the total number of pre-
programmed bids over the life of each auction. Fast auctions had a total number of 46 pre-
programmed computer bids while slow auctions had 23 possible pre-programmed computer 
bids.  This meant that fast auctions would appear more active and therefore more competitive 
than slow auctions, enabling the impact of general bidding intensity on switching frequency 
to be examined.  Across the six conditions, slow auctions were compared together as were 
fast auctions. Fast auctions were also compared with slow auctions (note that the same 
individual auction schedule could appear in more than one condition).   
 
While opening bid levels of fast auctions were well below the opening bids in slow 
auctions, the gap between bids in the two auctions narrowed progressively as the auctions 
progressed. In the closing stages, the auctions reach general parity and therefore became 
genuinely competitive with each other at this point.  From the point of general parity to the 
end of the auction, the identity of the auction with the lowest bid at differing points of time 
changes.  Within slow and fast auction combinations, this would represent the first period in 
which the bid level of the fast auction could exceed that of the slow auction.  In the case of 
two auctions with the same bid frequency (fast-fast or slow-slow), the identity of the auction 
with the lowest prevailing bid at any point in time would vary earlier in the process. The 
comparable pre-programmed bids for each Condition pair are shown in Figure 5 while the full 
data is available in Appendix B.  In most of the conditions, bid increments were fixed at £50, 
the exception being condition 5, comprising two slow auctions, where different fixed bid 
increments (£50 and £100) were applied to the auctions respectively.  This enabled any bias 
in relation to bid increment to be tested.  Condition 6 comprised two fast auctions, as with  
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Figure 5: Path of pre-programmed bids for the two auctions by Condition . 
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condition 3, although the amount of interchange between auctions in terms of cheaper relative 
bids at any point in time was greater under condition 6 than condition 3.   
 
Participants were pre-assigned randomly to each Condition, with the same number of 
participants in each category.  Participants were shown how to use the software and were free 
to ask questions on any aspect of its functionality at any time.  Following initial online 
instructions, each participant was required to “log in” using a unique User ID.  By default, 
participants were then presented with the first auction page. At this point, the simulated 
auctions were “live”.  Standard information contained the start time of the auction being 
viewed, set automatically from the computer’s internal clock, the ending time (start time plus 
300 seconds, or 5 minutes) and time left to expiry of the auction, updating in real time. Each 
auction proceeded on the basis of a pre-set initial bid, progressing in predetermined, fixed 
increments. Participants were informed of the level of bid required to become the highest 
bidder at each point in time but were not able to enter their own jump or proxy bids. 
Participants were free to bid in either auction as often as they wished, so long as they were 
not already the current highest bidder in that particular auction.   In the event that participants 
did not bid, the programme would trigger its own pre-programmed bid sequence according to 
the elapsed time in the auction.  The auction pages would then update automatically with the 
latest data.   
 
Participants entered bids via a button which then triggered a prompt for confirmation. 
The prompt provided summary details of the level at which the bid would be made and 
requested the user to confirm the intention to bid. At this stage, a bid could either be 
confirmed or cancelled. Once confirmed, and in the event that no equivalent or higher 
intervening bid had been received (triggered by the computer), the user would then become 
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the highest bidder at that point in time. In the event that an equivalent or higher intervening 
bid had been received prior to the user confirming acceptance of the bid, participants were 
informed that they had been outbid and were then free to initiate a new bid at a higher level 
up until the point at which the auction ended.  Participants could access the full bidding 
history of either auction at any time by clicking a “View Bid History” button. This option, 
available throughout the duration of the auctions, took participants out of the existing auction 
page into a new “view”. Bidding history contained information on the timing and levels of 
prior bids and the “identity” of the bidder at each stage. This information did not update in 
real time. Therefore, new bids entered whilst this page was open would not be displayed. 
Participants could return to the “live” auction by closing the History View window.  Since the 
aim was to examine overall bidder behaviour rather than simply to analyse actual bids made, 
the software was designed to capture all relevant mouse clicks by participants as well as the 
actions associated with those clicks. All switches between auctions, history views and 
initiated and confirmed / cancelled bids were therefore logged with the time of each click 
captured. Upon the conclusion of the experiment, the software generated a fixed format file 
automatically which contained all of the interactive data for that participant.   
 
6.3. The Model 
 
The study used a number of static and dynamic variables which could affect switching 
propensity and auction choice.  The static variables are fixed bid increments, which are set at 
the start of each auction and remain constant over the course of the auction, while the 
dynamic variables are the elements which change during the course of each auction: the latest 
bid with the associated ID of the bidder; bid histories to date; differentials between prevailing 
bids in each auction and changes in bidding intensity (the frequency with which competitive 
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bids occur within a given timeframe).  The variables are therefore characteristics of the 
auctions rather than fundamental differences between the items offered.  While the study 
makes assumptions about utility maximising behaviour, it does not seek to measure utility 
directly.  There is, however, an implied link between search effort, as evidenced by switching 
frequency, and utility as switching enables bidders to identify the auction which offers the 
greatest potential consumer surplus at any point in time.   
 
The study generated binary data reflecting the actions of participants captured by mouse 
clicks.  Therefore, a mouse click triggering a switch between auctions would result in a “1” 
being added to the data field relating to auction switches.  The exact time that the action was 
triggered was also recoded.  Combining this data with the pre-programmed data enabled all 
mouse-based clicks to be placed within the context of broader auction data.  For example, 
since the exact time of an auction switch was captured, the prevailing bids in each auction  at 
that time could be determined, as could all other associated data (highest bidder.ID, the 
number of bids to date and bidding frequency to date).   
 
The data generated by the study was analysed using log-linear regression in which search 
effort is the dependent variable (DV).  Search effort is measured by the number of switches 
between auctions undertaken by participants over fixed, non-overlapping periods.  Each 
auction lasted for a relatively short period of time (5 minutes).  Switching frequencies were 
therefore measured over discrete 10 second periods thereby enabling a common basis for 
comparing switching activity over the course of each auction (this is similar to the empirical 
approach to timespan data adopted by Lee,  Zioło, Han, and Powell, 2018).  The independent 
variables (IVs) were as follows; 
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Bid Intensity; measured by the number of observable competitor bids over the previous 
discrete 10-second period.  By recoding all mouse clicks triggered by the participant, a 
record is maintained of which auction was displayed at various times.  The number of 
observable bids would therefore comprise bids from both auctions if a participant 
switched between auctions during the previous discrete 10-second period; 
 
Max Diff;  the maximum differential between prevailing bids in the two concurrent 
auctions measured over the previous discrete 10-second period 
 
Category;  a categorical variable, taking values 1 to 6, representing each of the 
conditions. 
 
6.3.1 Hypotheses 
 
The study is designed to investigate the effect of relevant information relating to price 
divergence, level of competitiveness and auction structure on bidder’s auction switching 
propensity.  It is assumed that bidders behave rationally and therefore seek to maximise their 
utility in the form of consumer surplus.  As a result, bidders are expected to track relative bid 
levels between auctions in order to establish which one of the pair offers the higher payoff 
(the possibility of acquiring the item at the lowest possible price).  Therefore, while the 
primary focus of the study is to establish potential determinants of switching behaviour, the 
assumption of rational behaviour also implies that participants will bid in a manner 
consistent with maximising their potential payoffs.   Consequently, the majority of actual 
participant bids should be placed in the auction offering the lowest level of valid bid at the 
time the bid is placed.   
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The key hypotheses can then be described formally as follows: 
 
1. The frequency with which competitive bids occur (bidder intensity) is expected to affect 
the frequency of switching.  The frequency of competitive bids is a proxy for the degree 
of competition for the item, increasing the prevailing highest bid in the process.  Since 
rational bidders seek to maximise their utility, as measured by consumer surplus, they are 
expected to switch to the other auction in order to identify which of the two auctions 
offers the greatest potential payoff at that point in time.  A positive coefficient is 
therefore expected for this variable. 
2. The relative bid differential between the two auctions is expected to affect switching 
propensity.  As the level of prevailing bids in the two auctions approaches parity, so 
bidders are expected to switch more regularly, again reflecting the desire to maximise 
potential payoff.  A negative coefficient was therefore expected for relative bid 
differential, implying that switching propensity should increase as relative bid 
differentials narrow (Dholakia, Basuroy & Soltysinski, 2002; Haruvy, Leszczyc, Carare, 
Cox, Greenleaf, Jank & Rothkopf, 2008; Kayhan, McCart & Bhattacherjee, 2010).  
3. Switching propensity is also expected to be influenced by experimental condition.  The 
different conditions  provide combinations of  auctions with differing characteristics.  
Paired auctions with broadly similar relative bidding intensities (slow-slow or fast-fast) 
are expected to show greater underlying levels of switching than combinations with slow 
and fast auctions.  This simply reflects the fact that the bid differential within slow-fast 
combinations is significant at the outset of the auction, only converging in the latter 
stages.  As a result, there is less need for rational bidders to check current bid levels in 
the slow auction until the fast auction is seen to substantially close the initial gap in bid 
levels.  
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6.3.2. General Description of the Data Generated by the Study 
 
Across all conditions and all 180 participants, the collected data shows that 4181 clicks 
were recorded, the overwhelming majority of which (3252, 77.78%) represented switching 
between auctions. A total of 842 bids were entered of which 123 “failed” due to higher 
intervening (computer) bids.  Thus, 719 bids prevailed as the highest current bid at that point 
in time (85.39% of total bids made). The majority of participants made multiple bids with 119 
participants making three or more bids and 70 making five or more bids. History views 
(viewing auction bid histories to date) accounted for just 87 (2.08%) of the total number of 
clicks, and were triggered by 54 of the 180 participants (3.0%). While all participants 
switched between auctions, 10 failed to enter a single bid during the course of the auctions. 
Sniping-type bids within the final second of the auctions were made by 19 participants 
(11.18% of active bidders) while 38 participants (22.35%) placed bids within the final two 
seconds. 95.13% of all successful bids were placed at the lowest available level at the time of 
each bid.    
 
Switching activity was not evenly distributed in terms of time interval across the various 
auction pairs.  Based upon average switching frequencies across all auctions, early levels of 
switching activity tended to subside slightly after the first minute of the auctions.  However, 
activity picked up progressively after approximately the 150 second mark, accelerating 
appreciably in the latter stages of the auctions, reaching a peak some 20 seconds before the 
end of the respective auctions, on average (Figure 6).  There are some differences between 
auction pairs described by the various Conditions.  The auction pairs represented by 
Conditions 1 and 4 (both slow-fast combinations) showed the greatest change in overall  
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Figure 6.  Frequency Distribution of Inter-Auction Switching Behaviour: Aggregated by 
Condition.  
 
switching activity over the course of the auctions.  The relatively lower levels of switching 
activity in the early stages of the auctions is probably explained by the wide initial bid 
differential between the auctions, as noted earlier.  However, once the auctions became 
genuinely competitive with regard to prevailing bid levels, switching activity increased 
significantly.  Participants therefore appeared to react more strongly to the changing 
competitive nature of these auction pairs.  Conditions 2 (slow-slow), 3 (fast-fast) and 6 (fast-
fast with active bid cross-over) represent the auction pairs with similar bidding intensities 
across the respective pairs.  Somewhat different switching behaviour is apparent for  
these Conditions.   
 
Participants within Condition 2 continued to switch actively right to the end of the 
auction, collectively showing the highest cumulative switching frequency within the last 10-
seconds of the auctions.  Participants in that category also switched most actively at the start 
of the auction periods.  It is not clear why this was the case although it is possible that the 
relatively slow nature of the auction being viewed prompted participants to check if bid levels 
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in the alternative auction were proceeding at the same general slow pace or relatively moving 
out of line. Switching activity tailed off relatively sharply in approximately the last 40 
seconds for participants in Condition 3 while participants within Condition 6 tended to track 
the pattern of average switching behaviour across all participants, with switching activity 
peaking approximately 20 seconds before the end of the auctions.  Participants assigned to 
Condition 5 (auctions pairs with different bid increments) appeared to be affected by the 
different bid increments between the auctions, starting to increase switching activity as the 
prevailing bid differential between the two auctions narrowed to two bid increments.  The 
general pattern of switching behaviour is broadly consistent with expectations, tending to 
increase significantly as the auctions approached their climax.  It is at this stage that active 
bidders are likely to be most engaged in attempting to capture the item.  The slight decline in 
aggregate switching activity in the final few seconds of most auctions is then consistent with 
the proposition that bidders had, by that stage, identified their target auction and wished to 
concentrate on entering a valid bid before the auctions ended.   
 
6.3.3. Statistical Test Results 
 
The relationship between switching frequency, bid intensity and relative bid differentials 
was tested using log-linear regression.  The broad effect of Condition was also tested using a 
categorical variable.  The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 13.  The 
goodness of fit statistics compare an independent (constant-only) model, in which the linear 
combination of explanatory variables reduces to zero, with the full model, including the effect 
of the IVs.  The Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R2 measures indicate that the full model had 
significant explanatory power.  As a result, the null hypothesis (that the coefficients of the 
IVs are zero) can be rejected.  The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s 
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Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) test the quality of the model by measuring the amount 
of information lost as a result of parameter estimation.  The measures therefore examine the 
goodness of fit adjusted for any overfitting resulting from the inclusion of additional 
variables.  Lower values for AIC and BIC for the full model virus the constant-only model  
confirm that the IVs have some explanatory power and the full model improves the 
independent model.  
 
The confidence tests assess the extent to which the full model maximizes the value of the 
likelihood function which makes the observed data most likely given the model’s parameters.  
Higher values for each of the measures suggest a greater degree of confidence.  Each of the 
test statistics: -2 Log –Likelihood (p < .0001); Score 
(p < .0001) and Wald (p < .0001) is highly 
significant, denoting that the IVs, in combination, significantly enhance the explanatory 
power of the full model.  
 
 The regression model coefficient for Bid Intensity is positive (b = .069, Wald 1, N = 
180) = 14.04, p < .0001), implying a direct relationship between the intensity of recent 
bidding activity and the frequency of auction switching.  Thus, as auctions appear to become 
more active in terms of bidding levels, the greater the likelihood of participants switching 
between auctions, consistent with the proposition that rational bidders seek of maximise 
consumer surplus by identifying the current auction with the higher potential payoff.  The 
coefficient for Max Diff (the maximum difference between auction bids over a fixed interval) 
is negative (b = - .001, Wald 1, N = 180) = 130.93, p < .0001), indicating a tendency for 
switching activity to increase as the differential between the two auction bid levels narrows. 
The categorical variable for condition was also found to be significant (b = .07, Wald 1, N 
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= 180) = 13.84, p < .0001), suggesting that the various auction pairings tended to impact 
participant behaviour with regard to switching activity. 
 
Table 13.  Results analysis of switching frequency 
 
Summary goodness of fit statistics 
 
 
Confidence tests: 
 
 
Model parameters for the components 
 
. 
 
Statistic
Independent 
(Constant Only)
Full Model
Observations 180 180
Degrees of Freedom 179 176
-2 Log(Likelihood) 1297.60 1173.18
R²(Cox and Snell) 0.00 0.50
R²(Nagelkerke) 0.00 0.50
Akaike Information Criterion 1301.60 1183.18
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion 1307.99 1199.14
Statistic DF Chi-square Pr > Chi²
-2 Log(Likelihood) 3 124.43 < 0.0001
Score 3 84.88 < 0.0001
Wald 3 192.50 < 0.0001
Source Value SE Wald Chi-Square Pr > Chi²
Intercept 2.710 0.090 1007.01 < 0.0001
Bid Intensity 0.069 0.020 14.04 0.0000
Max Diff -0.001 0.000 130.93 < 0.0001
Condition 0.070 0.020 13.83 0.0000
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The results support the hypotheses relating to the impact of short-term recent bidding 
intensity and current price-differentials between auctions on switching propensity; each of 
these predictor variables is significant.  Since price outcomes are determined by the level of 
competition, as measured by relative bidding intensity, the model implies that rational bidders 
can be expected to switch between auctions when bid frequency in the currently viewed 
auction increases as they seek comparable information about the second auction.  Therefore, 
bidders appear to be sensitive to changes in the dynamics of an observed auction when they 
are aware of the existence of another, simultaneous auction offering a close-to-identical item.  
This is consistent with the proposition that bidders adopt a primary goal of seeking to 
maximise their consumer surplus by tracking simultaneous auctions in a manner consistent 
with enabling them to potentially acquire the item at the lowest possible price.  These 
findings are consistent with the conclusions drawn from the empirical work of Haruvy and 
Popkowski Leszcyc (2010) and Rand and Jank (2013) with regard to information and 
participation costs.  In the case of the simulated auctions described here, search costs were 
minimal, enabling active bidders to easily identify the auction with the greater current 
potential payoff.   
 
 Different experimental conditions based upon the various categories of auction pairs 
were also expected to result in significant differences in overall switching propensity.  It will 
be recalled that the conditions paired auctions in various ways based upon their characteristics 
defined by the number of pre-programmed computer bids possible in each.   Auctions were 
therefore classified either as “fast” or “slow”.  Fast auctions had a maximum total number of 
46 computer-generated bids over the 5-minute period for which the auction ran versus a 
maximum number of 23 bids in slow auctions.  Since all auctions were programmed to end at 
the same bid level, opening bids differed between fast and slow auctions in order to allow for 
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the greater number of bids within fast auctions, each one increasing the prevailing highest bid 
by the same bid increment.  Therefore, the greatest disparity between bid levels in fast and 
slow auctions would occurred at the start of the auctions, the gap closing as the auction 
progressed.  Due to the acceleration in bidding activity towards the end of each auction, 
relative bid differentials between the two auctions would narrow increasingly quickly, being 
eliminated as the auctions reached their final stages.  At this point, the auctions were 
considered to be highly competitive in nature; maximum bid differentials between them were 
no greater than one bid increment, making relative final outcomes difficult to determine.   For 
convenience in relation to the following comments, the six conditions are summarized again 
below (Table 14); 
 
Table 14. Summary of auction pairs by category 
 
 
 
The regression analysis indicated that the categorical variable for condition had 
significant explanatory power (b = .070, Wald 1, N = 180) = 13.83, p < .0001).  It is not, 
however, possible to determine where the differences between the various categories occur.  
Category First Auction Identifier Second Auction Identifier
1 Slow 1 Fast 1
2 Slow 1 Slow 2
3 Fast 1 Fast 2
4 Fast 1 Slow 1
5 Slow (Bid Increment: £100) Slow 1
6
Fast 3 (With Active 
Switching)
Fast 4 (With Active 
Switching)
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Condition Mean Std Dev. Std Err N
1 12.90 8.18 1.49 30
2 17.73 7.51 1.37 30
3 21.13 6.74 1.23 30
4 14.40 9.27 1.69 30
5 15.37 9.75 1.78 30
6 25.30 11.69 2.13 30
Source Type III SS Df Mean Sq. F Prob.
Model 3265.69 5 653.14 8.06 <..0001
Error 14102.50 174 81.05
Total 17368.19 179
Mean Diff. SE q Prob.
1 2 -4.83 1.64 2.94 0.30
3 -8.23 1.64 5.01 0.01 ***
4 -1.50 1.64 0.91 0.99
5 -2.47 1.64 1.50 0.90
6 -12.40 1.64 7.54 0.00 ***
2 3 -3.40 1.64 2.07 0.69
4 3.33 1.64 2.03 0.71
5 2.37 1.64 1.44 0.91
6 -7.57 1.64 4.60 0.01 ***
3 4 6.73 1.64 4.10 0.04 **
5 5.77 1.64 3.51 0.13
6 -4.17 1.64 2.53 0.47
4 5 -0.97 1.64 0.59 1.00
6 -10.90 1.64 6.63 0.00 ***
5 6 -9.93 1.64 6.04 0.00 ***
Cross-Condition 
Comparison
Analysis of Variance (Switching Frequency)
Post hoc Tukey  tests for Condition
Descriptive Statistics
In order to obtain greater clarity, a one-way ANOVA was performed with post hoc tests for 
condition.  The results are shown in Table 15.   
Table 15.  ANOVA of the Impact of Condition on Switching Behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes :  The F-score confirms a significant overall impact of condition upon switching behaviour. The post 
hoc (Tukey) analysis provides additional information on the significance of switching propensity on the 
basis of condition.  The Table shows the critical (q) values based upon significance (at the 5% level with 
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the associated probability that the mean differences observed across conditions occurred by chance. 
Significance levels are denoted by; ***, p < .01;  **, p < .05 
 
From the summary descriptive statistics, it is apparent that fast auctions paired together 
(conditions 3 and 6) generate the highest average number of switches; the average number of 
switches in condition 3 was 21.13 (SD = 6.74) and 25.30 (SD = 11.69) for condition 6.  Pairs 
of fast with slow auctions (conditions 1 and 4) generated the lowest average number of 
switches; 12.90 (SD = 8.18) in the case of condition 1 and 14.40 (SD = 9.27) for condition 4.  
The higher average number of switches associated with fast-fast auctions in comparison with 
pairs involving at least one slow auction is consistent with the proposition that bid frequency 
or intensity impacts switching behaviour; in the event that there are two simultaneous 
auctions with the same relatively high level of bid intensity, rational bidders are likely to 
engage in greater levels of switching in order to identify the auction offering the lowest 
relative bid level.  The somewhat higher dispersion found for condition 6 versus condition 3 
suggests that some bidders in the former condition were affected by the more frequent 
changes in terms of which auction in the pair offered the lower bid level at various stages of 
the auctions.   
 
In the case of fast and slow auction pairs, a significant disparity in bid levels (greater that 
2 incremental bids) persists for a large part of the total auction time.  These auctions only 
become competitive in their latter stages once the differential in bid levels between the two 
auctions closes to +/- one bid increment; around this point, rational bidders need to engage in 
greater switching in order to establish the auction offering the lowest current bid level.  The 
two slow auction pairings (conditions 2 and 5) appear to generate marginally higher average 
switching activity than fast-slow pairs but  below the levels seen for fast-fast pairings.  This 
can be explained by the lack of bidding intensity in slow auctions relative to fast  
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auctions.  Nevertheless, relatively narrow differences in prevailing relative bid levels in the 
case of condition 2 appear to provide some incentive for bidders to switch in order to track 
the two auctions.  Bid increments themselves only appears to have only a marginal impact on 
switching frequency, as evidenced by condition 5.   Consequently, the average switching 
frequency for condition 2 is found to be 17.71 (SD = 7.51) versus 15.37 (SD = 9.75) for 
condition 5 
 
The analysis of variance shows that there was a statistically significant difference 
between categories (F(5, 174) = 8.06, p < .0001); the null hypothesis that condition means are 
equal is therefore rejected.  The post hoc (Tukey) analysis provides more detailed information 
on statistically significant differences between mean switching activity based upon category 
or condition.  Pairwise comparisons show significant differences (p < .0001) in switching 
propensities between condition 1 (slow-fast) and conditions 3 (fast-fast) and 6 (fast-fast with 
active switching), in line with the observations noted above.  This is mirrored by condition 4 
(fast-slow) versus the same fast-fast conditions, 3 and 6;  p < .05 in the case of condition 4 
and 3 comparison and  p < .0001 in the case of conditions 4 and 6.  Of the slow-slow auction 
pairs, significantly lower average switching frequencies were found for conditions 2 (slow-
slow) and 5 (slow-slow with different bid increments) compared with condition 6 (fast-fast 
with active switching).  However, no significant differences are found in relation to the other 
fast-fast pair (condition 3); it is not clear why this should be the case.  No statistically 
significant differences in mean switching frequencies are found in relation to the slow-fast 
pairings (conditions 1 and 4) and either of the slow-slow pairings (conditions 2 and 5). 
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Overall, these findings reinforce the earlier interpretation of results particularly as they 
relate to the effect of bidding intensity on switching behaviour.  Therefore, bidder behaviour 
in terms of tracking effort is likely to be a function of the specific characteristics of close-to-
contemporaneous auctions.  In the event that these auctions for identical items are 
competitive, in the sense that bidding is active and prevailing bid differentials between the 
auctions are considered to be sufficiently narrow, such information being easily accessible to 
potential bidders, then switching activity and participation are likely to increase.  Again 
interpreting these results within the context of the findings of the studies conducted by 
Haruvy and Popkowski Leszcyc (2010) and Rand and Jank (2013) discussed earlier would 
then suggest that multiple auction environments which are close-to-frictionless in terms of 
information and switching costs should tend towards price convergence for identical items as 
the number of bidders increases.  However, in the event that there is limited access to relevant 
information, or the costs of its acquisition are considered by potential bidders to be too high, 
then inertia may result, thereby enabling price dispersion to persist.   
 
 
6.4. A Consideration of Auctions with Posted Exit Prices 
 
Competitive auctions, of the type considered above, are essentially variable price formats 
through which selling prices are determined as a result of interaction between interested 
buyers.  The advent of online platforms means that multiple sellers offering similar items 
effectively form a single marketplace in which buyers, sellers and items compete.  Rational 
sellers are assumed to seek to maximise their sales revenues while rational bidders attempt to 
maximise their consumer surplus by acquiring items at the lowest possible price, equal to or 
less than their private value for that item.  In the absence of any frictions in the form of 
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participation costs or lack of information, pricing outcomes should be efficient as price 
differentials between auctions of identical items would see bidders switch to the auction with 
the lowest prevailing bid, entering their own bids until such price differentials were 
eliminated.   This essentially describes markets where perfect competition prevails such that 
buyers neither under- nor overpay and sellers maximise their revenues.   
 
While online marketplaces such as eBay were originally dominated by standard auctions 
of the type described above, more recently, the variable pricing formats of many online 
auctions have changed as a result of the inclusion of fixed-pricing in the form of buy-it-now 
(BIN) options6.  BIN options allow bidders to end an auction by agreeing to purchase the item 
at the fixed, posted price.  BIN options are therefore the equivalent of known exit strategies at 
certain prices as opposed to participating in standard auctions where final price outcomes are 
uncertain.  However, within the context of competitive auction markets, BIN options appear 
to be puzzling choices for sellers as, unlike reserve prices which are designed to achieve 
minimum level of revenue, BIN options would appear to have the effect of placing an upper 
limit on maximum selling prices, thereby potentially reducing revenues.  Not surprisingly, 
considerable research has focused on the implications of fixed-price offerings for both buyers 
and sellers. 
 
Using an analytical model involving a consideration of broad participation costs, Wang, 
Montgomery and Kannan (2008) found that BIN options could actually result in higher seller 
profits when customer participation costs, including opportunity costs and the uncertainty of 
acquiring the item at an acceptable price, were high.  BIN options were also found to attract 
more buyers who might otherwise have ignored the auction.  Similarly, Budish and Takeyama 
                                                 
6 eBay introduced BIN options in 2000.  The majority of items on that site are now fixed price offerings.  
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(2001) have shown that BIN options can increase seller revenues when buyers are risk-averse 
as such buyers tend to view the BIN option as a form of insurance.  Anderson, Friedman and 
Singh (2008) undertook empirical analysis using extensive auction data relating to eBay 
transactions of homogeneous goods in auctions of relatively short duration.  The data 
included auctions with BIN options as well as those with no fixed-priced offering.  The 
analysis controlled for numerous characteristics which may affect the appeal of an auction, 
such as seller reputation, type of seller, product characteristics (new and used items were 
included in the data) and auction characteristics (including low start prices, auction length and 
product description).  Results indicated that seller reputation did not consistently boost final 
selling prices, although it appeared to increase participation levels (increasing the number of 
bids rather than their level).   Across the entire sample, the presence of BIN options did not 
have a significant impact in terms of increasing final selling prices and buyers appeared to be 
largely indifferent to the presence of a BIN option.  However, it was found that buyers tended 
to reject BIN offers when the seller attempted to extract a premium but tended to accept the 
offer when there was little or no premium over alternative auctions.  In contrast, a study by 
Yoo, Ho and Tam (2006) found that the presence of BIN options increased price outcomes as 
a result of an “information effect” associated with BIN postings.  Thus, BIN prices were 
deemed to provide bidders with a better estimate of likely final prices.  In instances where 
BIN options were not triggered, auctions with this option performed as well as standard 
auctions with no fixed price offering.  Therefore, it was concluded that the information effect 
of BIN prices improved overall market efficiency, the positive effect outweighing any 
negative effect from the presence of BIN options themselves. Chan, Kadiyali and Park (2006) 
examined the effect of BIN prices on willingness-to-pay (WTP), finding that setting 
“optimistic” BIN prices actually increased WTP, reducing it when BIN prices were set 
comparatively low.  Furthermore, with regard to the overall data, there appeared to be 
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evidence that sellers often set BIN prices sub-optimally, apparently misinterpreting 
competitive aspects of auctions for similar items.  They found a greater tendency to under-
price rather than overprice BIN, thereby negatively affecting potential revenues. 
 
 
In order to consider the impact of BIN options within the simulated framework described 
above, a further auction pair was examined in which a BIN option was available in one of the 
auctions; all other characteristics of the auctions making up the pair stayed the same as before 
(item, duration, programmed bids, and so on).   The data was analysed using logistic 
regression (described in more detail in Chapter 8).  The output, dependent variable was BIN 
selection by the participant, a binary variable taking the value 1 if selected and 0 if not.  
Certain assumptions were made concerning likely bidder behaviour in response to a BIN 
option.  It was again assumed that bidders would be wholly rational and seek to acquire the 
item at the lowest possible price.  On that basis, it was expected that prevailing auction prices 
would help to inform the buying decision.  To the extent that bidders expected auction prices 
to exceed the BIN levels, the likelihood of that event happening should increase.  Thus, 
whereas in the initial study, bidders might be primarily concerned with the comparative paths 
of each auction, in the presence of a BIN option, they can be expected to make some sort of 
forecast about likely future prices.  In the case of actual BIN auctions with multiple bidders, it 
might be expected that individual bidders may even form views about the likelihood of other 
active bidders triggering the BIN option; that aspect what not relevant in this simulation. 
 
Predictor variables were based upon the specific characteristics of the auctions (two fast 
auctions were paired, the equivalent of condition 3 in the study described above).   In order to 
capture the aspect of bidders’ assessments of likely auction ending prices in the event that the 
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BIN option was not triggered, simple forecasts were computed at each point in time using all 
available price versus time data to date, with the parameters of the forecast then used to 
estimate the ending prices for the two auctions.  A simple linear forecast was calculated in the 
form; a + bx where a = 𝑦 - b𝑥 and b = ((x - 𝑥)(y - 𝑦)) / (x - 𝑥)2, 𝑥 and 𝑦 denoting the 
sample means.  Since forecasts were calculated on the basis of all available information-to-
date, updated forecasts were recalculated whenever new pricing information within the 
auctions became available.  Forecasts were therefore both time and bid dependent.  A major 
simplifying assumption was then that all bidders applied identical forecasts.  The full list of 
predictor variables is as follows; 
 
F.Gap; defined as the difference between the highest forecast ending price across the two 
auctions and the prevailing BIN price;   
 
Cum Switches; the cumulative number of switches undertaken by individual bidders at 
each point in time; 
 
Cum Placed Bids; the total number of bids placed by individual bidders at each point in 
time; 
 
Cum Bid Intensity;  the total number of proxy “competitor” (computer-generated) bids at 
each point in time. 
 
The full set of predictor variable data was derived from relevant values of each parameter 
measured each second; a minimum elapsed time of 25 seconds was required before any 
forecasts were calculated.   The data applicable for each participant depended upon whether 
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or not they chose to execute the BIN option.  In the event that this option was activated, data 
for that bidder would only reflect available information up to the time that the BIN option 
was triggered.  In the event that the BIN option was not triggered, full data was compiled for 
the period over which the BIN option remained available.  The overall approach is somewhat 
similar to that employed by Anderson, Friedman and Singh (2008) to the extent that an 
attempt has been made to distinguish between auctions based upon characteristics and 
changing dynamics of the auctions.  However, the dataset is clearly much more limited and 
other characteristics of the auctions, such as duration, participation costs and item are 
deliberately equalised between the two auctions.  
 
The hypotheses relate to the effect of key predictor variables on the output variable 
(exercising the BIN option). 
 
1. The likelihood of exercising the BIN option will increase as the differential between 
the forecast ending level of the competitive auctions approaches the BIN price.  The 
BIN option provides a risk-free exit strategy in comparison with the uncertain 
outcome which results from remaining in the auction.  Therefore, rational bidders are 
likely to evaluate the BIN price relative to expectations regarding closing prices 
within a standard auction format. 
2. The likelihood of exercising the BIN option will increase as the frequency of bids 
intensifies within the paired auctions.  Bidders are likely to attach degrees of 
uncertainty to their forecasts of final auction outcomes as one of the key 
determinants, the frequency of competitive bids, is also an unknown.  Therefore, 
evidence that bidding intensity is increasing may tend to increase the uncertainty 
around bidder forecasts. 
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6.4.1. Participants 
 
A total of 60 participants, allocated equally and at random across two conditions, took 
part in the study. As with the first study, a pair of simultaneous auctions of identical items 
was run with each auction ending at the same time.  The auctions were both “fast”, identical 
to condition 3 of the initial study.  The first auction in the pair contained a BIN offer.  By 
gender, 31 of the participants were male with 29 females taking part. Ages ranged from 21 
years to 62 years (M33.40, SD = 9.36).  Each participant was assigned a unique user id and 
had no prior knowledge of the item to be offered through the simulated auctions. The auctions 
proceeded in a manner identical to that described in the first experiment. 
 
6.4.2. Design 
 
The same simulated online auction software platform was used, the only difference being 
the availability of a “Buy It Now” button in the first auction. The same interactive user data 
was logged in real time following the same procedures as before with the timing of any BIN 
execution also being logged and stored in the dynamic data files. At the end of the simulated 
auctions, all of the captured interactive data was again downloaded to a master file named in 
accordance with the specific user id and saved to the hard drive of the computer for 
subsequent analysis.    
 
6.4.3. Method 
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This experiment introduced a BIN option into the first auction (Appendix F). The BIN 
option was available from the start of the auction and offered participants the chance to 
purchase the item at a declared, fixed price. Selecting the BIN option ended the competitive 
nature of the auction and provided certainty with regard to acquiring the item concerned. The 
initial BIN price was set at £2500, well above the opening bid levels of each auction. As the 
auctions progressed, the BIN price increased periodically by increments of £150.  A total of 
three increments were applied so that the BIN price increased from its initial level to a final 
level of £2950.  Participants were thus exposed to opportunity costs and risks. Not only did 
they have to assess the BIN option against the anticipated outcome of the competitive 
auctions if this option were not triggered, they also had to speculate on whether, and for how 
long, the BIN price would remain available and unchanged. The BIN options expired before 
the end of the auction with participants receiving on-screen notification of this impending 
expiry 20 seconds before the event, with an on-screen ‘clock’ counting down the seconds to 
expiry. Thus, participants had to make a final decision on whether to accept this fixed price 
purchase or carry on with the competitive auction in the normal way. 
 
6.4.4. General Overview of the Results 
In aggregate across all participants, a total of 801 clicks were generated. The average 
number of clicks per participant (26.7) was similar to that of condition 3 in the first study 
(27.47).   Note, however, that the average duration of auctions with a BIN option included in 
the pair was 236.18 seconds as BIN selections ended the relevant auction at that time.   
Switching activity accounted for 649 clicks (81.02% of total clicks), a somewhat higher 
percentage than the 77.31% found to condition 3    
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Excluding BIN selections, 114 user bids were initiated 18 of which failed due to higher 
intervening computer bids (12.50% of total submitted bids).  Including any BIN options, 9 
participants made 3 or more bids with 5 making 5 or more.  Overall, 19 participants selected 
the BIN option (63.33% of participants), 10 making that decision within the last 20 seconds 
of the BIN options availability.  This was, of course, the timeframe for which an on-screen 
message informed participants that the BIN option was coming to an end.   The majority of 
participants therefore selected the BIN option at its highest level.  Overall, no participants 
selected BIN at its introductory level of £2500; two triggered it at £2650 with the remaining 
five buying at £2800.  Of the participants choosing the BIN option, only 5 made active 
auction bids prior to selecting BIN.  There was a total of 38 History Views (summoning a 
table showing the bid history of the currently watched auction to date), 25 of which were 
triggered by participants who subsequently selected the BIN option.   
 
6.4.5. Statistical Test Results 
 
Logistic regression was used to test the likelihood of BIN selection given predictor 
variables which captured certain dynamic characteristics of the auctions.  The results are 
shown in Table 16.  As before, the goodness of fit statistics compare an independent 
(constant-only) model, in which the linear combination of explanatory variables reduces to 
zero, with the full model, including the effect of the IVs.   
 
The Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R2 measures indicate that the full model had 
significant, but modest explanatory power.  As a result, the null hypothesis (that the 
coefficients of the IVs are zero) can be rejected.  The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) shows mixed results, AIC indicting some 
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improvement in terms of model quality while BIC suggesting that better specification may be 
possible.  
 
Table 16.  Results analysis of BIN likelihood 
Summary of goodness of fit statistics 
 
Confidence tests 
 
Model parameters for the components 
 
 
The confidence tests assess the extent to which the full model maximizes the value of the 
likelihood function which makes the observed data most likely given the model’s parameters.  
Higher values for each of the measures suggest a greater degree of confidence.  Each of the 
test statistics: -2 Log –Likelihood (p < .0001); Score 
(p < .0001) and Wald (p < .0001) is highly 
Statistic
Independent 
(Constant 
only) Full Model
Observations 6376 6376
Sum of weights 6376.00 6376.00
DF 6375 6371
-2 Log(Likelihood) 247.32 213.87
R²(Cox and Snell) 0.00 0.13
R²(Nagelkerke) 0.00 0.14
AIC 249.32 223.87
SBC 256.08 257.67
Statistic DF Chi-square Pr > Chi²
-2 Log(Likelihood) 4 33.45 < 0.0001
Score 4 39.15 < 0.0001
Wald 4 21.74 0.000
Source Value
Standard 
error
Wald Chi-
Square Pr > Chi²
Intercept -9.31 2.82 10.94 0.001
F.Gap 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.846
Cum Switches -0.05 0.05 1.16 0.282
Cum Placed Bids 0.32 0.15 4.38 0.036
Cum Bid Intensity 0.17 0.08 5.12 0.024
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significant, denoting that the IVs, in combination, significantly enhance the explanatory 
power of the full model.  
 
The regression model coefficients indicate the extent to which the predictor variables 
increase the likelihood of BIN being triggered.  Individual coefficients can then be interpreted 
as log-transformed probabilities measuring the expected change in the log odds of the output 
variable taking the value of 1 (the reference event, defined as the BIN option being triggered) 
given a unit increase in one predictor variable holding all other variables constant.  Positive 
coefficients attached to a predictive variable therefore indicate that the probability of the 
reference event increases as the value of the predictive variable rises.   
 
Two of the predictor variables are significant at the 5% level; Cum Placed Bids and Cum 
Bid Intensity; the former measures the cumulative (non-BIN) bids placed by a participant 
while the latter measures the cumulative frequency of all bids (including computer-generated, 
notion “competitor” bids).  Consequently, there is no evidence to support the first hypothesis 
that the relationship between the prevailing BIN price and the measure used to forecast 
auction ending values has any impact on the likelihood of the BIN option being triggered.  
However, the results do support the hypothesis that changes in bidding intensity affect the 
likelihood of BIN being triggered.  Switching behaviour again appears to carry no particular 
significance with regard to BIN preference and is, presumably, more a functional element of 
the complete bidding strategy.  Overall, therefore, while the measure used here to forecast 
outcomes of the standard auctions did nothing to increase the likelihood of the BIN option 
being triggered, evidence that changes in bidding intensity are significant holds the possibility 
that rational bidders indeed make some evaluation of likely outcome when deciding upon 
strategy.  It may also be relevant to note again, therefore, that the majority of BIN events 
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were triggered in the period just before the removal of that option, thereby taking away the 
risk-free exit and acquisition strategy.  
 
6.5. Discussion 
Two studies were conducted using a simulated platform to gather data relating to 
behaviours of bidders in notional auctions.  Mouse tracking was used to record all significant 
interactions of study participants with the software.  The simulated environment, structured in 
this way, made it possible to examine important aspects such as switching behaviour 
independent of any particular bidding strategy which might be adopted.  This then made it 
possible to examine other factors which influence that switching.   
 
There are inevitably a number of limitations associated with the studies.  Primary 
amongst them is the fact that these were not real auctions, no bids had any monetary 
consequence and no items could be acquired as a result of a successful bidding campaign.  As 
a result, any conclusions must be treated with a degree of caution.  While participants were 
asked to behave as if the auctions were real, there can be no guarantee that this outcome was 
achieved and it remains possible that individuals may have behaved very differently in this 
study from the way they might ordinarily behave in a “live” auction with consequence.  
Similarly, the simulated environment used pre-programmed computer bids to add a degree of 
authenticity.  As a result, there was no genuine competition between bidders. 
 
In addition, the studies were somewhat limited in scope.  Running pairs of short-duration 
auctions which overlap exactly in terms of time period would are something of a special case.  
For popular items sold on major online platforms, the period of overlap may not prove too 
restrictive; there are, after all, likely to be several live simultaneous auctions with 
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approximately the same ending times.  However, the restriction of allowing participants to 
consider just two possible auctions is somewhat limiting.  Other studies have shown that, 
while multiple overlapping auctions  of close-to-identical items appear to create an integrated 
marketplace with high levels of competition between sellers, buyers and items themselves, a 
necessary condition for efficient outcomes for buyers and sellers, numerous frictions arise 
which in fact result in a degree of inefficiency.  Much of this appears to be associated with 
participation costs which appear to create a degree of inertia.  Multiple contemporaneous 
auctions appear to require widespread information dissemination in order for them to be 
efficient as it is that which enables rational bidders to identify relatively “cheap” auctions.  
The current studies had no such constraints; participation costs were extremely low, largely 
restricted to the minimal time cost associated with switching from one auction to the other.  
Indeed, it could well be that the opportunity cost to a rational bidder seeking to acquire the 
item at the lowest available price is greater than any information search costs of the type 
mentioned here. 
 
 
There are further aspects of fixed duration auctions which can complicate certain types of 
analysis. In essence, the outcome of a standard auction with no fixed-price exit option is 
determined by a single event; the placing of the final, winning bid.  Strictly, there is no 
requirement for any bidder to participate in any way before that point is reached.  It is 
therefore possible that many aspects of a bidder’s behaviour might remain undisclosed and 
undetected.  The studies reported here did, of course, try to partly address this aspect via 
mouse tracking.  Indeed, by capturing events other than bidding, the data did show that there 
was a degree of interaction throughout the auctions.  This could itself have been aided by the 
very short duration of the auctions adding to the focus of participants. 
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Notwithstanding, a number of findings derived from the studies described above support 
evidence from other empirical studies.  In particular, the studies presented here are supportive 
of the proposition that bidders behave as if they are utility maximisers, qualified to the extent 
that this is found to be the case when participation costs are sufficiently low.  Therefore, 
bidders appear to seek and demand certain information in order to inform their decisions and 
strategies.  Consequently, while auction markets may be considered to be fairly well-defined 
environments in terms of understanding processes and parameters, developing effective 
strategies is perhaps a somewhat more complicated task.  Therefore, a typical bidder in an 
auction may be considered to face certain probabilities and uncertainties which vary over 
time.  To the extent that they operate across multiple auctions, they face and array of such 
probabilities.  The efficiency of the decision-making process is then likely to be at least a 
partial function of the availability of and access to critical, relevant and timely information, 
echoing Rand and Jank (2013).   
 
In the next chapter, we examine aspects of behaviour in relation to financial markets.  
This is the prelude to the final empirical study presented in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE BEHAVIOURAL ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
7.1. Efficient Markets and Observed Market Price Behaviour  
 
Standard theories of market efficiency, such as CAPM and APT, assume that all 
decision-makers hold rational expectations with regard to asset prices.  Therefore, in the 
strongest form of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), all available relevant information 
is deemed to be known by all decision-makers and reflected fully in current prices as a result 
(Shiller, 2003).  Rational investors are therefore considered to be highly efficient discounters 
of information, agreeing upon its value in terms of price impact.  This is a necessary 
condition for equilibrium as it ensures that all securities are perceived as being “fairly priced” 
by all agents at all times (Malkiel, 2005). Consequently, there is no possibility for speculative 
gain based upon knowledge alone and specific trading strategies can be profitable only on the 
basis of luck.   
 
We can easily express the basic principles of market efficiency as follows:  Assume the 
rate of return for any asset is defined as; R = (Pt+1 - Pt  + Ct. t+1) / Pt , where Pt+1 - Pt  represents 
the capital gain over the period from t to  t + 1 and C t. t+1 is any cash flow (for example, 
dividends) received over the same period.  At time t, investors hold rational expectations 
regarding future prices and cash flows, giving; Re = (Pe t+1 - Pt  + Ce) / Pt.  Such expectations 
reflect unbiased, optimal forecasts incorporating all available information, including relevant 
fundamentals affecting an asset’s return components.  Allowing expected cash flows to distil 
into forward prices implies; Pe t+1 = PF t+1 → Re = RF.  This holds if agents are homogenous in 
their views and are aware of the rational views of all other agents.  From this, we are able to 
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define market equilibrium, Ras the state in which all assets are efficiently priced such that; 
RF = R  
 
Arbitrage conditions exist when RF <> RThereforewhen;  RF > R→ Pt ↑ → RF↓, the 
forecast rate of return over and above the equilibrium rate leads to an increase in the price of 
the asset triggering a reduction in the expected rate of return until convergence is achieved.  
The reverse applies in the case of forecast rates of return below the prevailing equilibrium;  
RF < R→ Pt ↓ → RF↑.  In this manner, potential profit opportunities are removed entirely, 
assuming zero-cost adjustment mechanisms. “Noise” traders have the ability to create short-
term price distortions away from equilibrium thereby providing rational agents with further 
opportunities for arbitrage.  As the term implies, noise traders hold erroneous beliefs, trading 
on the basis of random signals or data which have no information value in terms of price 
formation; they are therefore irrational components of the market.  Since noise traders 
systematically incur losses rather than gains as rational traders intervene to correct their 
errors, they are expected to be eliminated from the market over time. 
 
Should the EMH be an accurate description of market dynamics, actual trading volumes 
would be extremely low as prices adjust to changes in rational expectations conditioned in 
most cases by new information.  It is this discounting mechanism, along with homogeneity of 
views, which instantly determines prices meaning that there is no requirement for new 
equilibria to be established as a result of physical transactions; the instant adjustment 
therefore eliminates any actual opportunity for arbitrage as no trading volume takes place.  
Note that within this framework, prices are determined solely by forward-looking 
expectations; the past is therefore no guide to the future.  As a result, all asset prices must 
follow a random walk devoid of serial correlation since new information is, by definition, 
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unknown to any market participant beforehand (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969; Schwert, 
2003).  
 
In fact, observed behaviour of asset prices in financial markets is very different from that 
implied by EMH.  As opposed to low volume and constrained price volatility, recorded 
trading volumes and price volatility are both unusually high given the level of information 
flow (Shiller, 1981).  In addition, the distribution of asset prices reveals the presence of fat 
tails with large leptokurtosis as opposed to the normal return distribution assumed by models 
of market efficiency.  A fat-tailed distribution has a much greater likelihood of extreme 
events than would be the case under a normal distribution; for example, while a three-
standard deviation event only has a 0.3% chance of occurring on the basis of a normal 
distribution, the magnitude of fat tails is much more unpredictable and can accommodate 
extreme events (> 3SD) which occur empirically with much greater frequency than would be 
expected under EMH, as evidenced by numerous market bubbles and crashes (Veldkamp, 
2005).   
 
Contrary to the assumption of random walks, serial correlation has also been observed in 
stock price data, implying that past price behaviour may carry some information about future 
short-term returns (Lo & MacKinlay, 2011). Such anomalies have been found in relation to 
both short- and long-term returns, with longer time frames exhibiting negative serial 
correlation, or mean reversion, the reverse of the positive serial correlations (continuation of 
trend) found with regard to shorter-term movements. Such anomalies appear to be significant; 
Chaudhuri and Wu (2003), for example, found that between 25% and 40% of the variability 
in long-term returns could be predicted on the basis of mean reverting behaviour.  Strong 
evidence of mean reversion after significant declines has also been found (Bali, Demirtas & 
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Levy, 2008), with markets tending to recover to their longer-term trends after significant 
declines. This suggests that investors may both under-and over-react to events or news, 
challenging the proposition that all information is efficiently reflected in prices (Dhar & 
Kumar, 2001).  
 
Further observed price-related anomalies have been found in relation to volatility 
clustering and correlations between trading volume and general price volatility.  Volatility 
clustering implies that large changes in prices tend to be followed by further large changes 
while small changes tend to be followed by other small changes (Mandelbrot, 1971).  
Therefore, absolute returns (and their squares) have been found to display significant positive, 
slowly decaying autocorrelation over timeframes ranging from a few minutes to several 
weeks, therefore; corr (⎹ rt .⎹  rt +  ⎹ ) > 0. Trading volume has also been found to be 
positively correlated with the level of price volatility implying “long memory” behaviour 
(Lobato & Velasco, 2000).  
 
The proposition of rapid assimilation and full discounting of new information into stock 
prices has also been tested empirically. In that regard, certain stock-specific traits have been 
found to influence short-term returns, with some factors persisting over time. Taylor (1999) 
undertook a study examining return trends, persistence and sensitivity using data on over 
1,000 UK-listed equities. The study investigated a number of stock-specific factors derived 
from detailed earnings forecast data provided by independent equity analysts at brokerage 
firms as well as fundamental valuation data (such as price-to-earnings ratios, price-to-book 
values and dividend yields). The study found evidence of the assimilation of earnings revision 
data into stock prices to the extent that positive and negative revisions to mean estimates 
resulted in systematic impacts on stock prices. Consistent with loss and risk aversion, the 
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negative effect of downward revisions of earnings estimates was found to be cumulatively 
greater than the positive effect from equivalent upward revisions. The intensity of analyst 
revision activity (percentage of analysts revising their estimates upwards or downwards over 
the immediately prior period) was also found to affect stock prices in the direction of the 
revisions, implying that investors were also influenced by the sheer number of analysts 
making revisions independent of the magnitude of any changes in estimates. These findings 
support the proposition that investors react to and assimilate relevant news. However, the 
study found that, while positive and negative earnings ‘surprises’ (defined as reported 
earnings outcomes more than two standard deviations away from prior average forecasts) 
tended to have a fairly immediate impact on stock prices in the direction of the surprise, 
prompting a jump in short-term price volatility, the full effect of more constrained earnings 
revisions appeared to be realised over a longer period with no evidence of a significant 
immediate bias. This is consistent with the findings of others regarding under-reaction to new 
data (Ball & Bartov, 1996; Brennan, Chordia & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Fama & French, 
1996), suggesting that ongoing news is absorbed into stock prices incrementally over time, 
perhaps as more investors become aware of the latest changes in expectations of others. With 
regard to stock valuation metrics, Taylor found evidence of longer-term cyclicality in terms 
of returns to such factors.  This is consistent with the anomalous “value effect” observed by 
others (Fama & French, 1996).  
 
7.2. “Noise” Trading, Limits to Arbitrage and Non-Homogenous Expectations  
 
Deviations of observed market behaviour from that implied by models of market 
efficiency have led to the development of alternative behavioural models relaxing some of the 
core assumptions of EMH.  We have already noted that, under EMH, noise traders should 
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quickly be eliminated from the market as they hold erroneous beliefs which can be exploited 
by rational agents.  This proposition rests upon the key assumptions of homogeneity with 
regard to rational beliefs and cost-free arbitrage.  In practice, limits to arbitrage can exist for a 
number of reasons (Gromb & Vayanos, 2010). For example, since actual trading involves 
costs, this may place a limit on the ability or willingness of rational agents to arbitrage away 
all pricing inefficiencies.  In addition, should heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity, of 
views prevail, pricing disequilibria may persist, meaning that arbitrage is no longer a risk-free 
proposition.   
 
Heterogeneity of views was assumed by Arthur et al (1996) in order to develop a model 
in which expectations were derived from inductive rather than deductive reasoning (as 
assumed by EMH).  This can be explained by expressing an equilibrium price at time t for a 
security with stochastic return components (dividends and price) incorporating all available 
information, It, as; 
 
Pt = ∑ 𝑤௜ i,t (Ei [Dt + 1 ⎹  It] + Ei [Pt + 1 ⎹  It])  Equation 32 
where ∑ 𝑤௜ i,t defines the weighted average of agents’ expectations discounted by the 
common factor,  r).  
 
The stochastic element of expectations is represented by the conditional variance of combined 
expectations, 2j,t, given  It. The weighting function, wi,t = (1/2j,t) / k 1/2k,t  can then be 
thought of as the degree of “confidence” assigned to agent i’s forecast relative to those of all 
other agents.  In the event of homogeneity, expectations for future dividends and prices are 
identical, reducing the weighting function to 1/N.  Since arbitrage resolves all pricing 
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inefficiencies and dividend forecasts are by definition unbiased, Diba and Grossman (1988) 
show that Equation 31 can be reduced to; 
 
Pt = ∑ 𝐸ஶ୩ୀଵ  [Dt + k ⎹  It]  Equation 33 
 
The current price thus derives from the unbiased estimates with regard to dividends while 
fluctuations in price occur as a result of changes in information.  The deductive element of 
EMH stems from the fact that rational behaviour with homogeneity of views and knowledge 
of the rational views of all other agents implies that decision-makers can, in theory, logically 
calculate equilibrium prices.  Therefore, under EMH, market efficiency can be wholly 
resolved even subject to limits to arbitrage based upon cost alone. 
 
Where agents hold heterogeneous views, there can be a range of expectations with regard 
to the key variables which determine prices and also differing views relating to the impact of 
information on prices.  In such an environment, arbitrage opportunities may exist but may not 
be acted upon due to perceptions of risk over and above costs.  Once limits to arbitrage are 
assumed, the existence of noise traders allows the possibility that pricing inefficiencies may 
persist allowing trading based upon such anomalies to be deemed rational.  Rational traders 
might then trade in a particular manner on the basis of the irrational, yet non-random, 
behaviour of others.  Therefore, should noise traders act on the assumption that a trend in a 
particular stock will persist, rational agents may exploit this by themselves investing in the 
same security, thereby participating in, and extending, that trend.  Rational traders therefore 
still exploit inefficiencies created by others but may not always do so in a manner which 
promotes market efficiency.  Since there is no longer a mechanism for ensuring the timely 
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reversion of securities prices to “fair value”, the potential exists to generate excess risk-
adjusted returns (Schleifer & Summers, 1990). 
 
Under conditions of heterogeneity, the treatment of information relevant to price 
outcomes is no longer common to all agents but may reflect past prices, cash flows, past 
earnings, volumes, volatility and a wide range of fundamental indicators. Heterogeneity 
therefore allows for the possibility that each agent applies different weightings to some or all 
of the information when deriving their private expectations.  Consequently, there is no 
coordinated model of expectations, nor is it possible for one agent to discern the expectations 
of others.  This results in a lack of consensus with regard to Pt + 1.  From the perspective of a 
single agent, an assessment of current fair value is therefore a function not only of his own 
expectations but also his expectations with regard to the views of all other agents.  Therefore, 
agent i’s expectations relating to Pt+1 would be formed as follows; 
 
Ei[P t+1 ⎹  It] =  Ei∑ {𝑤௝ i,t+1 (Ej [Dt + 2 ⎹  It] + Ej [Pt + 2 ⎹  It])} ⎹  It] Equation 34 
 
Since current expectations with regard to P t+1 must include a forward looking element to P t+2 
when heterogeneity prevails, agents must make yet more assumptions about the views and 
weightings of other agents.  This process is wholly inductive as there is no logical way to 
weight the unknown subjective views of others in order to derive a coherent rational price 
expectation.   
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7.3. Financial Market Simulation & Agent-Based Models 
 
The role which psychology plays in shaping asset prices in markets has been explored 
using agent-based model simulations.  These approaches allow for interaction between agents 
to be examined using different rules-based systems.  Heterogeneity of views is a central 
assumption of such models which, in the context of financial markets, have frequently sought 
to explain stylised facts, or observed behavioural anomalies, to the extent that they can be 
replicated by agent interaction within simulated markets.    
 
While numerous agent-based models have been proposed, most share common features 
(for a comprehensive review, see LeBaron, 2006).  Central to all models are agent preferences 
since it is through such preferences that potential interactions are defined.  In theory, any 
behavioural biases can be assigned to categories of agents; it is also possible to allow agents 
to switch between strategies based upon cues.  Hurdles or triggers for activity must be 
specified within the models which then determine buying and selling activity, the net effect of 
which is reflected in price changes.  Agents are therefore assumed to have in-built 
propensities to trade often based upon a weighted interpretation of feedback in the form of 
information.  In order to enable the simulated models to operate with a degree of realism, 
methods of clearing or matching trades must be accommodated.  For example, Day and 
Huang (1990) generated buy and sell orders subsequent to the declaration of  prices issued by 
market-makers.  Trades on each side (purchases and sales) were then aggregated; when there 
was excess demand, the underlying asset price increased, falling in the case of excess supply.  
The magnitude of price changes in such models is often proportional to the level of excess 
demand or supply, for example; 
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Pt+1 = Pt + (B(Pt) -  S(Pt)) Equation 35 
 
Perhaps the most realistic price discovery mechanism was provided by Farmer, Patelli and 
Zovko (2005) whose model allowed agents to post bids and offers which could then be 
matched with all other agents in the system allowing a greater chance of clearing trades at 
prevailing prices.    
 
A number of agent-based models have been structured on the basis of a small number of 
strategies which agents use to trade risky assets.  For example, Alfi, Cristelli, Pietronero &. 
Zaccaria (2009) considered a model comprising N interacting agents divided into 
fundamentalist and chartist investors.  The former were assumed to evaluate opportunities on 
the basis of fundamental “fair value”, broadly consistent with the typical behaviour of long-
term, large institutional investors in actual financial markets, while the latter were short-term 
traders searching for emerging trends in price patterns; such agents being wholly reliant upon 
manipulations of historical price data.  The two categories of agents essentially exert market 
influence in opposite directions.  Fundamentalist agents are deemed to provide a stabilising 
influence within the market as they seek to increase overall efficiency by correcting price 
divergences away from fair value.  Formally, these traders seek to move all risky assets 
towards their perception of a fair fundamental price (pf).  The behaviour of fundamentalist 
traders can then be described by the following stochastic equation, which assumes an 
underlying random walk modified by the strength of action by agents; 
 
p(t + 1) = p(t) + (pf  - p(t)) + (t)  Equation 36 
where;  measures the strength of action exerted on p(t) by fundamentalist agent;  is 
residual noise with amplitude .   
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Chartist traders use only price information to derive expectations.  In this case, they are 
assumed to pursue a simple strategy based upon trends which are detected and defined by the 
degree to which a current price (pt) diverges from a moving average computed using a range 
of previously observed prices.  These traders employ the common expectation that future 
prices will continue to move further away from the moving average, whether in a positive or 
negative direction.  The following stochastic equation can be used to describe chartist 
behaviour, again expressed as a random walk modified by a “force” centred upon the 
difference between pt and the moving average; 
 
p(t+1) = p(t) + b/ (M -1) F( p(t) -  pM(t)) + (t) Equation 37 
where: pM(t) = 1/M ∑ 𝑝ெ୧ୀ୲ (t) defines the moving average calculated over the time interval 
M; b is a measure of the strength of the “force”. 
 
As opposed to the stabilising influence of fundamentalist traders, the actions of chartists are 
essentially destabilising to the extent that they tend to move prices away from fundamental 
fair value in a persistent manner contributing to greater disequilibrium.  Such behaviour has 
the potential to create extended directional moves in prices perhaps, leading to bubbles and 
crashes in the extremes. 
 
Simulated market evolution under this model is sensitive to the relative number of 
fundamentalist (Nf) to chartists (Nc) agents as that determines their collective impacts subject 
to propensities to trade.  Alfi et al allowed agents to switch from one category to the other 
during the simulation adding a further degree of realism.  The probability of change was 
based upon two factors: a herding element and a “consideration” of price.  The first 
component is designed to capture observed behaviour whereby some agents appear to adopt 
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the strategies and actions of others; it was assumed that the likelihood of this effect would 
depend upon the relative number of agents in the two categories with agents more likely to 
switch to a larger category.  The second component assessed switching probability on the 
basis of the price behaviour.  The likelihood of switching from a chartist agent to a 
fundamentalist agent was assumed to be proportional top(t) – pF, while the likelihood of 
switching the other way, to become chartist, was proportional to;  p(t) – pM(t).  In order to 
more accurately replicate actual market behaviour, switching was controlled in such a way 
that asymmetry between the agent categories was maintained, ensuring Nf > Nc.  
 
Alfi et al ran a number of simulations varying N from a single agent to multiple 
heterogeneous agents.  They found consistent evidence of fat tails and volatility clustering.  In 
general, periods of high or low volatility reflected the relative weighting of agent styles with 
greater chartist influence triggering higher volatility.  There was also evidence of positive 
autocorrelation with decay.  Varying b, the strength of chartist action, amplified fat tails and 
the likelihood of bubbles and crashes when the impact of chartist agents increased.  Similarly, 
volume/volatility correlations were found to increase coincident with transition rates towards 
chartists. 
 
   Many agent-based models have shown that they can generate anomalies of the type 
observed in actual markets, similar to the results of Alfi et al described above (see Hommes, 
2006).  However, in most cases, agents are assumed to behave as if they have no price impact 
as a result of their own actions and that these actions are taken independently of all other 
agents.  In contrast, Chakrabarti and Roll (1999) developed an information acquisition model 
in which agents observe the actions of other large traders, adjusting their own beliefs 
accordingly.  Thus, agents receive information signals each period and also feedback relating 
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to the trades of all other agents.  This data is assumed to be combined and used to develop 
expectations of future returns to securities in accordance with Bayesian updating of 
probabilities.   
 
Based upon a series of simulations with varying parameters, Chakrabarti and Roll found 
that price volatility increases with signal diversity but that the resultant price behaviour 
provides a better forecast of future value.  Thus, while greater trading activity increases price 
volatility, the information content of prices appears to be improved.  However, under certain 
simulated conditions, the process of learning through which agents modify their own beliefs 
based upon observed behaviour of others has a tendency to reduce volatility while at the same 
time increasing the accuracy of market price as a forecast of value.  The greater overall 
efficiency of asset prices therefore reduces trading volumes due to smaller disparities between 
asset prices and fair value.  
 
7.4. Feedback, Information and Search Effort 
 
The evidence provided by agent-based models assuming heterogeneous agents subject to 
limits to arbitrage suggests that such frameworks can provide a useful basis from which to 
explore behavioural anomalies in financial markets.  With noise trading able to affect asset 
prices in a systematic and persistent manner, the absence of an automatic short-term 
adjustment process restoring price equilibrium means that rational agents can adopt a range of 
strategies designed to exploit anomalies with a potential of generating excess risk-adjusted 
returns.  In addition, by creating or contributing to general price disequilibria, noise traders 
themselves have the opportunity to realise gains as a result of their own concerted actions, as 
180 
opposed to the almost certain losses their irrational behaviour should realise in markets 
described solely by informational efficiency.   
 
Noise traders are defined within efficient markets theories as agents who make decisions 
based upon data which should have no objective information value in relation to price 
discovery; they therefore operate on the basis of erroneous beliefs.  Fully efficient markets 
require that current prices reflect all relevant information; it is from this that conditions for 
equilibrium can be derived.  Therefore, past prices, old news, historical volatility, volume or 
any other such data should be of no value in predicting future prices as they are all fully 
discounted in current prices.  As seen in the discussion of agent-based models, noise traders 
are usually described as agents whose actions are conditioned, in some cases solely, by 
signals derived from technical analysis (the study of historical price patterns).  In all cases, 
expectations of such traders are predicated upon the assumption that prices exhibit serial 
correlation as opposed to being wholly random.  Historic prices therefore represent essential 
feedback from which signals are taken which then trigger actions.  Positive feedback traders 
bet upon a continuation of a trend while negative feedback traders take positions contrary to a 
trend on the assumption of mean reversion; the two therefore exert differing influences in the 
market, the latter tending to stabilise, while the former destabilise prices away from any 
equilibrium.  Positive feedback trading is typically associated with overvaluation of stocks 
and, in extreme cases, bubbles (DeLong et al, 1990a).  Both types of trading contribute to 
short-term serial correlation in stock prices when the influence of feedback agents is 
sufficiently high.     
 
Fundamental investors are assumed to trade on the basis of information; data which is 
relevant to price discovery.  The core assumption is that such traders derive a perception of 
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fair value with a belief that, over the long-term, prices will converge towards such fair values.   
Since agents are heterogeneous in their views, information acquisition and the subjective 
weighting of its importance can vary across agents.  In addition, the presence of persistent 
noise trading affecting outcomes means that, while fundamental traders may apply anchors in 
terms of fair values, they may not act on evidence of price divergence due to the potential for 
trends to persist. 
 
We have seen that models of market efficiency assume that all information is known to 
agents with no explicit consideration of search effort.  For their part, agent-based models 
recognise differences in the type of information routinely used by traders, for example, 
chartists versus fundamentalists, but are also generally silent on the factors which may 
determine levels of search effort associated with its capture.  For example, simulated models 
which allow switching between styles of heterogeneous agents generally assume that there 
are no limits to switching imposed by information costs or deficits.   
 
Information search effort is often considered within the context of a trade-off between 
benefits and costs; benefits are expected to accrue in the form of better decisions while the 
costs relate to the time and cognitive effort which must be devoted to acquire relevant 
information.  Therefore, in the consumer field, greater information search is often perceived 
as a risk-reducing strategy to the extent that a better-informed decision should reduce the risk 
of error (Kivetz & Simonson, 2000).  However, despite generally easier access to 
information, particularly given the widespread availability of technology, it should not be 
assumed that more is always better than less.  For example, within complex environments in 
which knowledgeable agents operate. Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1988), found that 
decision-makers often adapt to the environment from which information is acquired.  
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Therefore, in environments with extensive real-time data and news flow, agents appear to 
develop the belief that rapid decisions hold the key to success.  In practice, more frequent 
feedback has been found to lead to worse performance due to placing greater emphasis upon 
recent data with a tendency to overreact to random noise (Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 
1985).  
 
 In an extension of this proposition, Lurie & Swaminathan, (2009) empirically tested the 
effects of timeliness and frequency of information in rapidly changing decision-making 
environments.  They found that decision-makers who received more frequent feedback 
generated lower performance than those with less frequent feedback, but only in high-
variance environments.  Recipients of more frequent feedback did however tend to place 
greater weight on recent information.  Escalating costs of data acquisition in high-frequency 
feedback domains did nothing to temper information search behaviour, and therefore failed to 
lead to improved performance.   Based upon process tracing methods, the frequency of 
feedback was found to not only affect the amount of information processed but also the 
manner in which it was processed.  Thus, when the frequency was high, decision-makers 
were far less likely to place recent information in context, again overweighting the 
significance of the most recent information received.  When feedback frequency was reduced, 
decision-makers were more likely to consider information from prior periods.  In addition, 
decision-makers in high frequency feedback environments were found to be less selective in 
their processing of information.   
 
While numerous studies have considered the supply of information, Vlastakis and 
Markellos (2012) examined both the supply and demand for information within financial 
markets as it related to the largest stocks traded on the NYSE.  They found a significant 
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relationship between the search for information and risk aversion, particularly associating the 
increased effort with residual uncertainty regarding an event or its potential outcome; 
information search effort therefore increased systematically as investors sought to reduce 
uncertainty.  Greater volatility was also explained on the basis of investor concern over the 
impact of new information on stock prices.  The same relationship was found during periods 
of general market “distress”.  A further analysis of demand for information was conducted by 
Dimpfl and Jank (2016) using data relating to retail investor internet searches for four major 
global indices (Dow Jones, FTSE, CAC and DAX).  High levels of search activity were found 
to follow unusually high market volatility while heightened search activity also proved to be a 
reliable forecaster of future market volatility (bi-directional Granger causality).   The findings 
provide further evidence of “long memory” characteristics of markets and support agent-
based model findings relating to noise trading and volatility.  In addition, they suggest that 
retail investors can significantly amplify noise trading effects which may even be predicted 
based upon information search activity.  However, no direct examination of retail investor 
trading data following periods of high internet search activity was undertaken to substantiate 
this point.   The research is consistent with the results of a study by Bank, Larch and Georg 
(2011) who found a causal relationship between increased internet search activity and higher 
trading activity and stock liquidity in Germany.  
 
7.4.1. Trading Propensity 
 
We have noted that one of the observed anomalies in financial markets is overall trading 
volume which appears to be excessive given the level of information flow and variability in 
investment style characteristics (Barber & Odean, 2000).  Theoretical models of market 
efficiency imply low trading volume environments as prices rapidly absorb new information, 
184 
often in a manner not requiring physical trading to occur.  In such environments, noise traders 
are needed to generate actual trading volume as rational agents take advantage of the 
mispricing brought about by irrational traders (Pfleiderer, 1984).  As noted earlier in this 
chapter, markets with heterogeneous agents and limits to arbitrage are expected to generate 
higher trading volumes in comparison with EMH as rational investors again exploit the 
actions noise traders.  However, in this case, rational investors may seek to exploit trends 
engineered by noise investors as opposed to simply seeking to restore equilibrium fair value 
prices as such arbitrage is no longer risk free.  Within such markets, trading volume may 
therefore be influenced by the relative importance of noise traders versus fundamental agents.    
 
Various behavioural biases have been suggested as explanations for excessive trading 
propensity.  Thus, Odean (1999) has argued that the disposition effect and overconfidence 
affect trading levels, the former describing a process whereby investors prefer to sell 
positions with cumulative gains rather than losses.  Investor’s perceptions of their levels of 
competence have also been used to explain trading frequency (Graham, Harvey & Huang, 
2009) with those assuming greater competence tending to trade more.  A further important 
area of consideration relates to trading propensity as a function of investor style. 
 
In the discussion relating to agent–based models, we noted that heterogeneous agents 
were assumed to apply different investment styles.  In broad terms, noise traders are typically 
assumed to be short-term in nature, often relying upon an analysis of prior price behaviour in 
order to derive trading signals (chartist). Counterbalancing this are fundamental investors, 
often assumed to be institutional in nature, who analyse investment prospects on the basis of a 
concept of long-term value.  From this, we would therefore expect each category of investor 
to respond to different signals.  While chartists seek to exploit patterns in prices, 
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fundamentalists derive signals in part from price changes, as they affect relative value, and 
also new information.  The actions of each type of agent can, of course, help to generate 
actionable signals for the other due to the transmission effect of changes in price.  
 
Breaking down investment styles in this manner is very general in nature.  In practice, 
there are many sub-categories which are useful descriptors of these broad classifications as 
they may affect investor behaviour differently.  Therefore, within the chartist category, some 
investors may seek to identify emerging momentum in prices (the start of a trend which is 
likely to be sustained) while others may be contrarian, seeking “extended” stocks whose 
prices have diverged significantly from some threshold, often defined by a moving average of 
prices.  Contrarian investors therefore expect trends to be reversed, a process often known as 
mean reversion.  Many other strategies are possible based upon the identification of particular 
price patterns or characteristics (for a detailed overview, see Edwards, Magee & Bassetti, 
2018).   Within the fundamentalist category, a distinction might be drawn between growth 
and value investors or size preferences (small cap versus large cap, for example).  These 
classifications may be further broken down based upon any specific primary sector focus or 
parameters, for example: technology stocks; cyclicals; high yield; private market value; low 
beta.    The resulting portfolios can then be analysed objectively based upon “factor” models 
which describe stock-specific characteristics (Lee & Stefek, 2008).   
 
There is empirical evidence that investor behaviour is conditioned by investor style.  
Froot and Teo (2008) found strong evidence that institutional investors adhere closely to their 
defined styles, reallocating assets within a particular style rather than diversifying into other 
styles.  Style trading also has implications for underlying propensities to trade (Nagel, 2005).  
Adherence to a particular investment style requires investors to rebalance their portfolios to 
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the extent that the underlying characteristics of their holdings drift over time.  Typically, 
styles where characteristics are relatively volatile should see more signals as a result of that 
volatility, potentially triggering greater trading volume; the same might apply to very 
narrowly defined styles. A distinction can again be drawn between short-term trading and 
long-term investing.  The former implies that traders act upon signals which change 
materially over a relatively short timeframe.  Conversely, the characteristics of stocks held by 
long-term investors are likely to be inherently more stable, meaning that new information 
affecting signal thresholds is likely to be less frequent.  It might be noted, however, that the 
majority of trading styles take account of price movements to varying degrees.  Therefore, 
even long-term value investors are likely to measure value at least in  part by reference to 
price using such metrics as: price-to-earnings ratios; dividend yields (dividend per share as a 
percentage of price); market value (share price multiplied by shares outstanding) to book 
value per share, and so on.  Clearly, in most cases the price component of these ratios will 
change much more frequently than the other components.  However, under relatively stable 
market conditions, short-term changes in price alone are unlikely to dramatically change 
valuation perspectives.  Chartists are expected to be more affected by short-term price 
changes since they are essentially trading on the basis of perceived patterns independent of 
general price levels.  Short term price volatility, or even its absence, may even form part of 
the signal generation for chartist investors.   
 
Blackburn, Goetzmann & Ukhov (2014) found evidence that investors do indeed vary 
their trading propensities depending upon style.  Thus, value investors, who were generally 
contrarian in their asset allocations, tended to rebalance portfolios less frequently than growth 
investors who more actively pursued momentum as a strategy (defined according to positive 
rates of change in underlying factors such as earnings per share).  Significantly, investors who 
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invested in both styles were found to adapt their trading behaviour according to each style 
component.  The same adaptation to context was found in relation to risk appetite; therefore, 
investors with assets allocated to both equities and fixed income may exhibit risk-seeking 
behaviour with regard to equities while being risk averse in relation to the fixed income 
portfolio (Shiller, 1999).  Within equity portfolios, investors have also been found to vary 
trading behaviour according to the nature of stocks held.  Thus, investors displaying the 
disposition effect in relation to stocks bought on speculative grounds may not exhibit the 
same behaviour in relation to stocks purchased for yield (Grinblatt & Matti, 2001).  While 
confirming the same relationship between style and trading propensity, Keim and Madhavan 
(1994) also found that the mechanism of trading varied according to style, with differing 
implications for price impact.  With regard to investment style, systematic relationships 
between past excess return and trading decisions were found for both value and momentum 
style managers; value managers only buying stocks following a decline in price.  A number of 
momentum investors were found to buy stocks which had, on average, experienced relatively 
strong price performance (> 6%) in the week prior to the trades.   Other longer-term style 
managers showed no obvious effect with regard to prior price outcomes.  Heterogeneity was 
found with styles.  Thus, some chartist managers clearly followed contrarian rules, yet did not 
appear to be guided by positive excess returns.  In some cases, asymmetries were found 
between buy and sell decisions.  For example, some institutional investors who regularly 
bought stocks pursuant to price declines did not follow an equivalent rule when they sold.  
The reasons for such asymmetries were not clear.  With regard to trade execution, large 
purchases by long-term investors were routinely spread over a longer time period, presumably 
to minimise market impact.  However, sales of a similar size were executed more quickly, 
suggesting that the market impact of buying activity is considered to be greater than that of 
selling.  However, when trading was motivated by information which might have a short 
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duration, such as is the case with chartists trading on short-term price signals, market orders 
were used extensively to execute the trades in full, regardless of any associated market 
impact.   
 
 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) analysed extensive data relating to individual and 
institutional investors in Finland in order to determine motivations for trading.  Using 
multivariate analysis, the interactive effect of causal variables was studied with Logit 
regression then being employed to analyse buy and sell decisions.  The disposition effect and 
tax-loss selling were found to be major determinants of propensity to sell with a strong 
tendency to retain holdings with cumulative losses in excess of 30%.  Stocks exhibiting 
strong recent gains and with prices at or close to monthly highs were more likely to be sold.  
Negative past returns were found to affect trading propensity relatively more than positive 
past returns while a stock trading at a short-term (monthly) high or low tended to increase the 
likelihood of trading decisions in the case of contrarian or momentum styles.  Within these 
broad findings, significant differences were found based upon the sophistication of the 
investor.  Thus, contrarian behaviour was found to be most prevalent for private investors and 
non-profit organisations.  Finance and insurance companies, along with other domestic 
groups considered to be more sophisticated, showed significantly less contrarian behaviour in 
response to short-term price changes.  Foreign investors tended to contrast with the majority 
of domestic investors to the extent that they overwhelmingly tended to pursue momentum 
strategies.   
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7.4.2. The Herding Effect 
 
The process of herding describes the aggregation of similar and correlated behaviour by a 
sufficient number of investors to create an observable trend in securities prices. The 
phenomenon has been identified in relation to significant events, such as market spikes or 
crashes where investors overwhelmingly execute trades in the same direction, creating direct 
evidence of cause and effect (Fenzl & Pelzmann, 2012; Persaud, 2000; Prechter 2001). 
Herding does not only manifest itself in relatively short-term moves in prices, however, as it 
can also be seen in longer term trends (Nofsinger & Sias, 1999; Shapira, Berman & Ben-
Jacob2014; Summers, 1986). It also appears to be a robust characteristic of market behaviour 
independent of the level of sophistication of market participants. 
 
Empirical evidence for highly correlated behaviour at the individual trade level for retail 
(non-sophisticated) investors is provided by a study by Barber, Odean & Zhu (2009a). This 
study, examining actual trading data for US retail investors over a period from 1991 to 1999, 
found significant evidence of coordinated trading across individual investors. Thus, in any 
particular month, the majority of individual investors were found to buy and sell the same 
stocks. Serial correlation was also found to the extent that, in aggregate, if individual 
investors were net buyers of a particular stock in one month, they were likely to also be net 
buyers of the same stock in the following period. From the overall data, four broad 
characteristics of individual trading were identified: First, investors revealed a preference for 
buying stocks with strong historic returns. The same bias was evident with regard to sales, 
although the effect was more pronounced based upon short-term (one or two quarters) rather 
than long-term (up to 12 quarters) price behaviour. Thirdly, buying was found to be more 
concentrated in fewer stocks relative to selling activity. Finally, retail investors were found to 
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be significant net buyers of stocks with unusually high trading volume. In a further extensive 
study of tick data derived from small trades executed on behalf of retail investors, it was 
found that, over short periods, noise trading was responsible for pushing stock prices too high 
(Barber, Odean & Zhu, 2009b). The reverse was found in terms of selling impact. In both 
cases, the effects were subsequently found to reverse with temporarily low prices tending to 
recover whilst excessively high prices tended to drift back. In essence, these studies of retail 
investors suggest that past outcomes and trends are considered to be relevant to the future, 
implying that expectations of serial correlation or continuing directional trends in security 
returns are quite significant. Where this condition exists, a sunk cost effect also tends to 
manifest itself with decision-makers likely to add to positions where recent feedback (price 
performance) is positive. Such investors therefore appear to be heavily dependent upon 
feedback which then informs current decisions which are not then simply forward-looking 
expectations independent of what has gone before.  
 
 The observed coordinated behaviour of individual investors in terms of buying and 
selling activity could be caused by numerous factors. Quite possibly, retail investors might be 
exposed to similar, relatively limited sources of information, including buy and sell 
recommendations of certain brokers’ analysts, wealth advisors or ‘tip sheets’ upon which 
these investors may be unusually reliant.  In addition, the development of online resources 
and forums may again lead to a general homogeneity of view as the same information and 
opinions are widely disseminated and are likely to fill a high percentage of the available 
attention span of non-full-time investors (Sprenger, Tumasjan, Sandner & Welpe, 2014). 
Beyond such information and data sources, retail investors may also develop their own style 
biases and preferences, such as growth versus value. Again, these may be influenced by any 
peer interaction via forums or other core sources of information.  Retail investors may also 
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feel less constrained by benchmark comparisons such that their performance versus a 
recognised index such as the S&P 500 becomes less important in the short term.  As a result, 
they may be more prone to select investments purely on a stock-by-stock basis, maybe 
influenced by apparently attractive ‘stories’ (Barber & Odean, 2008; West, 1998).  The 
clustering of trading activity in the proximity of new recommendations may indicate a 
perception of a cost associated with delay (an assumption that it is better to ‘get in early’). 
This implies an expectation of a herding effect which rewards investors who respond 
immediately to new recommendations ahead of the majority of other investors who may 
delay. Such behaviour is likely to be encouraged by those selling their recommendations or 
who benefit from the subsequent placing of trades (brokerage firms); it may also be learned 
behaviour on the part of investors to the extent that they see or experience short-term 
movements in share prices subsequent to new recommendations. The representativeness 
heuristic, status quo effects and familiarity bias may therefore explain this process and also 
help to explain the observed tendency to buy past winners. Attention bias may also be a 
significant factor as stocks which have generated high historic returns tend to be more 
newsworthy and attract additional coverage and comment in the financial media. Such strong 
attention effects have indeed been identified empirically (Barber & Odean, 2008). In essence, 
therefore, non-professional investors may have access to restricted sources of information 
upon which they rely. As a consequence, they may be less likely, and may feel less able, to 
investigate alternatives outside of these sources. The presumed lack of sophistication and 
expert knowledge of non-professional investors suggests that they base decisions upon inputs 
received from those who are considered to possess some relevant expertise (Kaustia & 
Knüpfer, 2012).  This expertise may be perceived based upon reputation, claims or past 
experience.   
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Herding has also been found to be prevalent in the more sophisticated institutional arena 
with studies confirming an association between net changes in institutional share ownership 
and stock returns over the same period (Grinblatt & Titman, 1989; Grinblatt, Titman & 
Wermers, 1995; Hsieh, 2013; Jones, Lee & Weis, 1999; Sias & Starks, 1997; Walter & 
Moritz Weber, 2006; Wermers, 1999, 2000; Wylie, 2005). Information cascades, whereby 
investors infer information content on the basis of the trades of others, have been proposed as 
a basis for this behaviour; essentially, some investors may believe that perceived competitors 
have an information edge in a particular area and therefore mimic their behaviour (Alevy, 
Haigh & List, 2007; Banerjee, 1992; Ghashghaie, Breymann, Peinke, Talkner & Dodge, 
1996; Watts, 2002).  This effect has again been suggested as a contributory factor in market 
bubbles and crashes (Orléan, 1989; Topol, 1991; Lux, 1995).  Institutional investors have also 
been found to interpret information in a similar manner, in effect adopting the same signals 
and responses (Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, 1992; Gleason, Mathur & Peterson, 2004; Oehler 
& Chao, 2000).  Within the mutual fund industry, a word-of-mouth process has been 
hypothesised to the extent that fund managers appear more likely to buy, sell or hold a stock 
if other managers in the same locality are executing similar trades (Hong, Kubik & Stein, 
2005).  While the authors attribute this to word-of mouth dissemination, either through 
investment managers intermingling or via information leakage from other agents, it could also 
be caused by reliance upon the same primary data sources, such as regional brokerage houses. 
Thus, to the extent that the same managers have a tendency to pay attention to the output of 
local brokerage research and analyst opinion, there is clearly scope for unintended mimicking 
behaviour, similar to that seen in the retail environment.  Major brokerage houses, in turn, 
have a tendency to pass their most timely information on to their largest clients first, with 
some evidence that this creates a positive performance bias for larger clients in comparison 
with smaller clients, who receive the same price sensitive information later (Fong, Gallagher, 
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Gardner & Swan, 2004).  This may encourage smaller managers to pay closer attention to 
recent trades by their larger counterparts. Similarly, in the mutual fund arena, Fong et al (op 
cit) found positive evidence of leadership and follower relationships whereby trades 
undertaken by the best performing managers appeared to be scrutinised more closely by 
others, leading to subsequent mimicking behaviour. 
 
The potential for negative reputation outcomes provides a further possible behavioural 
explanation for herding. Thus, certain investors may wish to avoid being seen as contrarian 
(not following the herd or consensus), particularly if those decisions become associated with 
poor performance (Boyson, 2010; Choi & Sias, 2009; Scharfstein, & Stein, 1990). Pomorski 
(2006), in a similar investigation, found that mutual funds with the worst recent historical 
performance tended to mimic the best funds more than average return funds. Also, small and 
newer funds tended to mimic more than established funds.  
 
Herding behaviour in the institutional arena may also to be a consequence of style bias. 
Thus, managers who employ a particular, well-defined investment style create biases in terms 
of the types of securities they select; managers of similar styles therefore have a tendency to 
select from the same sub-group of stocks (Falkenstein, 1996; Lobao & Serra, 2002; 
Mohamed, Bellando, Ringuedé & Vaubourg, 2011; Oehler & Wendt, 2009). Fund size may 
also lead to further filtering of perceived available investment opportunities as the largest 
funds are less able to allocate meaningful amounts of their capital to smaller capitalisation 
issues due to liquidity constraints, again reducing the overall size of perceived investment 
choices (Kadapakkam, Kumar & Riddick, 1998; Pollet & Wilson, 2008). Fund size may also 
be a major factor in explaining short-term serial correlations in trades. Thus, in order to 
minimise total market impact, large funds may prefer to spread their purchases and sales over 
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a number of trading days, resulting in repeats of the same trades in the same stocks (Sais, 
2004). Finally, of particularly relevance to markets exhibiting excess, fads, such as the 
internet bubble, have been proposed as an explanation for herding behaviour, with strong 
relative performance from identifiable groups of stocks forcing greater following effects due 
to gathering performance disparities between bubble stocks and the rest of the market 
(Barberis & Shleifer, 2003; Sharma, Easterwood & Kumar, 2006; Singh, 2013; Walden & 
Browne, 2008).  This would imply that, under certain conditions, professional investors may 
become substantially reactionary, placing trades primarily on the basis of current trends.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE EFFECT OF STYLE, FEEDBACK & CONTEXT ON INFORMATION 
DEMAND AND TRADING PROPENSITY, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The following case study examined the effect of short-term feedback and market context 
on the demand for, and use of, information within a dynamic, complex environment with high 
levels of uncertainty.  The empirical data was derived from a novel simulated financial 
market environment employing actual historical prices and fundamental data together with 
mouse tracking in order to capture and record the actions of participants.   
 
As well as considering evidence for well-established behavioural characteristics relating 
to risk and loss-aversion, the study tested the findings of Lurie & Swaminathan, (2009) with 
regard to apparent emphasis upon recent feedback and scope of utilisation of new 
information.  Similar to the studies conducted by Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) and Dimpfl 
and Jank (2016), demand for information was also examined testing the effects of volatility 
and market “distress”.  Trading propensity was explored within the context of sell-versus-
hold and sell-versus-buy decisions using methodology similar to that employed by Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001).  The degree of overall adherence to self-declared investment styles was 
also examined (Shiller, 1990).   
 
Mouse tracking elements of the study add significantly to the detail and findings 
regarding overall behaviour as all mouse-based interactions with the underlying data were 
recorded.  Over the course of the experiment, participants were exposed to considerable 
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feedback and potential information flow.   Feedback stemmed from the regular display of 
portfolio and stock performance information with an Index benchmark offering a potential 
reference point against which performance could be evaluated.  A substantial amount of 
information relating to potential investments was also available to participants; this could be 
accessed in a straightforward manner using the software platform provided. Nevertheless, 
participants were required to take well-defined actions in order to retrieve the various types of 
information available, enabling each item of information demanded to be logged.  The 
information itself was dynamic, updating according to the latest data available for each 
period.  Therefore, participants had the opportunity to evaluate “new” information on a 
regular basis. 
 
8.2. The Study 
 
A total of 57 individuals took part in a case study of portfolio management behaviour. 
The simulated stock market environment was designed to produce a high degree of realism, 
using actual historical data drawn from a 12 month period running from early May, 2010 to 
the end of April, 2011. Index data was taken from the US S&P 100 Index to represent the 
market as a whole while the daily closing prices of 98 stocks comprised the investable 
universe for participants.   
 
To place the selected data range within a broader context, the S&P 100 Index fell by 
38.49% over the course of 2008, due largely to the widespread market dislocation resulting 
from systemic risks in the broader financial system. The Index declined further in the initial 
part of 2009, reaching a low of 676.53 on 9th March 2009. This represented a total fall of 
25.10% from the end of 2008. Subsequent to the 2009 low, the Index underwent a rapid 
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recovery to 3rd May 2010 (the start date for Phase 1). To illustrate the broader context 
visually, the closing levels of the Index from 10th May, 2007 to 28th April, 2011 are shown in 
Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. S&P 100 Index, daily closes (May, 2007 to April, 2011) 
 
 
The stocks chosen for inclusion in the study were all members of the S&P 100 Index for the 
period concerned and were all classified as being large capitalisation in terms of market value 
(defined as being in excess of $10bn). The smallest company in the sample had a market 
capitalisation at the time of approximately $18bn, ranking 243rd out of all of the 
corresponding NYSE constituents. The largest company had a market capitalisation of 
approximately $500bn, ranking first within the S&P in terms of size. The 98 companies 
covered 11 standard, recognisable sector classifications (e.g. healthcare, technology, 
financials, energy). Each of the stocks was highly liquid with average daily volumes ranging 
from just under 1m shares to over 60m shares traded.  
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In order to help minimise the chance of memory association from participants, all of the 
information was rendered anonymous. Thus, while participants were informed that actual 
market prices were being used, the stock exchange and period from which they were taken 
remained undisclosed. All prices were expressed in generic terms with no currency assigned. 
In addition, actual company names were replaced by fictitious, pre-assigned names. The same 
applied to the Index itself. Participants were simply told that all of the stocks available to 
them as possible investments were large capitalisation issues and highly liquid. Any 
perceptions of size or liquidity biases should therefore have been eliminated.   
 
While all data relating to the companies and the Index was rendered anonymous as to 
source, relevant industry/sector classifications were maintained. In order to create an 
environment with a level of richness in terms of information content, actual fundamental data 
applicable to the time period covered was also incorporated and made available to 
participants. Participants were informed that they would each be managing their own notional 
portfolio, simulated over a period of time. In order to provide an incentive, participants were 
told that the individual achieving the highest portfolio return at the end of the experiment 
would receive £100 worth of gift vouchers from a major store. 
 
8.2.1. Participants 
 
Participants for the study were recruited from a number of seminars and workshops 
offered by a UK-based investment management company. These events were held over a 
number of days and featured presentations on a range of relevant investment-related topics. 
The seminars and workshops were offered entirely free, although attendees were asked to 
take part in the study in return; such participation being entirely voluntary. In the event, all 
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Role / Main Experience Gender
Breakdown by 
Gender Average Age
Average Years of 
Investment 
Experience
Average Starting 
Age (in Role)
Number with Higher 
Degrees / 
Professional 
Qualifications
Male 16 44.69 17.31 27.38 15
Female 3 43.00 21.33 21.67 3
Total 19 44.42 17.95 26.47 18
Male 5 50.80 22.80 28.00 5
Female 0 NA NA NA NA
Total 5 50.80 22.80 28.00 5
Male 2 37.00 16.50 20.50 2
Female 4 35.25 10.25 25.00 4
Total 6 35.83 12.33 23.50 6
Male 22 43.00 15.86 27.23 19
Female 2 43.09 15.00 28.00 2
Total 24 43.08 15.79 27.29 21
Male 3 58.33 27.33 31.00 2
Female 0 NA NA NA NA
Total 3 58.33 27.33 31.00 2
Male 48 45.13 17.81 27.31 43
Female 9 39.56 15.00 24.56 9
Total 57 44.24 `7.368 26.88 52
Overall Totals
IFA
Investment Manager
MBA
Private Investor
Stockbroking
attendees agreed to participate and were tested jointly. The participants all declared an “above 
average” interest in financial markets with a number having direct experience in the industry. 
In terms of profile, 52 out of the 57 participants (91.22%) held first or higher degrees (various 
subjects) and/or held various professional qualifications. Independent advisors (IFAs) and 
wealth planners accounted for one-third of the total number (19 out of 57); 6 participants 
were enrolled on an MBA course at a local business school while 2 participants were 
currently employed as investment managers. The remaining participants were all active 
private investors managing their own money or had prior experience in stockbroking or 
portfolio management at some stage in their careers. The participants comprised 48 males 
(84.21% of the total) and 9 females; ages ranged from 24 to 64 years (M 44.25, SD = 9.53).   
The breakdown of participants by role, age and gender is shown in Table 17.  There is no 
significant difference in age between genders; using the two-tailed sample test for unequal 
variances, t(55) = -1.63, p= 0.11.  No significant differences were also found for years of 
relevant investment experience based upon gender; t(55) = 1.67, p = 0.44. 
Table 17. Breakdown of participants by experience, gender, average age, investment experience and 
qualification. 
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Self-Declared Style Number of particiapnts
Growth 12
Judgmental 20
Technical 13
Value 12
The breakdown of participants by self-reported investment is style shown in Table 18.  
Table 18. Breakdown of participants by self-declared investment style. 
 
 
8.3. Materials and Methods 
 
Participants were provided with custom-built software loaded onto a number of 
networked desktop computers. The software contained all of the tools necessary for each 
participant to manage their own notional portfolios within the context of the environment 
provided.  At the outset, and as the study progressed, participants could evaluate potential 
investments, buy and sell securities and change portfolio holdings as they chose, subject to 
the general constraint that no shorting (selling a stock not already held) or leverage 
(borrowing to finance a purchase) was allowed. There was no time limit imposed in relation 
to creating individual portfolios, although individual transactions, once executed, were 
binding. Once satisfied with their portfolios, participants could ‘step forward’ to the next 
valuation period. At that point, the latest portfolio valuation would be displayed and 
participants could see a summary of their performance since the prior valuation date together 
with the performance of each stock in their portfolio and the return of the market index. In 
addition, at each stage, participants could see the cumulative performance of their own 
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portfolio and that of the market Index up to that point. Participants therefore had two key 
pieces of performance information available to them at each stage; absolute portfolio returns, 
in monetary and percentage terms, and relative returns (portfolio return compared with the 
market Index return over the same period). 
 
Since the aim of the study was to extract as much information regarding user interaction 
as possible, the software was designed to capture all keyboard actions and mouse clicks, with 
the derived data being logged and saved in files stored on each computer. Each participant 
began the experiment with a notional 5,000,000 (generic currency unit) of cash which they 
were free to allocate across the universe of available investments in any way they chose, 
subject to the general constraints regarding leverage and shorting. Participants were 
introduced to the full functionality of the software over a 45 minute period during which they 
could practice, test and ask questions relating to the software.  
 
Unique identification codes were assigned to each participant. Participants were also 
presented with a single sheet of paper on which they were asked to select their generic 
investment style from a printed list of four broadly defined categories; value, growth, 
technical or judgmental. In addition to tick boxes applicable to each category, a brief 
description of the general characteristics of each style was also provided on the sheet. For 
example, it was suggested that value investors may favour stocks offering high dividend 
yields, low price to earnings ratios (PE), low price to book value ratios (PBV), or low price to 
cash flow ratios (PCF). Alternatively, they might assess stocks on a relative basis by 
comparing, for example, an individual stock’s P/E ratio against that of the market average, or 
by comparing combinations of factors, such as a high relative return on equity (ROE) versus 
low relative PE. Growth investors were described as being more likely to place greater 
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emphasis upon positive, dynamic rates of change of key underlying variables, such as the 
year-over-year rate of change in earnings per share (EPS). Technical investors were 
categorised as those who based stock selection predominantly upon historic price patterns, 
deriving signals in whichever manner primarily from that source. The final, judgmental 
category was used to capture all other explicit or co-mingled styles. Thus, investors who 
considered numerous indicators and factors, without necessarily assigning a dominant role to 
any particular source, would fall into this category. Similarly, hybrid styles, such as a 
combination of growth and technical analysis, might also be so assigned.  
 
For the purposes of the experiment, self-reported styles were used as descriptive elements 
designed to reflect the participants’ own perceptions of any particular investment (heuristic) 
bias which they may have. There was no presumption that participants would necessarily 
adhere to such styles throughout the course of the experiment, although it was assumed that 
participants would tend to adopt such style biases and methods at least in the initial stages of 
the portfolio building and management processes. Adherence to particular styles was, in any 
case, analysed from the detailed portfolio data in order to establish any factor biases in the 
portfolios created and the consistency of those biases over the course of the experiment.  On 
that’s basis, style biases can be inferred and compared with the self-declared style attributes.  
Participants were able to access a substantial amount of fundamental and price-
related data as well as manage their portfolios via the software platform.  On opening 
the software programme, participants entered the main “Dashboard” area where they 
input their unique User IDs.  This allowed access to the various data and portfolio 
management tools.  The Dashboard view is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. “Dashboard” screen for navigate the software. 
Note: Upon entering the software, participants input their User IDs into the box shown on the Dashboard 
above. They were then able to access the main modules of the programme. The drop-down list enabled 
them to quickly summon information on a single security. Alternatively, participants could choose to enter 
one of the data modules available through the Toolbox. Should they wish, participants could move directly 
to the Portfolio Management Module .It was possible to return to the Dashboard at any time during the 
experiment, although all of the information accessed through that route could also be accessed from any of 
the other modules at any time. 
 
Fundamental and technical (price-based) data was presented in the form of tables while 
historical price charts were also readily available for each security and the market Index.  
Simple menus available in each section of the programme made it easy to move freely from 
one table to another as required. By default, fundamental (company-specific) and technical 
indicator tables were displayed according to assigned company name, sorted alphabetically 
(please see Appendix H for more information on the tables and their contents).  
Additional information could be accessed via the tables by double-clicking on the name 
of a chosen security.  This gave participants the option of generating a historical price chart 
for the selected security which then gave access to additional tools for plotting and creating 
various technical indicators in graphical form. It was therefore possible to use the software to 
perform analysis as defined by the user as opposed to being limited to pre-set metrics and 
defaults.  Participants also had the option of changing default table views by sorting either of 
the tables based upon any of the data columns.  For example, participants could choose to sort 
the fundamental data table on the basis of the P/E column.  This would then sort the 
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information in the table from high-to-low based upon P/E.  All of the underlying data in the 
tables updated over the course of the study to reflect the latest prices and other data which 
would have been available at each point in time; all ratios and other computed data were 
instantly recalculated where necessary.  
 
The primary purpose of the tables was to enable participants to perform various types of 
analysis to support their decision-making.  In order to make the software as user-friendly as 
possible, once a potential investment had been identified, participants could add the security 
to their existing portfolio easily from either table simply by right-clicking the security code. 
This inserted the selected security, along with the latest price, into the portfolio form ready 
for shares to be purchased as required. There was no obligation for participants to conduct 
any transaction simply by transferring securities in this way; entering actual transactions 
could only be accomplished via the portfolio form as a result of activating the formal 
procedure for enacting such transactions. Participants were not required to view any of the 
available data at any stage in order to create, maintain or modify their portfolios.  If desired, 
they could simply “step forward” to the next valuation period without conducting any search 
or review activity and without making any changes to holdings.  Consequently, it is safe to 
conclude that viewing data was an active decision on the part of participants.  
 
Each data and information request was logged by the software, identifying the time of the 
request derived from the computer’s internal clock, the identity of the security for which 
information was requested and the type of data polled (for example, fundamental or chart 
data). Participants could also request information on the market Index as a whole (market 
Index data was included at the bottom of each table).The actual portfolio construction process 
205 
Stock List:
Total Portfolio Value: 5,203,946.00
Available Cash: 179,192.93
Security Code Price Shares Value
Aplian Healthcare DCS1002 22.02 12,500 275,250.00
Bosphur Financial DCS1005 44.82 8,600 385,452.00
Catsom Industrials DCS1008 68.54 6,000 411,240.01
Decorum Materials DCS1018 48.54 7,500 364,050.01
Ecom Pharmaceutical DCS1021 21.74 14,300 310,882.00
Grafton Oil DCS1031 62.08 5,400 335,232.01
Halter Goulding DCS1034 12.72 15,800 200,976.00
Hayden Dynas DCS1037 19.28 13,600 262,208.01
KP Systems DCS1044 25.93 12,000 311,160.00
Lear Computing DCS1050 259.04 1,000 259,040.01
SafeGuard Technologies DCS1076 44.43 9,000 399,870.00
Starlight DCS1085 25.88 13,100 339,027.99
TG Systems DCS1089 35.99 9,500 341,905.02
True Vision DCS1092 23.02 15,700 361,414.01
Yoga Exploration DCS1099 17.54 15,000 263,100.01
Portfolio Management Form
was designed to be both easy and flexible. A dedicated portfolio form could be accessed from 
the main Dashboard or directly from any of the activated table or chart forms. Figure 9 shows 
a typical portfolio view.  
 
While security names and prices could be added to the portfolio form either directly from 
a drop-down box or via the tables, transactions could only be undertaken from within the 
portfolio form. To change the number of shares held, participants clicked in the appropriate 
row under the “Shares” column (double-clicking to buy shares, right clicking to sell). These 
actions triggered a dialogue box enabling participants to enter the required number of shares  
 
Figure 9. Example of portfolio holdings list. 
Note: By default, the portfolio view listed stocks alphabetically, showing the latest price, the number of 
shares held and the value of each holding. The total portfolio value was shown along with any residual 
cash. Participants could initiate transactions by selecting the appropriate row and clicking the 
corresponding “Shares” column. A new potential holding could be added by selecting a new stock from the 
drop-down box labelled “Stock List”. 
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to buy or sell. Once entered and confirmed, a summary screen would appear displaying 
details of the proposed transaction, including the value of the trade, net of transactions costs. 
At this stage, participants were required to accept the trade in order to execute the transaction, 
or cancel (see Figure 10).  In the event that a proposed trade was cancelled, no monetary 
amounts or number of shares held changed.  However, once a trade was accepted, it became 
binding. At that point, the new number of shares would be displayed in the appropriate cell, 
the aggregate value of the total holding being updated. The available cash balance also 
adjusted automatically, as did the total value of the portfolio (the aggregate portfolio value 
changing due to the impact of transactions costs). Since no intraday prices were used, all 
transactions were executed at previous end-of-day closing prices. In order to increase realism, 
notional spreads along with commissions were applied to both purchases and sales such that 
total transaction costs amounted to 0.30% of the underlying value of each transaction. 
Therefore, any participant investing the total amount of available cash (5,000,000) at the 
earliest opportunity would experience an immediate drop in the ending value of their portfolio 
of 0.30%.    
 
Checks were incorporated into the software to prevent “illegal” trades. Thus, as no 
shorting was allowed in this experiment, share balances could not be negative (it was 
therefore not possible to sell more shares than the number already held). Similarly, since no 
leverage could be employed, cash balances could not fall below zero. In the event that 
proposed trades violated either of those conditions, an error message would appear informing 
participants of the “violation”. The proposed trade was then reset (cancelled) and all open 
dialog boxes were closed with no changes to the portfolio or cash balance being made; if they 
wished, participants were then free to enter a new trade which would not violate the 
constraints. Within the available constraints, participants could select any number of stocks 
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they wished, trading in any size. In the event that participants wished to change a previous 
trade, they could do so only on the basis of a new transaction, thereby incurring additional 
transaction costs. No time limits were imposed on the portfolio building process; participants 
could therefore take as long as they wished to create the desired portfolio. Once any changes 
to portfolios had been completed, participants moved forward to the next valuation date by 
selecting the “Advance to Next Period” option on the form. This took participants to the next 
“valuation day”. At that stage, the latest portfolio would be displayed updated to reflect 
closing prices and holding values for the next period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of a transaction dialogue box. 
Notes: The above example is that of a participant activating a sale of Bosphur Financial.  In an initial 
dialogue box, participants simply entered the number of shares to be sold. This information triggered a 
second dialog box (shown above) containing a  summary of the trade, including the total value of the 
proposed  transaction. Participants therefore had one final opportunity to cancel the proposed trade, or else 
proceed by clicking the “Accept” button. 
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Participants received summary feedback regarding the performance of their portfolios 
and individual holdings throughout the course of the study. At each valuation date, the 
aggregate performance of the portfolio for the latest period would be displayed along with the 
cumulative performance since inception. As a comparison, the equivalent performance data 
for the market Index was also provided. Participants could therefore see at a glance whether 
the performance of their portfolio exceeded or lagged that of the market Index. Participants 
also received performance information about individual holdings within the portfolios, 
including latest period returns as well as cumulative gains or losses in relation to book costs. 
At no stage was the performance of other portfolios managed by other participants disclosed. 
Therefore, while participants could easily see how they were performing versus the Index 
benchmark, they had no information on how their performance compared with that of their 
peers.  While performance feedback was provided automatically to each participant 
throughout the experiment, all other information relating to fundamental or price data 
required participants to take actions in order to retrieve it thereby enabling their level of 
demand for information to be assessed. 
 
In order to ensure that the study was not unduly time consuming (approximately three 
hours had been allocated for the entire experiment), portfolio valuation periods were set to 
occur at intervals of 5 trading days. Therefore, having completed the initial portfolio and 
stepping forward, the next valuation would reflect price changes over the subsequent 5 
trading days. Consequently, over the course of the entire experiment, participants would 
create, review, evaluate and manage a total of 51 portfolios from start to finish. 
 
 
 
209 
8.4. Description of the Source Data 
 
As noted earlier, actual historical data was used for the study. The period chosen, 3rd May 
2010 to 28th April 2011, was selected due to its specific characteristics. Within this time 
period, there are two distinct phases: In the first part of the period, the general market Index 
experienced a significant decline, with the S&P 100 (the index chosen for the experiment) 
falling from a starting level of 1202.26 on 3rd May 2010, to a low of 1022.58 on 2nd July 
2010, representing a fall of 14.94%. From that low position, the Index recovered in an 
irregular manner to reach 1148.67 on 24th September 2010, representing an increase of 
12.33% from the low point. Over the period, from 3rd May 2010 to 24th September 2010, the 
market as a whole therefore declined by 4.46% based upon closing prices. For the purposes of 
the study, this time period is described as Phase 1.  
 
The second intra-period, described as Phase 2, spanned the period from 24th September, 
2010 (the end of Phase 1) to 11th March, 2011. This period is marginally longer than the 
period defining Phase 1 (116 versus 101 trading days). Over the course of Phase 2, the 
market Index displayed a generally rising trend, ending some 13.55% above the opening 
level. The closing price of 11th March, 2011 was therefore 8.49% above the level of the Index 
level as of 3rd May, 2010 (marking the start of the experiment). In summary, Phase 1 was a 
period of above average volatility with sharp declines in Index levels over the initial period, 
which saw significant cumulative declines. Towards the end of the Phase 1 period, there was 
some reversal of this downtrend as the market as a whole experienced cumulative gains. 
Phase 2 involved a continuation of that recovering trend with reduced levels of volatility 
relative to that present during Phase 1.  
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The study is designed to examine the impact of real-time feedback on the demand for 
information, as evidenced by search activity conducted by participants.  Much of the feedback 
to participants relates to the performance of their investments, both at the portfolio and 
individual stock level.  It is expected that participants will evaluate this feedback according to 
some reference points; in this case, the primary reference points are likely to be absolute 
returns, either gains or losses, and performance relative to the Index benchmark, the latter 
providing a context for the overall investment environment.  The distribution of individual 
stock returns might therefore play a significant role in determining both relative and absolute 
performance of participant portfolios.  This was examined in two ways; the first simply 
looked at the basic distributions of the data; the second used Monte Carlo analysis to generate 
a series of random portfolio whose returns could be calculated.   
 
Over the entire period for which data was applied to the experiment, the capital return 
(excluding dividend yield) for the S&P 100 Index was 13.16%. The Index is weighted 
according to the market capitalisation (share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding) of its individual constituents.  The level of the Index is therefore calculated in 
the following manner; 
 
Ix = ∑ 𝑃௜ i .Qi  / Divisor Equation 38   
where Pi .Qi is the market capitalisation of stock i based upon the current price, Pi , and 
the free shares outstanding Qi.  The divisor is an adjustment factor to allow for stocks 
leaving and joining the Index over time, ensuring continuity in its price level.   
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The capitalisation weighting of the Index means that the largest companies, in terms of their 
market value, exert more of an influence on the price outcome due to their higher weighting 
relative to smaller capitalisation issues. Examining each of the 98 stocks included in the 
experiment, the median return was found to be 13.90% over the entire period. The median 
return is thus similar to that of the market capitalisation weighted return. However, the 
equally-weighted mean return was found to be significantly higher than the market 
capitalisation weighted Index return and the median stock return (17.09%), reflecting the 
overall impact of outliers. The summary of the findings is presented in Table 19.  
Table 19. Summary of returns for 98 stocks used in experiment. 
Highest Individual Stock Return 74.44% 
Lowest Individual Stock Return -36.98% 
Mean Stock Return 17.09% 
Median Stock Return 13.16% 
Standard Deviation 21.14% 
 
In order to assess the impact of the skewed stock return data distribution on overall 
portfolio performance, Monte Carlo simulations were conducted based upon randomly 
generated, static (non-trading) portfolios. A total of 250,000 such random portfolios were 
created based upon arbitrary criteria. Specifically, the number of assumed holdings for each 
random portfolio was itself subject to a process of random number generation, and could 
range, in whole numbers, between 8 and 20 holdings. Once the number of planned holdings 
had been determined in this manner, the identity of each security to be included in the new 
portfolio was again selected at random from the available universe of 98 stocks7. For each 
                                                 
7 Therefore, the first random number generated the number of holdings which would appear in that particular 
portfolio. The second set of random numbers to be generated identified the specific stocks which would make up 
212 
portfolio, the initial cash was then allocated equal between holdings, ensuring a fully invested 
portfolio which was then held without modification throughout the entire time period 
corresponding to the experimental data range. Therefore, once created, no trading was 
assumed to take place.  Consequently, the total return for each portfolio over the entire period 
0  to t was simply calculated based upon the weighted cumulative return of all included 
holdings, derived from;  
Pret = (( ∑ 𝑃௜ i, t . Qi, 0 / ∑ 𝑃௜ i,0 . Qi, 0) – 1) * 100  Equation 39 
 
The simulation of random portfolios confirms a return skew relative to the Index, as shown in 
Table 20.   
 
Table 20.  Monte Carlo random portfolio simulation (250,000 portfolios). 
 
Note: The data in the Table defines the overall return distribution derived from the Monte Carlo simulation. 
The distribution provides a basis against which to judge participant performance in terms of skill (as 
measured by the likelihood of a particular return outcome occurring by chance). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that required number of holdings. For this purpose, stocks were ranked alphabetically by name with the random 
number identifying the stock at that corresponding position in the list. The total number of unique random 
numbers generated at the second stage obviously equalled the initial value of the random number determining 
the total number of portfolio holdings; in other words, the same security could  not be randomly selected more 
than once and included more than once in the portfolio. 
Maximum Portfolio Return 42.45%
Minimum Portfolio Return -16.29%
Mean Return 16.02%
Median Return 16.20%
Standard Deviation 6.03%
Mean + 1.96.sd 27.84%
Mean - 1.96.sd 4.21%
95% Confidence Interval
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Based upon these parameters, a randomly generated, fully invested, non-trading portfolio was 
found to have a greater than 68.23% chance of outperforming the Index over the period. (In 
other words, a random investor applying no investment skill would be expected to outperform 
the Index benchmark 68.23% of the time.) This is a structural bias within the data which 
could have some impact on the results generated by the study, particularly if participants 
place emphasis upon their relative performance (portfolio return versus that of the Index), 
taking positive outperformance as positive affirmation of their current strategy. It is equally 
possible that some investors may mistake underlying data bias, resulting in excess portfolio 
return, for skill.  
 
8.5. Hypotheses 
 
 
The study is designed to examine the level of participant demand for information 
primarily as a function of short-term feedback and certain “environmental” factors which 
provide context.  The key hypotheses can be described formally as follows: 
 
1. Participants would exhibit systematically different behaviour in the domain of losses 
versus gains.  Consistent with existing literature, the level of demand for information was 
expected to be influenced by the nature of short-term feedback in the form of portfolio 
and individual holding returns (Bank, Larch & Georg, 2011).   Specifically, negative 
returns were expected to trigger greater information search relative to gains, consistent 
with risk aversion and response to uncertainty (Vlastakis & Markellos, 2012).  An 
inverse relationship was therefore expected between portfolio return metrics and demand 
for information. 
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2. Demand for information would vary according to the level of overall volatility.  The 
standard deviation of Index returns over rolling 21-day periods was used as a proxy for 
general volatility.  Higher levels of market volatility were expected to trigger additional 
search and exploration activity, again due to risk-aversion and the desire to reduce 
uncertainty.  A direct relationship is therefore expected between the two variables. 
 
3. Significant differences in demand for information were expected based upon investment 
style.  Technical style participants, who derive information primarily from price 
behaviour and patterns, were expected to engage in greater levels of  information search 
activity relative to other, more fundamentally based, styles.  Technical trading is 
inherently more short-term in nature than many fundamental styles and is therefore more 
likely to be responsive to short-term price movements.  Value investing, by contrast, is 
likely to be significantly less susceptible to the influence of short-term market price 
changes.   The search for price patterns and structures suggests that Technical style 
investors are likely to be presented with potentially actionable signals more frequently 
than fundamental style investors, particularly within more volatile periods.  The basic 
differences between styles were therefore expected to be magnified in periods of 
heightened volatility. 
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8.5.1.  Description of Variables and Testing Procedures  
 
The overall effect of real-time feedback on information demand was investigated using a 
series of regression models.  The dependent variable (DV) in each case was frequency data 
representing the number of search actions per participant for each portfolio period, measured 
by the number of relevant mouse clicks generated by participants, f(DS).  Relevant mouse 
clicks included all requests for stock-specific fundamental or price data.  A visual 
representation of f(DS) is provided by Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Frequency data of  f(DS) for all participants overlaid with the market Index 
 
Casual inspection of the data suggests a clear pattern with regard to the distribution of f(DS) 
with aggregate demand for information appearing to be correlated with the short-term 
directional bias of the market and changes in trend.   
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Formal analysis of the data was conducted using log-linear (Poisson) regression, 
reflecting the frequency data DV, tested for overdispersion. Four models were tested; each 
model had common independent variables in the form of most recent period returns, 
cumulative returns to date and short-term market volatility.  Additional dummy variables 
were then added to capture any effects from style and phase.  Table 21 displays the detail of 
the models tested. 
 
Table 21.  Dependent and independent variables (IVs) of the models 
 
where: 
 
f(DS), the DV, is the sum of all relevant mouse clicks triggering the retrieval of  
fundamental or price data for individual stocks in each period; 
IV1 (PPerf %) is the most recent period portfolio performance in percentage terms; 
IV2 (CPerf %) represents cumulative performance of the portfolio to date in percentage 
terms, updated for each period; 
IV3 (Mvol) is a proxy variable for volatility, computed as the rolling standard deviation of 
daily market Index returns over the prior month8. 
                                                 
8 Volatility, computed by standard deviation, measures the short-term variability in broad market Index returns 
and is therefore a proxy for the state of the prevailing investment environment. To the extent that participants are 
inherently risk averse, increases in volatility may imply heightened levels of absolute risk in the overall 
investment environment and may, therefore, suggest greater potential for future losses. 
DV IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV4B IV5
Model1 f(DS) Pperf% Cperf% Mvol
Model 2 f(DS) Pperf% Cperf% Istyle
Model 3 f(DS) Pperf% Cperf% Sstyle
Model 4 f(DS) Pperf% Cperf% P 1,2
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IV4A (Istyle) is a dummy variable representing broad investment style.  Participants are 
categorised as either Technical (chartists) or Fundamental (fundamentalist) 
investors.  The assignment to each classification was made according to the self-
described investment styles of participants and took the default values of 0 for 
Fundamental investors and 1 for Technical investors.  The Fundamental 
classification therefore encompasses the Value, Growth and Judgmental sub-
classifications of self-declared styles. 
IV4B (Sstyle) is a categorical variable based upon the four sub-styles self-declared by 
participants.  The categorical variable took values from 1 to 4 based upon these sub-
styles corresponding with: Growth; Judgmental; Technical; Value. 
 IV5 (P1, 2) is a separate categorical variable denoting the various “phases” within the time 
period of the study as described earlier.  The categorical variable took values of 1, 2, 
and 0; the first two corresponding to Phase 1 and Phase 2 respectively while the 
latter corresponded with the short residual period post-Phase 2. 
 
 
Model 1 was therefore a direct test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, with feedback measured by 
portfolio returns over the latest period in addition to cumulative portfolio performance up to 
each point within the study period.  The market volatility proxy represented the broad 
“environmental” variable in order to measure the extent to which behaviour was influenced 
by recent volatility in general asset prices.   Model 2 added a dummy variable capturing the 
broad division between Technical (chartist) and Fundamental (fundamentalist) styles as self-
declared by participants.  Model 3 performed a similar analysis but broke the Fundamental 
category down into its various sub-styles (Growth, Judgmental and Value), again as self-
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declared by participants.  Model 4 tested for additional explanatory power provided by market 
phases.   
 
 
8.6. Description and Discussion of Results 
 
The summary statistics (Table 22) and correlation matrix (Table 23) provide insights into 
the structure of the variables.  Reflecting the nature of the test period, the summary statistics 
indicate relatively high levels of volatility and data ranges for the non-dummy variables.  The 
characteristics of the return-related variables, Pperf % and Cperf %, in particular capture the 
volatile nature of the period, confirmed by the range for Mvol.  The correlation matrix reveals 
a weak relationship between Pperf% and Cperf% and between Pperf% and Mvol.  A 
moderate (inverse) relationship is found between Cperf% and Mvol.  Positive correlations are 
found between the two portfolio return variables while both are negatively correlated with 
Mvol.  The latter is to be expected as Mvol is strictly positive while the general return data 
reflected fundamental differences between the Phases; the average daily return and 
annualised standard deviation of  daily returns during Phase 1 (M = -0.03%, SD = 23.46%) 
differing substantially from those during Phase 2 (M = 0.11%, SD = 12.10%).   
 
Four regression models were run with Model 1 testing the core hypotheses relating to the 
impact of feedback, in the form of portfolio returns (individual period and cumulative 
portfolio returns), and general volatility on the demand for information as measured by 
participant search activity.  Each subsequent model tested additional variables as shown in 
Table 21.   The results of the regression tests are shown in Table 24.   
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Variable Observations
Obs. with 
missing 
data Min. Max. Mean
Std. 
deviation
Number of Views f (DS ) 2850 0 0.00 16.00 0.92 1.98
Absolute Performance (Pperf% ) 2850 0 -8.07 8.58 0.39 2.45
Cumulative Performance (Cperf%) 2850 0 -19.99 26.93 2.96 10.18
Return Volatility (Mvol ) 2850 0 0.21 2.85 0.91 0.55
Styles Technical, Fundamental (Istyle) 2850 0 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42
Self-Declared Style (Sstyle ) 2850 0 1.00 4.00 2.44 1.04
Phases  (P 1,2 ) 2850 0 0.00 2.00 1.32 0.71
Variables
Absolute 
Performance 
(Pperf% )
Cumulative 
Performance 
(Cperf%)
Return 
Volatility 
(Mvol )
Styles 
Technical, 
Fundamental 
(Istyle)
Self-Declared 
Style (Sstyle ) Phases  (P 1,2 )
Absolute Performance (Pperf% ) 1.00 0.22 -0.30 -0.02 -0.01 0.07
Cumulative Performance (Cperf%) 0.22 1.00 -0.51 -0.22 -0.08 0.04
Return Volatility (Mvol ) -0.30 -0.51 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.13
Styles Technical, Fundamental (Istyle) -0.02 -0.22 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.00
Self-Declared Style (Sstyle ) -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.00
Phases  (P 1,2 ) 0.07 0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 22.  Summary statistics: description of variables used in the four models 
 
 
 
 
 Table 23.  Correlation matrix for all variables used in the four models 
 
 
 
   
 
The goodness of fit statistics compare the performance of an independent (constant-only) 
model, in which the linear combination of explanatory variables reduces to zero, with a full 
model, including the combined effects of all of the IVs. These tests found that each of the 
models possessed considerable explanatory power; Cox and Snell  R2 measures ranged from 
0.49 (Model 1) to 0.51 (Model 4) while Nagelkerke R2 measures ranged from 0.50 (Model 1) 
to 0.53 (Model 4).  The high level of significance for the models means that the null 
hypothesis (the coefficients of the IVs are all zero) is rejected. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) provide tests of the 
quality of the models under consideration by measuring the amounts of information lost 
through parameter estimation.  Both measures test goodness of fit adjusted for potential 
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overfitting as a result of adding additional variables.  Lower values for AIC and BIC suggest 
better fits, providing a basis for comparing models.   
 
Consistent with the R2 statistics, each model is found to be a significant improvement on 
the independent constant-only model.  The confidence tests assess the extent to which the 
models under consideration maximize the value of the likelihood function which makes the 
observed data most likely given the model’s parameters.  Higher values for each of the 
measures suggest a greater degree of confidence.  The Type II analysis evaluates the 
likelihood of generating a “false positive” with regard to the hypothesis associated with 
individual variables.  Each of the variables across the four models is found to be highly 
significant with the likelihood of Type II error therefore low.   
 
The coefficients for the IVs are found to be stable across the four models, consistent with 
the relatively low correlations between the dummy variables and other IVs.  Crucially, they 
are all stable in terms of sign.   Overdispersion tests derived the following p-values for each 
of the models: Model 1, p = .93; Model 2, p = .98; Model 3, p = .92; Model 4, p = .89.  As the 
computed p-value in each case exceeds the significance level,  = .05, the null hypothesis that 
the data are Poisson distributed cannot be rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
Statistic
Chi-
square Pr >  ²
Chi-
square Pr >  ²
Chi-
square Pr >  ²
Chi-
square Pr >  ²
-2 Log(Likelihood) 1903.10 < 0.0001 2022.53 < 0.0001 1944.13 < 0.0001 2059.95 < 0.0001
Score 2090.79 < 0.0001 2260.48 < 0.0001 2138.75 < 0.0001 2260.50 < 0.0001
Wald 1782.27 < 0.0001 1955.00 < 0.0001 1822.51 < 0.0001 1936.65 < 0.0001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Table 24.  Results of log-linear (Poisson) regression tests of four overlapping models 
 
Summary goodness of fit statistics: 
 
Confidence tests: 
 
 
Type II analysis 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Statistic
Independent 
(Constant 
only) Full Model Full Model Full Model Full Model
Observations 2850 2850 2850 2850 2850
DF 2849 2846 2845 2845 2844
-2 Log(Likelihood) 10274.94 8371.83 8252.40 8330.81 8214.98
R²(Cox and Snell) 0.00 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.51
R²(Nagelkerke) 0.00 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.53
Akaike Information Criterion 10276.94 8379.83 8262.40 8340.81 8226.98
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion 10282.89 8403.65 8292.18 8370.59 8262.71
Source
Chi-square 
(LR) Pr > LR
Chi-square 
(LR) Pr > LR
Chi-square 
(LR) Pr > LR
Chi-square 
(LR) Pr > LR
Absolute Performance (Pperf% ) 131.53 < 0.0001 128.82 < 0.0001 130.35 < 0.0001 138.70 < 0.0001
Cumulative Performance (Cperf% ) 573.11 < 0.0001 434.37 < 0.0001 590.62 < 0.0001 464.23 < 0.0001
Return Volatility (Mvol ) 167.18 < 0.0001 203.43 < 0.0001 161.44 < 0.0001 226.34 < 0.0001
Style (Istyle ) 119.43 < 0.0001 108.33 < 0.0001
Self-Declared (Sstyle ) 41.02 < 0.0001
Phases (P 1, 2 ) 37.42 < 0.0001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 M odel 4
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Model parameters for the components 
 
 
The model results support the main hypotheses.  Demand for information has been found 
to be influenced by the nature of short-term feedback in the form of portfolio returns; both 
recent and cumulative returns appear to impact behaviour.  The negative regression 
coefficients for Pperf% and Cperf% indicate that search effort increases disproportionately in 
the domain of losses versus gains, consistent with risk aversion and response to uncertainty.  
Investors therefore appear to be highly sensitive to their own recent performance and the 
nature of short-term feedback received within the context of the overall market environment, 
varying information search accordingly.  These results are consistent with the findings of 
Lurie, Jayashankar and Swaminathan (2009) who found the similar evidence relating to the 
impact of feedback on information demand.  General short-term market volatility captured by 
Mvol was also found to impact search effort, the positive regression coefficients revealing 
that demand for information increases in periods of higher short-term volatility.  These results 
are consistent with the emprirical findings of  Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) and Dimpfl and 
Jank (2016), but add important new information in terms of the effect of short-term 
Source Value (SE )
Wald Chi-
Square (Pr >  
²) Value (SE )
Wald Chi-
Square (Pr >  
²) Value (SE )
Wald Chi-
Square (Pr >  
²) Value (SE )
Wald Chi-
Square (Pr >  
²)
-0.65 217.01 -0.83 307.27 -0.36 33.75 -1.23 216.96
0.04 < 0.0001 0.05 < 0.0001 0.06 < 0.0001 0.08 < 0.0001
-0.09 125.96 -0.08 123.60 -0.09 124.74 -0.09 131.65
0.01 < 0.0001 0.01 < 0.0001 0.01 < 0.0001 0.01 < 0.0001
-0.06 519.42 -0.05 398.53 -0.06 533.57 -0.06 401.83
0.00 < 0.0001 0.00 < 0.0001 0.00 < 0.0001 0.00 < 0.0001
0.45 176.52 0.50 216.19 0.44 170.33 0.53 239.42
0.03 < 0.0001 0.03 < 0.0001 0.03 < 0.0001 0.03 < 0.0001
0.46 124.35 0.44 112.57
0.04 < 0.0001 0.04 < 0.0001
-0.12 40.81
0.02 < 0.0001
0.27 35.22
0.04 < 0.0001
Intercept
Absolute Performance (Pperf% )
Cumulative Performance (Cperf%)
Return Volatility (Mvol )
Phases (P 1, 2 )
Self-Declared (Sstyle)
Style (Istyle )
Model 1 Model 3 Model 4Model 2
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performance-related feedback in shaping behaviour as noted above.  This behaviour was also 
found to vary according to investment style.  Greater explanatory power was derived from the 
broader style classification (Istyle), which assigned participants to either Technical or 
Fundamental groupings.  The latter category encompasses three sub-styles declared by 
participants (Growth, Judgmental and Value).   Performing the analysis on the basis of each 
sub-style (Model 3) still found style to be highly significant.  Adding a categorical variable to 
capture Phases had only a marginal effect on the overall explanatory power of the models, 
despite the significance of the variable.  This would suggest that the return-based IVs along 
with the measure of short-term volatility substantially captured the variability of the DV.  
Overall, the models are broadly similar in terms of quality and explanatory power.  However, 
adding both the style and phase dummies, Istyle, Sstyle and P1, 2, improves the models.  Based 
upon confidence tests and goodness of fit, Model 4 is marginally the better.   
 
8.6.1. Validating Self-Declared Styles 
 
In order to evaluate the validity of the use of self-declared styles within the models, 
additional analysis is needed.  The categorical variables used in the models are based upon 
self-declared investment styles; while it might be expected that participants would at least 
adhere to the broad characteristics of the various styles at the outset of the experiment, there 
is no guarantee that they did not switch styles throughout its course.  In addition, certain 
styles, particularly Judgmental and Technical, may adopt various biases over time as a 
consequence of the fluidity of their approaches (Shiller, 1999). For example, Judgmental 
investors may modify their perceptions of potential investments as market characteristics 
change, perhaps becoming more risk averse or risk seeking in different periods.  As a result, 
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they may switch between growth and value over time, changing portfolio biases accordingly 
(Blackburn, Goetzmann & Ukhov, 2012).  Examining frequency charts showing aggregate 
information search per period by self-declared style does suggest differences in search 
intensity across styles.  (In order to take account of the differing number of participants in the 
various styles, the frequency data discussed below has been averaged.)  
 
The frequency charts shown in Figure 12 provide insights into the information demand 
attributable to specific styles.  The Technical style grouping exhibited the greatest level of 
demand for information across the study, averaging 76.6 total searches per style participant 
over the whole period.  Demand was particularly strong during the initial period of market 
weakness and picked up again coincident with the reversal in trend of the broad market.  The 
preponderance of all search activity occurred in Phase 1 (69.3% of total searches) while 
25.9% occurred during Phase 2.  Growth and Judgmental style participants showed similar 
patterns of demand (averaging 44.3 and 44.7 overall searches per style participant 
respectively).  Most search activity again occurred during the course of Phase 1 (64.6% and 
66.7% respectively), more than double the level of search activity in Phase 2 (31.8% and 
31.5%).  The Value style showed the lowest level of search activity by a considerable margin, 
averaging just 18.6 searches per participant over the course of the study, with 54.7% 
occurring during Phase 1 and 35.0% during Phase 2.  Assuming consistency with regard to 
style biases, the above findings support the hypothesis that information demand is influenced 
by investment style.  The clear distinction between Technical and Value style participants 
might be expected as the former tends to have a short-term focus while the latter is inherently 
longer term with regard to investment horizon.  The findings for the Judgmental and Growth 
styles suggest a degree of similarity in terms of behaviour. 
225 
.Demand for Information Frequency - Growth Style 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand for Information Frequency - Judgmental Style 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand for Information Frequency - Technical Style 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand for Information Frequency - Value Style 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Frequency data of  f(DS) by self-declared style overlaid with the market Index. 
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8.6.2.  Using Factor Analysis to Deduce Style 
 
A more formal investigation of characteristic portfolio biases which may be indicative of 
certain investment styles was undertaken using factor analysis.  Factors are general 
characteristics which describe stocks, such as the fundamental variables described earlier in 
relation to the stock screens available through the study.  Relative factor exposures would be 
expected to vary according to investment style (Taylor, 1999, Peltomaki, 2017).  Therefore, 
value-biased portfolios would be expected to display above-average weighted exposures to 
some or all of the well-defined value metrics such as: EP; DY; PBV.  Analysis of factor 
exposures therefore enables an assessment to be made about the key metrics which drive 
stock selection through time as well as the consistency with which those metrics are applied; 
the latter then providing an indication of the degree of adherence to a defined style. 
 
The aggregate exposure of a portfolio at period t to a specific factor, a, can be derived 
from; 
Pt(at) = ∑ 𝑤(𝑖)௡௜ୀଵ
tNt.at Equation 40 
where w(i)t is the weighting of stock i in the portfolio at period t and Nt.at represents the 
normalised exposure of stock i to factor a at period t.   
The normalised value for each stock is obtained from the usual standardisation 
procedure; 
Z(Fi) = (Fi - 𝐹෠ i) / SFi Equation 41 
where 𝐹෠ i is the mean of the distribution and SFi is the standard deviation. 
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Outliers which would distort the mean and standard deviation of the raw data, and hence the 
standardised scores, are excluded; means and standard deviations are therefore calculated 
without the impact of outliers.  Windsorization is then applied so that outliers are bounded by 
standardised scores of 2.05, -2.05 (the 98th and 2nd percentiles of a standardised distribution 
respectively). 
 
Factor analysis of Fundamental portfolios showed systematic biases towards a number of 
the core metrics which would be associated with growth and value styles.  Summary data 
relating to factor exposures for Fundamental and Technical portfolios is shown in Table 25.  
 
Table 25.  Weighted average factor exposures according to style (Fundamental v Technical) 
 
The maximum and minimum exposures in the above Table are calculated from the individual 
period weighted portfolio exposures across the entire study period (51 periods).  As has been 
noted above, the Fundamental category covers three distinct styles (Growth, Judgmental and 
Value).  This aggregated grouping might therefore be expected to be something of a hybrid of 
the characteristics of those individual styles.  This proposition is supported by the high 
average exposure to the relative value measure, PEG (earnings growth relative to P/E ratio) 
and well above average exposure to EP, DY and EPSG.  The coefficient of variation for DY 
Geeral Factor 
Characteristic
Max 
Exposure
Min 
Exposure
Average 
Exposure
SD Coeff of 
Var
Max 
Exposure
Min 
Exposure
Average 
Exposure
SD Coeff of 
Var
EP 0.71 0.23 0.48 0.16 0.33 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 NM
DY 0.64 0.50 0.57 0.04 0.07 0.09 -0.11 0.02 0.06 NM
PBV 0.13 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.59 -0.13 -0.22 -0.18 0.03 NM
PCF 0.30 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.61 0.08 -0.13 -0.02 0.07 NM
Relative Value PEG 1.08 0.81 0.94 0.09 0.10 0.52 0.43 0.48 0.02 0.05
Growth EPSG 0.66 0.35 0.64 0.04 0.07 0.66 0.41 0.44 0.01 0.03
Technical RSPERC 0.53 0.20 0.35 0.09 0.25 0.93 0.18 0.44 0.17 0.38
Value
Fundamental (Growth, Judgmental and Value ) Style Technical Style
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and EPSG is low, suggesting that these characteristics are possibly significant determinants of 
stock screening, biases which remained stable across the course of the study.   
 
Based upon the data, there are significant differences between the characteristic factor 
exposures of Fundamental and Technical style portfolios.  Whereas the Fundamental 
classification shows significant and consistent bias towards particular metrics (DY, EPSG and 
PEG), the same profile is not apparent for the Technical style.  This might well be expected: 
in the case of price-driven investors, consideration of fundamental data is likely to be of 
secondary importance, suggesting that fundamental factor exposures are more likely to be the 
residual outcome of some other primary processes which determine stock selection. In 
essence, technical investors are typically considered to base decisions upon relatively short-
term price movements or defined historical patterns.  Only one variable in the above analysis, 
RSperc, has any direct bearing as a technical input as it is a measure of relative price 
momentum.  Nevertheless, it will be noted that this self-declared style still exhibited some 
consistency in terms of certain fundamental factor exposures; PEG and EPSG both show 
positive factor exposure bias with consistency over the course of the study.  It is possible that 
technical analysis based upon emerging price momentum, as opposed to a contrarian bias, 
may naturally carry some systematic factor biases in common with growth investing.  It is 
also possible that technical investors use certain fundamental metrics as part of their filtering 
process.  Therefore, while price patterns may represent necessary conditions for potential 
stock selection, a secondary screening process may differentiate on the basis of specific 
fundamental factors as a means of reducing stock selection risk.  Similarly, an inherently 
contrarian technical style may at times create a fundamental value factor bias.   These 
possibilities again highlight the potential breadth and diversity of the potential investment 
strategies which become grouped together under broad style classifications. 
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Based upon the observed data, there are significant overall differences in terms of 
factor exposures between participants classified either as Fundamental or Technical.  
Evidence that there is a degree of consistency with regard to core factor exposures suggests 
that self-declared styles can be used with some validity in the regression models.  For most of 
the fundamental factors, there is a clear difference in terms of exposures between the two 
classifications.  Even in the case where biases are in the same direction, as with PEG and 
EPSG, the degree of factor bias is significantly higher within the Fundamental style.  Formal 
t-tests show a significant effect for style; t(51) = 34.02, p < .00001 in the case of  PEG and; 
t(51) = 86.72, p < .00001 in the case of EPSG.   
 
A breakdown of the Fundamental category into its style-constituent parts using the same 
methodology as above is shown in Table 26.  The two most clearly defined styles, Growth 
and Value, reflect certain factor biases consistent with those styles. Growth shows a clear 
aggregate bias towards PEG and EPSG.  There is some bias towards EP alone from the value 
factors while the technical indicator, RSperc, appears to be coincidental to the primary drivers 
of stock selection.  Value shows a clear bias towards DY while exposure to EP varies 
considerably over the period.  There is a consistently positive exposure to EPSG suggesting 
that above average value could be paired with positive earnings dynamics for the period of 
the study.  This is further confirmed by the positive exposure to PEG, indicating that stocks 
with attractive rates of earnings growth could be acquired at reasonable valuations at times 
during this period.  Such a factor profile is therefore consistent with value investors able to 
meet thresholds for core  value characteristics while gaining exposure to other positive 
fundamental factors related to earnings trends, again diversifying risk.   
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Geeral Factor 
Characteristic
Max 
Exposure
Min 
Exposure
Average 
Exposure
SD Coeff of 
Var
Max 
Exposure
Min 
Exposure
Average 
Exposure
SD Coeff of 
Var
EP 0.46 0.10 0.32 0.12 0.37 0.88 0.21 0.50 0.22 0.44
DY 0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.03 NM 1.00 0.79 0.89 0.06 0.07
PBV 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.03 NM 0.11 -0.08 0.01 0.05 NM
PCF 0.16 -0.23 -0.01 0.15 NM 0.30 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.33
Relative Value PEG 1.37 1.18 1.26 0.06 0.05 0.83 0.60 0.70 0.06 0.09
Growth EPSG 0.94 0.00 0.89 0.13 0.14 0.64 0.56 0.61 0.02 0.04
Technical RSPERC 0.61 0.04 0.40 -0.13 NM 0.73 -0.11 0.36 0.17 NM
Value
Judgmental StyleGrowth Style
Geeral Factor 
Characteristic
Max 
Exposure
Min 
Exposure
Average 
Exposure
SD Coeff of 
Var
EP 0.86 0.37 0.61 0.15 0.24
DY 0.94 0.72 0.81 0.07 0.08
PBV 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.49
PCF 0.44 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.33
Relative Value PEG 1.09 0.64 0.87 0.17 0.19
Growth EPSG 0.49 0.36 0.42 0.04 0.09
Technical RSPERC 0.59 0.03 0.31 0.16 0.50
Value
Valuel Style
Table 26.  Weighted average factor exposures based upon  Fundamental sub-styles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As suggested by the earlier analysis, the Judgmental style category appears to be something 
of a hybrid of Growth and Value styles, with some participants perhaps deliberately 
diversifying stock selection according to sub-styles (mixing both growth and value 
characteristics in the portfolios). DY, PEG and EPSG display positive and consistent factor 
exposures with EP showing positive but varying bias over the period.   
Overall, the three styles show some distinctive elements in terms of emphasis upon 
specific factors.  However, there is undoubtedly some commonality in terms of direction of 
bias and focus.  For example, DY appears to be the preferred value metric within the 
timeframe of the study.  In addition, the volatile nature of the early period appeared to present 
opportunities to diversify factor exposures, particularly in the case of investors with a value 
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bias; therefore, individual investments appeared to be available offering attractive combined 
characteristics in terms of both value and growth factors.  While Value and Growth styles 
could be inferred on the basis of observed common biases in portfolio factor exposures, 
certain participants assigned to the Judgmental category could possibly be reallocated to 
either the Growth or Value categories based upon their portfolio factor profiles.  Overall, 
however, there is sufficient distinction between the three styles, and a degree of consistency 
within each individual style, to enable self-defined style groupings to stand. 
 
8.7.  Trading Propensity 
 
While investor style has been found to influence relative levels of demand for 
information, numerous studies have also found a strong link between investment style and 
trading propensity.  In part, it might be expected that levels of trading would be associated 
with the degree of adherence to particular styles since underlying changes in stock 
characteristics determine the need to rebalance portfolios (Froot & Teo, 2008).    Thus, 
Blackburn, Goetzmann & Ukhov (2012) found that value investors rebalance less frequently 
than growth investors, reflecting the fact that a number of standard valuation metrics tend to 
change relatively slowly.  For example, accounting-related measures, such as book value and 
total asset value, are typically revised in accordance with the reporting of newly announced 
balance sheet information by companies, often semi-annually or annually.  Similarly, 
dividend pay-outs are typically less volatile than earnings per share over time, although 
investors may clearly form expectations about the likelihood of dividend cuts or increases and 
respond accordingly (Surendranath, Jory & Hamid, 2017).  While many valuation metrics 
include price as an element, a large change in price is often needed to radically alter 
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underlying valuation metrics, meaning that, under relatively normal market conditions, 
fundamental values tend to evolve over time rather than experience sudden changes.  Where 
sudden changes in valuation do occur, it is therefore more likely to be due to specific events, 
such as a significant dividend cut or major write-offs affecting book and asset values.  As a 
consequence, the need for portfolio rebalancing based upon changing underlying valuation 
metrics is relatively limited in comparison with certain other styles. 
 
In the case of technical investors, potential trading signals are likely to occur with much 
greater frequency.  While particular patterns of stock behaviour may evolve over time, other 
triggers, for example, prices breaking above or below key moving averages, might occur 
much more regularly (Huang & Huang, 2018).  To illustrate, during the course of Phase 1 of 
the study, closing stock prices were found to have broken above their 55-day moving 
averages on 136 occasions, while breaking below the moving averages on 142 separate 
occasions; similarly, the 21-day moving broke above the 55-day moving average on 41 
occasions, breaking below 57 times9.  Technical investors using moving averages in order to 
derive signals would therefore have been exposed to a large number of potential triggers. 
While trading propensity may be a function of the need to rebalance portfolios in order to 
maintain adherence to a particular fundamental style, there can be many other motivations to 
trade, including controlling risk within a portfolio or changing expectations.  Over time, 
investors may become more or less risk-averse.  For example, declines in asset prices have 
been associated with changes in subjective expected returns as well as perceptions of risk 
(Beaud & Willinger, 2014).  Cohn,  Engelmann, Fehr and Maréchal (2015) found strong 
evidence of countercyclical risk aversion following the priming of investment professionals in 
                                                 
9 Many of these events would have related to the same stocks over the course of the study.  For example, many 
of the stocks which experienced prices breaking below moving averages during the initial period of price 
weakness would subsequently have seen them rise above the same moving averages as the market recovered. 
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relation to booms and crashes; risk aversion rising significantly in the case of the latter.  This, 
in turn, was found to influence the level of trading.  The data gathered during the course of 
the main study made it possible to examine trading propensity as a function of information 
demand, feedback, fundamental and technical data.  Casual examination of the underlying 
data showed significant differences between the number of trades entered into in aggregate 
across the various styles.  Sales and purchase transactions were also distributed somewhat 
differently throughout the study.  Figure 13 summarises the aggregate data for each 
investment style. While it can immediately be seen that the number of purchase and sale 
transactions differed substantially across styles, it is also noticeable that sale transactions 
outweighed purchase transactions during the period of market weakness, denoted as Phase 1.  
This pattern was reversed as the broad market, and therefore asset prices generally, started to 
recover with more evidence of same-period switching.   Net-selling versus net-buying may 
therefore be a function of intermediate market trends with each contributing in some degree 
to the extension of those trends.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Aggregate number of trades (buys and sales) by investment style. 
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8.7.1. Empirical Tests of Trading Propensity as a Function of Investment Style 
 
Trading propensity of the defined investment styles was investigated using logistic 
regressions, adopting an approach broadly similar to that employed by Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001), described in the previous chapter.  While that study used very extensive 
data relating to virtually all Finnish investors and sought to distinguish behaviour based upon 
general investor type, we are more interested in examining the effects of investment style and 
feedback on trading propensity.  Nevertheless, certain comparisons are possible with regard 
to the results.   
 
Logistic regression computes estimates of parameters which maximise the likelihood of 
observing the sample values of a binary outcome variable.  Regression coefficients therefore 
represent logit-transformed probabilities of a linear equation defining the relationship 
between the binary outcome variable and predictor variables.  If is the binary outcome 
variable taking the values of 0/1 (failure/success), p is the probability that For a set of 
predictor variables, x1, ……., xn, the parameters ……. , n are maximum likelihood 
estimates which form the linear equation; 
 
logit (p) = log(p/(1-p)) =  +  x1 + , . . . , + n*xn Equation 42 
 
The probability associated with the above equation is; 
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p =  exp(x1 + , . . . , + nxn)/(1 + x1 + , . . . , + nxn)) Equation 43 
 
Individual coefficients measure the expected change in the log odds of  = 1 given a unit 
increase in one predictor variable holding all other variables constant.  Standardisation of 
variable coefficients allows for easy comparison of the relative importance of variables 
expressed in different units, the coefficients then measuring the expected change in the log 
odds of   = 1 for a 1 standard deviation change in the predictor variable, holding all other 
variables constant.  
 
As implied by Equation 42, probabilities of individual variables can be calculated from 
the non-standardised coefficients as follows; pi = exp(xi) / (1 + exp(xi)).  The odds ratio, 
showing the relative likelihood of success ( = 1) versus failure ( = 0), is related directly to p 
and can be derived from; p/(1-p), the ratio increasing directly with p.  While probability is 
bounded by the range 0 to 1, the odds ratio can assume any value between -∞ and + ∞.  Both 
the probability and the odds ratio therefore provide indications of the likelihood of a predictor 
variable coinciding with observed events where  = 1.  Positive predictor variable coefficients 
are characterised by p  > .5 with odds ratios > 1 while negative coefficients are characterised 
by p < .5 and odds ratios < 1. 
 
8.7.2. Sell-versus-Hold Model 
 
 The first logistic regression model tested selling propensity within each investment style 
using a sell-versus-hold output variable.  This variable was derived from all holding data 
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across all portfolios of every participant assigned to one of the four investment styles.  The 
binary outcome variable took the value of 0 when a stock was held in a particular period and 
1 in the event of a sale transaction.  A number of predictor variables (PVs) were applied 
relating to stock-specific returns for relatively short-term, non-overlapping periods, 
fundamental factors and other relevant metrics (specific factors were added for Technical-
style participants to capture some unique elements of that style).  Stock return measures, 
including volatility, were used to test the impact of short-term feedback on selling propensity 
along with potential evidence of contrarian trading; relatively large short-term returns of 
either sign may create attention bias leading to a behavioural response affecting selling 
propensity while levels of volatility may have their own independent effects on the outcome 
variable due to changing levels of risk aversion and uncertainty.  Fundamental variables were 
used to test certain valuation anchors or hurdles which may lead to rebalancing decisions.  
Demand for information was also tested; it has already been found that the level of demand 
for information is affected significantly by the nature of short-term feedback.  Direct testing 
of information demand therefore examines the extent to which the amount of data gathered 
and evaluated translates into actionable decisions.   
 
The PVs were defined as follows; 
P.t 0 – 5;  measures the return to each security over the previous 5-tading days (the time 
interval between portfolio rebalancings in the main study above; 
P.t 5 –10; measures the return over the previous 5-trading days (t – 5 and t – 10); 
P.t 10 –30; measures the stock return over the period from t – 30 to t – 10. 
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S.Vol; is a proxy for stock price volatility, defined as the 21-day standard deviation of 
previous daily returns for each stock held in a portfolio. 
A number of factor exposures are included, together with the change in each factor over 
rolling 5-day periods; the factors chosen were the ones found to be actively weighted 
within the style portfolios, consistent with the analysis described above, specifically: 
RSPERC; PEG; EP; DY; PBV and their 5-day changes: ∆RSPERC; ∆PEG; ∆EP; ∆DY; 
∆PBV. 
Other PVs include; 
Hold period; the length of time the security has been held (investors may be reluctant to 
sell a position only recently acquired); 
BV+/-;  is the return to each security measured against its cost of acquisition (book cost).  
It is therefore a measure of cumulative gain or loss over the entire holding period and 
may provide an indication of possible disposition effects; 
Views; reflects the number of fundamental or technical views of specific stocks held in 
the portfolios in each period.   
Specific technical factors were included in the analysis for Technical-style participants as 
follows; 
MA-21 Break; a dummy variable assigned to each stock capturing price breaks of the 21-
day moving average (downward and upward breaks considered separately as indicated by 
the up and down arrows next to the variable label.  Positive (negative) breaks are deemed 
to occur when; Pt  > ( < ) MA-21t, given that  Pt-1  < ( > ) MA-21t-1.   
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MA-55 Break; a dummy variable assigned to each stock capturing price breaks of the 55-
day moving average; 
MA-89 Break; a dummy variable assigned to each stock capturing price breaks of the 89-
day moving average; 
GC-21-55; a dummy variable denoting a 21-day moving average breaking above the 55-
day moving average; 
GC-55-89; a dummy variable denoting a 55-day moving average breaking above the 89-
day moving average; 
DC-21-55; a dummy variable denoting a 21-day moving average breaking below the 55-
day moving average; 
DC-55-89; a dummy variable denoting a 55-day moving average breaking below the 89-
day moving average; 
 
Results of the analysis are shown in Table 27.   
 
The binary output variable has sell events as the reference variable, each such event 
taking the value of 1; all hold events take the value of zero.  Predictor variable coefficients 
are shown in standardised form to facilitate comparisons between variables measured in 
different units; none of the significance or confidence data change as a result of 
standardisation.  Positive coefficients attached to a predictive variable indicate that the 
probability of the reference event (sell) increases (decreases) as the value of the predictive 
variable rises (falls).  Negative coefficients indicate that the probability of the reference event 
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Growth Judgmental Technical Value Growth Judgmental Technical Value
Stock return variables P.t  0 - 5 -0.45 -0.40 -0.50 -0.06 -4.33 -5.05 -5.85 -0.56
P.t  5-10 0.08 0.02 -0.21 -0.10 1.05 0.27 -3.33 -1.10
P.t  10-30 -0.12 -0.04 -0.20 0.06 -1.27 -0.56 -3.25 0.71
Volatility S. Vol -0.17 -0.04 -0.26 -0.34 -1.64 -0.70 -3.45 -1.25
Fundamental factors PEG -0.26 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -2.68 -0.75 -1.05 -0.83
EP 0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.08 0.07 -1.73 0.31 0.98
DY -0.10 0.03 -0.17 -0.09 -1.06 0.43 -2.50 -0.90
PBV 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.03 1.06 1.82 0.79 0.35
Momentum factors RSPERC 0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.50 -1.42 0.41 -1.31
∆  Factors ∆PEG-5 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.26 -0.23 -0.44 0.24 -4.49
∆EP-5 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.02 -0.05 -0.68 -1.56 -0.26
∆DY-5 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.37 -1.06 0.22 0.76
∆PBV-5 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.10 -0.37 -0.15 1.38 -1.12
∆RSPERC-5 -0.24 0.05 -0.16 -0.15 -2.36 0.69 -2.36 -1.49
Other variables Hold Period 0.20 0.01 -0.06 0.03 1.81 0.16 -0.76 0.29
BV +/- 0.02 0.00 -0.18 -0.20 0.23 0.02 -1.65 -1.14
Views 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.24 5.00 5.46 7.38 5.40
Explicit techical variables MA-21 Break  0.12 2.56
MA-55 Break  0.00 0.02
MA-89 Break  0.01 0.22
MA-21 Break p -0.04 -0.48
MA-55 Break p -0.04 -0.62
MA-89 Break p -0.12 -2.13
GC-21/55 -0.12 -3.02
GC-55/89 -0.28 -0.01
DC-21/55 0.01 0.29
DC-55/89 - -
Pseudo R 2
McFadden 0.26 0.17 0.22 0.13
Nagelkerke 0.29 0.20 0.27 0.15
Confidence
-2 Log(Likelihood) 145.49 129.97 238.11 65.88
Score 209.13 179.40 346.83 99.08
Wald 111.31 115.70 177.81 60.67
Standardised Coefficients t-statistics
Independent variables
Dependent variable: Sell v Hold Dummy
declines (increases) as the PV coefficient increases (decreases).  Coefficients significant at the 
5% level are highlighted in bold.   
 
Table 27. Standardised regression coefficients and t-statistics  for sell-versus-hold binary DV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All confidence measures significant, p > 
 
Short-term return variables showed some significance, particularly P.t 0 –5 (the latest 
period return); this variable was found to be significant for all styles other than Value.  P.t 5 –10 
and P.t 10 –30, were found to be significant for the Technical style alone.  In each case, the 
negative coefficients indicate that positive short-term stock returns reduce the likelihood of 
sell events while price weakness tends to increase selling propensity.  The aggregate impact 
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of short-term returns is strongest for the Technical style, as might be expected given the 
assumed importance of short-term price changes to adherents of that style.  Conversely, 
Value-style investors appear to have been relatively indifferent to short-term price returns, 
again consistent with perceptions of that approach as being inherently longer-term and driven 
primarily by fundamental factors.  General stock price volatility was found to be significant 
for Technical-style investors.  Note, however, that the sign of the coefficient is negative for 
each style, indicating that higher volatility by itself tended to make selling activity less likely.     
This is consistent with the effects of uncertainty.  Few of the fundamental variables were 
found to be significant, although PEG and DY were significant for Growth and Value style 
investors respectively. Rates of change in the variables, while generally lacking significance, 
were found to have negative coefficients; improving fundamentals therefore tended to reduce 
the probability of a sale resulting.   
 
No significance was found for either the length of the holding period (Hold Period) or 
gains and losses in relation to book costs (BV+/-).  These findings are consistent with a 
proposition that investors tended to re-evaluated investments with a degree of objectivity to 
the extent that a short holding period was no barrier to potentially selling a position.  The 
absence of bias in relation to cumulative gains or losses means that there is no evidence of a 
disposition effect as captured by BV+/-.  Significance was found for Views, the predictive 
variable which measures the level of information demand.  The coefficients were positive for 
all styles meaning that the likelihood of sells tended to increase in line with rising demand for 
information.   This is again consistent with the proposition that investors re-evaluated 
portfolio holdings objectively on the basis of the latest available information before final sell 
decisions were executed.   Comparing standardised coefficients reveals that short-term returns 
and Views carried the greatest significance across all styles other than Value. 
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Specifically with regard to technically-driven investors, a number of price-based metrics 
were tested.  The behaviour of prices in relation to moving averages of various durations were 
used to identify positive and negative turning or “break” points in price trend.  Thus, the MA-
21 Break variable identified events where a share price closed below the 21-day moving 
average of closing prices having been above the moving average on the basis of the prior 
closing price.  Both downward breaks, denoted by the  suffix to the variable and positive 
breaks (denoted by p) were examined.  In addition, similar breaks associated with the 
moving average themselves were considered.  Thus, GC-21/55 recorded events where the 21-
day moving average closed above the 55-day moving average, having closed below it on the 
previous day.  Such positive breaks are often referred to as “Golden Crosses” within the 
framework of technical analysis and are considered to be bullish signals; equivalent 
downward breaks are often known as “Death Crosses” and are taken as negative signals with 
regard to future price evolution (Huang & Huang, 2018).  Each of these technical predictive 
variables is binary, taking the value 1 when the event occurs and 0 otherwise.  Downward 
breaks were found to be significant for the shortest duration measure (MA-21), the positive 
coefficient indicating that the likelihood of a sale increased with such breaks.  No such 
significance was found for negative breaks in relation to either the 55- or 89-day moving 
averages.  Upward price breaks did not mirror the evidence for downward breaks; neither 
MA-21 nor MA-55 was found to be significant.  MA-89 and GC-21/55 were found to be 
significant with negative coefficients, as would be expected.  The finding with regard to MA-
89 appears somewhat anomalous, however, given the lack of significance for the other shorter 
time-period variables.  (No significance was found for the other variables (DC-55/89 was 
removed from the model as there were too few such events to be meaningful).  
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The individual regressions models generated significant improvements over the null 
hypothesis (constant-only), as evidenced by the Pseudo R2 measures (McFadden and 
Nagelkerke).  The Judgmental and Value models represent moderate fits of the data while the 
Growth and Technical models showed good explanatory power in relation to the output 
variable.  The confidence measures were all highly significant, again indicating that each of 
the models was a significant improvement over the constant-only model.   Despite some 
apparent anomalies in relation to certain regression coefficients, most of the findings appear 
intuitive.  In general, positive short-term returns and improving fundamentals tend to reduce 
the likelihood of a stock being sold.  The most important finding relates to demand for 
information with heightened search activity associated with a greater likelihood of sell 
decisions being made for all styles of investors.  This is consistent with the proposition that 
investors employ new information when re-evaluating holdings and appear to behave 
objectively in terms of the decisions taken.  As a result, holding period and cumulative gains 
or losses were not found to be biasing factors and there is no evidence of any irrational bias 
such as the sunk cost effect 
 
8.7.3. Sell-versus-Buy Model 
 
It will be recalled that no shorting (selling of stocks not already held) was allowed in the 
main study.  For that reason, it was possible to consider the sell-versus-hold decision 
described above based solely upon the individual holdings of portfolios created by the 
participants.  Purchases, on the other hand, can be of two types; either additions to existing 
holdings or purchases of stocks not already held.  On that basis, the predictor variables must 
be modified to include relevant data relating to new stocks entering the various portfolios. 
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The output variable in the sell-versus-buy model mirrors that used in the sell-versus-hold 
model above.  In this case, however, stocks which are held in a portfolio in any period for 
which there is no transaction (purchase or sale) are excluded from the analysis.  The binary 
output variable is then constructed such that sell events again take the value of 1 (as above) 
while buy events take the value of 0.  The description of the predictor variables remains the 
same as before.  The results of the model are shown in Table 28. 
 
Table 28. Standardised regression coefficients and t-statistics  for sell-versus-buy binary DV. 
 
Confidence measures significant, p > for Growth and Judgmental styles and -2Log and Score for the Technical style; significance 
at the 5% is shown by **.  The Score and Wald values for Value are not significant. 
Growth Judgmental Technical Value Growth Judgmental Technical Value
Stock return variables P.t 0 - 5 -1.06 -0.95 -0.77 0.34 -3.00 -5.96 -3.33 1.24
P.t 5-10 -0.38 0.00 -0.23 0.20 -1.89 -0.04 -2.13 1.14
P.t 10-30 -0.44 -0.38 -0.34 -0.07 -1.76 -3.23 -2.65 -0.37
Volatility S. Vol 0.80 0.18 0.26 0.47 2.22 0.85 1.67 1.84
Fundamental factors PEG -0.36 0.20 -0.09 -0.52 -1.37 1.31 -0.74 -1.88
EP -0.42 -0.26 0.24 0.16 -1.65 -1.84 1.92 0.92
DY 0.20 -0.06 -0.25 -0.22 1.06 -0.47 -2.02 -0.98
PBV 0.75 0.33 0.07 0.00 2.72 2.79 0.56 0.00
Momentum factors RSPERC 0.86 -0.13 0.01 -0.11 3.14 -1.02 0.11 -0.52
∆  Factors ∆PEG-5 0.13 0.09 -0.02 -0.32 0.68 0.83 -0.16 -1.69
∆EP-5 -0.07 -0.28 -0.23 -0.29 -0.27 -1.73 -1.05 -1.46
∆DY-5 -0.72 0.25 0.08 -0.66 -2.20 1.73 0.46 -2.35
∆PBV-5 -0.65 -0.14 0.28 0.28 -2.03 -1.05 1.67 1.42
∆RSPERC-5 -0.51 0.29 0.34 0.20 -2.07 2.40 2.22 1.08
Other variables Hold Period -0.35 0.02 0.06 -0.16 -1.59 0.21 0.55 -0.82
BV +/- -0.53 0.01 0.14 0.03 -2.08 0.11 1.39 0.16
Views 0.11 0.06 -0.12 -0.22 0.42 0.46 -0.98 -1.30
Explicit techical variables MA-21 Break  0.41 2.20
MA-55 Break  -0.07 -0.48
MA-89 Break  2.36 0.01
MA-21 Break p -0.05 -0.42
MA-55 Break p 0.00 -0.04
MA-89 Break p 0.03 0.24
GC-21/55 0.12 1.41
GC-55/89
DC-21/55
DC-55/89 - -
Pseudo R 2
McFadden 0.48 0.31 0.34 0.24
Nagelkerke 0.56 0.46 0.50 0.37
Confidence
-2 Log(Likelihood) 111.09 92.78 108.10 0.32**
Score 74.53 72.26 83.04 26.13
Wald 29.27 49.28 46.93** 18.65
Dependent variable: Sell v Buy Dummy
Coefficients t-statistics
Independent variables
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The coefficients in the Table indicate the extent to which predictor variables make a sell 
decision more likely in comparison with buy decisions.  Once again, coefficients significant 
at the 5% level are shown in bold.   
 
Significance is found for the short-term return variable, P.t 0 –5, for every style other 
than Value.  The other period return variables (P.t 5 –10 and P.t 10 –30) are also significant 
for the Technical style alone.  Once again, the more significant values attach to negative 
coefficients indicating that positive short-term performance reduces the likelihood of sales, all 
other things being equal.  The measure of short-term volatility (S.Vol) has a positive 
coefficient, indicating that volatility makes sales somewhat more likely that buys; the 
coefficient is significant in the case of the Growth style.  The fundamental factors are 
generally not significant, the exceptions being PBV for the Growth and Judgmental styles.  
However, this factor was not found to have a consistent positive skew within the aggregate 
portfolios corresponding to those styles; it is therefore unclear how to interpret this finding.  
The rate-of-change variables relating to the fundamental factors again suggest a general 
pattern whereby fundamental improvement reduces the likelihood of a sale decision relative 
to a buy.  Significant, negative coefficients are found in relation to DY for the Growth and 
Value styles, as might be expected, particularly in the case of the latter.  The price momentum 
factor (RSperc) is significant only in the case of the Growth style.  The coefficient is positive, 
suggesting that relatively positive price momentum increases the likelihood of a stock being 
sold.  This might be consistent with a contrarian approach but could well be anomalous in the 
context of the particular style for which this output has arisen.  The rate-of-change of this 
variable is also significant for the Judgmental and Technical styles.  The positive coefficients 
again indicate that short-term improvements in relative price momentum increase the 
likelihood of sales rather than buys, consistent with a contrarian bias.  Holding periods and 
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gains or losses with respect to book costs are again insignificant across all style, suggesting 
an absence of behavioural bias with respect to these factors.  There is no evidence for the 
disposition effect, therefore.  Demand for information, as captured by Views, was found not 
be significant for any style,  indicating that search effort had no obvious bias in terms of 
impacting the likelihood of sales versus purchase decisions.  The variables unique to the 
Technical style were not found to be significant with the exception of MA-21 Break; stock 
prices breaking down thorough the short-term moving average therefore increased the 
likelihood of sales relative to buys, as would be expected .  
 
The Pseudo R2 values appear to indicate that the models offer reasonable explanatory 
power for the observed data.  However, the confidence statistics are somewhat mixed.  While 
the majority are highly significant for each of the measures (p < .0001), the Score and Wald 
statistics are not significant for the Value model while the  -2 Log Likelihood and Wald 
statistics are only significant at the 5% level for the Value and Technical styles respectively.  
Overall, the Value model is found to be the weakest in terms of goodness of fit, confidence 
and therefore specification.   
 
8.7.4. Discussion 
 
Interpreting the results of the above analysis should take account of the relatively limited 
data sets from which they are drawn.  For example, the study by Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001), referenced earlier, used over 290,000 binary data points relating to portfolio holdings 
and transactions and applied over 200 regressors; data for virtually all investors in the Finnish 
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market, both institutional and retail, were included.  The analysis presented here was based 
upon 57 investors each generating 51 portfolios over the course of the study (50 portfolios 
from which sell, buy and hold decisions could be extracted as the initial portfolios created in 
the initial period are ignored for these purposes).  The sell-versus-hold model, extracting data 
relating to the individual holdings of every portfolio, analysed 6843 data points for the output 
variable (sells and holds) comprising 389 reference points (sells), the latter representing 
5.68% of total data points.  The sell-versus-buy model analysed 698 data points (sells and 
buys), the reference points therefore making up 55.73% of total data points.  Notwithstanding, 
a number of interesting observations are possible. 
 
Both the sell-versus-hold and the sell-versus-buy models found strong evidence that 
short-term stock returns affected the likelihood of transactions occurring; the likelihood of 
sales increasing following short-term price weakness, the opposite for buys.  The most recent 
period return data generally carried the most significance.  Grinblatt and Keloharju found 
evidence that very recent gains in stock prices increased the likelihood of stock sales, a 
behaviour they found common to all categories of investors studied; the opposite of the 
results shown above.  Thus, whereas Grinblatt and Keloharju found systematic evidence of 
contrarian behaviour, the study presented here found evidence more associated with 
momentum investing, consistent with the findings of Nagel (2005).  Similarly, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju were able to find significant evidence of a disposition effect (the preference for 
selling stocks with cumulative gains versus losses); no such evidence is found here.  Indeed, 
from the above analysis, investors appear to be highly objective in their decision-making, as 
evidenced by the heightened search for new information prior to action.  There are some 
similarities between the studies in terms of general stock price volatility.  Similar to the 
Finnish study, the results above show a relatively weak effect for volatility on selling 
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propensity within the sell-versus-hold model, the exception being for Technical-style 
investors perhaps affected more by the fact that higher volatility is likely to generate more 
potential trading signals.  A slightly stronger effect is found in relation to the sell-versus-buy 
model, although the signs of coefficients are reversed.  Therefore, while the presence of 
greater short-term volatility would tend to reduce the likelihood of sales within the sell-
versus-hold comparison, the likelihood was increased for all styles when comparing sell-
versus-buy decisions.   
 
When drawing comparisons between studies, it is important to recognise key differences 
in how the models are framed.  The Finnish study considered classes of investors, such as 
Finance and Insurance companies, Governmental institutions and non-profit organisations.  In 
contrast, the studies conducted here differentiate according to investment style as opposed to 
investor type.  We are therefore interested in observing characteristics which different 
investor types have in common as well as those which differentiate them.  Further, the studies 
presented here are based upon a somewhat untypical market environment.  That market 
environment has been shown to affect the behaviour of participants due to the significance of 
the effects of feedback on behaviour, particularly the level of demand for information.  These 
factors alone may all help to explain the different findings.   
 
Notwithstanding caveats, relating primarily to the limited size of the available data 
set, we can nevertheless draw some potentially important conclusions.  The most 
significant of these is evidence that investors across all styles appear to demand current 
information before making trading decisions within their portfolios.  The search for 
new, current data as part of the evaluation process suggests that investors seek to 
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behave with a high degree of objectivity notwithstanding any uncertainty which short-
term market characteristics may present.  The evidence suggests therefore that, while 
demand for information is in part a function of risk aversion and uncertainty (as 
evidenced by the volatility measures), the new information also informs final decisions.  
Furthermore, evidence relating to the fundamental variables suggests that information 
sought is applied systematically.  Thus, while the levels of fundamental factors, in terms 
of normalised exposures of individual stocks to key fundamental metrics, are generally 
not significant, the rate of change measures of those same variables provide some 
evidence that improvements in short-term fundamentals reduce the likelihood of a stock 
being sold while increasing the likelihood of a purchase occurring.  This is again 
consistent with the results found by Nagel (2005) based upon an analysis of mutual 
fund data.   The results do not show evidence of a disposition effect; there was therefore 
no apparent preference to sell stocks with larger short- or cumulative gains.  This 
suggests that, at the very least, effect may be subject to context.  Similarly, there was no 
evidence of other biases such as the sunk cost effect.   
 
8.8. Conclusions 
 
The studies are found to support the proposition that response behaviour and levels of 
demand for information are affected by the nature of short-term feedback and the context in 
which it is received.  Losses appear to amplify information demand more than gains, 
potentially consistent with risk aversion.  The studies also suggest that participants were 
substantially objective in their decision-making, generally seeking the latest available 
information before making decisions.  The overall level of demand for information, in 
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combination with short-term return metrics, was therefore found to influence selling 
propensity.   
 
The pattern of sale versus buy transactions suggests that the overall market environment 
tended to influence the degree of switching in a portfolio (selling one position in order to buy 
another).  In the period of general weakness, a degree of net selling was apparent, although 
this was reversed once the market, and general price levels, recovered.  This would suggest 
that heightened market volatility, particularly when it is associated with losses, does lead to a 
certain modification of expectations.   It would also appear that price volatility leads to 
certain triggers, moreso for some investment styles than others.  Thus, the Technical style, 
most associated with short-term trading based upon price signals, would ordinarily be most 
affected by significant short-term volatility.  In contrast, Value-style investors are likely to be 
much less affected.  The results of the study are therefore consistent with other empirical 
findings with regard to patterns of volatility and trend-reinforcing reactions (Lobato & 
Velasco, 2000; Mandelbrot, 1971).  Thus, the emergence of volatility in the marketplace can 
trigger a behavioural response which itself further contributes to that volatility; the same 
effect can be seen in relation to trends to the extent that short-term weakness affects current 
net selling while the emergence of positive trends are more likely to encourage the 
commitment of any net cash.   
 
Since short-term performance and cumulative returns have been shown to play a 
significant role in terms of affecting current demand for information, the results described 
above should also be interpreted within the context of the overall portfolio return distributions 
of the participants.   Examination of the entire data from the study revealed that the average 
return across all 57 participant portfolios was 18.03%, higher than the Monte Carlo simulated 
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mean of 16.02% and significantly higher than the 13.16% generated by the market Index over 
the period.  Based upon the return distribution parameters derived from the randomly 
generated Monte Carlo portfolios, such average outperformance of the Index has only a 
6.26% probability of occurring by chance, strongly implying a degree of skill on the 
collective part of the participants. (The highest individual portfolio return was 26.93%., an 
outcome with only a 1.29% probability of occurring by chance.)   
 
Based upon self-declared investment styles, significant differences were found between 
average portfolio returns: Judgmental (M= 22.18%, SD = 2.83%) and Value (M= 20.19%, 
SD = 2.67%) styles generated portfolio returns significantly in excess of the returns achieved 
by Growth (M= 15.57%, SD = 2.25%) and Technical (M= 11.92%, SD = 3.45%) styles (p < 
.002), with Growth styles significantly outperforming the Technical style (p < .02).  The high 
level of skill implied by these general results may therefore have consequences for the type of 
behavioural responses observed in the study; it is not clear, therefore, how far the general 
findings might be extended to a broader array of investors where skill sets differ.   
 
With regard to Technical style investors, it is also worth noting that the structure of the 
study may have inadvertently affected their performance more than other style investors.  
Portfolio trading was possible only on portfolio valuation periods; it will be recalled that 
these periods covered underlying intervals of five trading days.  This means that the one style 
most associated with short-term trading might have been denied access to better trading 
opportunities, reducing their collective performance.    
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8.8.1. Limitations of the Study 
 
There are a number of limitations which should be considered relating to the study.  
While a considerable amount of data was made available to participants, it remained well 
short of an actual market environment in terms of both the breadth and depth of data.  In 
particular, the investable universe was limited to just 98 stocks, a fraction of what would 
ordinarily be available to even the largest institutional investor.  In addition, while substantial 
company-specific data was presented, the absence of relevant news, company announcements 
and analyst opinions meant that these potentially important sources were absent.   
 
The decision to anonymise the data was necessary in order to prevent participants from 
potentially identifying the period and changing their behaviour accordingly.  However, it also 
removed any specific expertise or knowledge which may have provided some participants 
with a potential competitive advantage.  Similarly, while it was possible to run many filters 
on the data in order to narrow down potential investments, there was a limit to how far 
participants could define their own screens.  Therefore, any participants used to running their 
own stock selection models using different formulations and types of data may have been 
somewhat limited by the design.  Nevertheless, it should also be recognised that, overall, the 
participants appeared to show a considerable amount of skill, generating returns at levels 
which would be unlikely to occur by chance, suggesting that, whatever limitations were 
faced, most participants were able to overcome them. 
 
The study was designed to include distinguishable phases of markets.  Since real data 
was used, this meant covering a large timespan of actual data and shrinking it into a much 
more condensed timeframe for the purposes of the study.  This is inevitably unrealistic and 
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prevents participants from absorbing any information that intraday movements in prices may 
confer.  Similarly, all trading was assumed to take place at daily closing prices and was only 
possible with certain frequencies (the 5-day timescale relating to portfolio valuation periods).  
Therefore, participants had no ability to trade on intraday prices, which could have 
significantly improved performance in some cases.  It has already been noted that this might 
have adversely affected the performance of Technical style investors in particular.     
 
The study used mouse tracking in order to capture data on certain behaviour of 
participants.  This generated a considerable amount of useful data.  Nevertheless, more 
extensive process tracing techniques could have proved particularly useful.  Foremost among 
these would be eye-tracking as that would have provided even greater insight into the exact 
data referenced by participants and its sequence.  Similarly, there is a possibility that 
analysing data in the manner conducted here placed undue weight upon “current” over 
potential longer-term signals, although certain attempts were made to consider information 
and feedback data over periods other than the latest, for example using return data relating to 
previous periods.  More generally, as an in-case study, caution should be used when 
extrapolating results.  This might be particularly relevant given the apparent level of skill of 
the participants in the current study.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
 
9.1 Overview 
 
This thesis has explored the role which feedback plays in shaping decision-making 
behaviour and has also examined factors which affect the level of demand for information 
within complex environments.  In many complex decision-making environments, uncertainty 
and ambiguity with regard to available choices can be profound.  This is perhaps readily 
apparent within financial markets, particularly in periods of heightened volatility.  In such 
cases, decision-makers, potentially able to access vast amounts of information often in real 
time, must attempt to distil which elements provide valuable information of relevance to the 
decision-making process and which are merely noise.  To the extent that decision-makers are 
rational, the effectiveness of decisions may then depend in part upon how new information 
informs current expectations, the challenge being to seek processes which minimise certain 
biases which could lead to erroneous decisions.   
 
The major empirical study on financial markets presented in the thesis provides support 
for the proposition that short-term feedback relating to portfolio performance and recent price 
volatility are significant factors affecting demand for information and response behaviour.  
The effect is magnified in the domain of losses relative to gains.  The extent to which 
investors seek new information is, however, conditioned by the investment style adopted 
(Blackburn, Goetzmann & Ukhov (2014).  Therefore, technical (chartist) investors are found 
to be significantly more reactive to short-term feedback than judgmental investors, with value-
style investors found to be the least reactive among the sub-categories of the latter general 
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classification.  The relative preponderance of investment styles at any one time would 
therefore appear important in relation to observed phenomena such as volatility clustering 
(Mandelbrot, 1971) as short-term traders in particular are likely to further contribute to price 
volatility due to the nature of their reactive behaviour.   
 
Similarly, the study found evidence that reaction to short-term feedback has a tendency to 
reinforce short-term trends.  Thus, negative feedback with heightened volatility triggered a 
degree of net selling, a process which reversed once the overall market environment 
stabilised.  This would appear to imply that, under conditions of market weakness and 
relatively high levels of stock price volatility, contrarian investors do not offset more reactive 
traders who are more likely to reduce overall market exposure to some degree by raising an 
amount of cash. The analysis of trading propensity was consistent with this proposition and 
provided some support for the proposition that general market volatility increases uncertainty.  
Investors may therefore re-evaluate their risk propensity within that context, becoming 
somewhat more risk averse at least in the short term.  The evidence from the studies therefore 
provides further possible explanations for some of the apparent anomalies observed in 
financial markets. 
 
9.2. Contribution of the Thesis and Suggested Future Research 
 
This thesis sought to add to existing knowledge in the area of judgment and decision 
making by focussing upon the role which feedback plays in shaping response behaviour.  It 
has considered numerous core theories, traced their evolution and examined empirical 
research relating to a range of behavioural traits and biases.  The empirical studies used mouse 
tracking techniques to generate data on behaviour as a prelude to decision-making rather than 
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the decisions themselves.  That data suggested that decision-makers were systematic in their 
search for, and use of data.  In both studies, participants appeared to behave objectively.   
 
In the case of the financial markets study, participants appeared to adopt consistent 
approaches which could largely be differentiated on the basis of investment styles.  This then 
appeared to shape response behaviour to a sufficient extent that investment style was found to 
be an explanatory or predictor variable in relation to both the demand for information and 
trading propensity.  Beyond that, the study found no evidence of other systematic biases.  This 
contrasts with other studies which continue to find fairly pervasive evidence of the sunk cost 
effect, for example (Agarwal, Green, Rosenblatt &Yao, 2015; Bao, Chunming Meng & Wu, 
2017).   As a result, further research could profitably be undertaken in order to distinguish 
between the contexts within which sunk cost biases are likely to persist from those where the 
systematic nature of decision-making minimises or eliminates them.  The apparent skill of the 
participants was reported in the main study, evidenced by the generally strong investment 
returns which were generated.  The question of whether skill and expertise minimises or 
eliminates irrational bias remains an important area for research. 
 
Much could be done to extend the financial markets study.  The use of eye tracking would 
have added yet more important information relating to the information gathering behaviour of 
participants over and above that which was captured by mouse tracking alone.  More 
generally, additional development of the simulated environment itself could prove useful, 
perhaps allowing investors to interact or at least see the trades of other participants.    The 
simulation could also be made more realistic by substantially broadening the data sets with 
many more potential investments made available and perhaps other sources of information 
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relating to news and company announcements being included, although the latter would be 
problematic should a high level of anonymity be required.    
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APPENDIX A : 
SAMPLE PAGE ILLUSTRATING THE SIMULATED ONLINE AUCTION 
This sample page format, although heavily simplified in terms of content, would likely be 
familiar to participants in mainstream online auctions. Navigation buttons are added to ease 
switching between auctions (top right) while the buttons for bidding and viewing bid histories 
are contained towards the bottom of the page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Sample online auction screen 
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APPENDIX B: 
SCHEDULE OF PRE-PROGRAMMED COMPUTER BIDS (STANDARD 
AUCTIONS) 
Table B.2. Schedule of pre-programmed timings and bid levels by auction type. 
 
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
Seconds 
From 
Start Bid
2.14 2000 4.87 2000 1.50 850 0.84 850 6.56 900 2.43 850 1.50 850
17.35 2050 16.88 2050 7.55 900 5.45 900 14.34 1000 7.23 900 6.55 900
38.96 2100 39.87 2100 15.43 950 14.77 950 29.55 1100 10.54 950 8.77 950
58.32 2150 64.46 2150 23.43 1000 19.55 1000 58.00 1200 15.65 1000 11.23 1000
75.46 2200 77.55 2200 32.23 1050 27.55 1050 74.54 1300 17.50 1050 18.66 1050
94.54 2250 88.50 2250 41.23 1100 40.23 1100 90.50 1400 20.50 1100 24.53 1100
112.15 2300 101.12 2300 48.76 1150 47.66 1150 106.00 1500 24.50 1150 37.66 1150
127.56 2350 116.55 2350 57.00 1200 52.35 1200 112.34 1600 34.00 1200 51.23 1200
146.00 2400 134.23 2400 60.35 1250 56.55 1250 128.00 1700 39.70 1250 63.45 1250
171.65 2450 167.75 2450 66.45 1300 60.12 1300 144.70 1800 46.50 1300 69.88 1300
196.55 2500 192.23 2500 75.46 1350 72.23 1350 172.32 1900 60.43 1350 77.00 1350
215.32 2550 217.60 2550 84.50 1400 87.35 1400 188.60 2000 66.00 1400 84.30 1400
230.40 2600 231.23 2600 93.68 1450 92.35 1450 200.61 2100 82.50 1450 101.34 1450
244.55 2650 246.00 2650 102.50 1500 101.23 1500 213.40 2200 84.30 1500 106.55 1500
256.45 2700 259.80 2700 108.66 1550 104.80 1550 219.30 2300 86.90 1550 111.23 1550
265.45 2750 264.00 2750 112.35 1600 114.35 1600 223.00 2400 104.20 1600 112.35 1600
274.54 2800 277.69 2800 122.34 1650 122.45 1650 245.40 2500 118.23 1650 122.34 1650
281.23 2850 286.57 2850 128.76 1700 131.88 1700 251.40 2600 142.32 1700 127.54 1700
286.45 2900 288.32 2900 130.23 1750 141.12 1750 255.00 2700 155.45 1750 133.20 1750
292.34 2950 290.23 2950 134.34 1800 149.88 1800 263.40 2800 159.80 1800 137.65 1800
296.55 3000 296.00 3000 139.00 1850 163.23 1850 275.40 2900 164.00 1850 142.34 1850
298.32 3050 297.40 3050 143.00 1900 172.35 1900 290.00 3000 169.70 1900 158.54 1900
299.20 3100 298.90 3100 149.57 1950 182.23 1950 299.80 3100 188.40 1950 175.40 1950
158.66 2000 190.35 2000 190.30 2000 189.34 2000
172.40 2050 193.92 2050 194.50 2050 198.35 2050
181.55 2100 210.23 2100 200.50 2100 209.54 2100
189.35 2150 214.35 2150 206.50 2150 216.44 2150
198.35 2200 224.35 2200 212.40 2200 228.66 2200
209.54 2250 236.46 2250 224.50 2250 236.56 2250
216.44 2300 238.70 2300 247.50 2300 238.65 2300
228.66 2350 242.00 2350 255.40 2350 244.34 2350
236.56 2400 245.35 2400 267.00 2400 249.76 2400
241.34 2450 248.92 2450 268.40 2450 262.60 2450
249.66 2500 252.49 2500 270.00 2500 264.43 2500
254.54 2550 267.57 2550 271.50 2550 266.76 2550
262.60 2600 271.14 2600 275.40 2600 271.23 2600
263.10 2650 274.71 2650 277.40 2650 276.45 2650
264.50 2700 278.28 2700 279.50 2700 277.40 2700
266.00 2750 282.12 2750 281.40 2750 278.40 2750
268.30 2800 286.55 2800 282.30 2800 279.50 2800
274.30 2850 290.23 2850 285.00 2850 283.34 2850
281.50 2900 291.45 2900 286.50 2900 288.43 2900
288.40 2950 295.34 2950 288.00 2950 291.00 2950
292.32 3000 297.54 3000 290.40 3000 295.53 3000
297.50 3050 298.30 3050 296.50 3050 298.00 3050
299.60 3100 299.00 3100 299.70 3100 299.60 3100
Fast 3 (With 
Active switching) 
Fast 4 (With 
Active Switching) Slow 2 Fast 1 Fast 2 Slow 1
Slow (Bid 
Increment : £100)
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In order to auctions of the same intensity (fast or slow) to end at the same level, they also 
had to use the same opening bid level given that the number of pre-programmed computer 
bids were equal. It will be noted that bid patterns in auctions with the same pre-programmed 
computed bidding intensity varied in terms of the planned timing of those computer bids (all 
times were measured from the start of the auction using the computer’s internal clock).  
 
Intervals between computer bids were irregular although the gap, in terms of number of 
seconds, tended to decline as the auctions approached their climax, in order to simulate 
greater competitive bidding action. 
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Pre-Programmed Bid 
Timings (Seconds 
from Start) Bid Price
"Buy It Now" 
Price
Pre-Programmed Bid 
Timings (Seconds 
From Start) Bid Price
"Buy It Now" 
Price
1.50 850 2500 2.43 850 2500
7.55 900 2500 7.23 900 2500
15.43 950 2500 10.54 950 2500
23.43 1000 2500 15.65 1000 2500
32.23 1050 2500 17.50 1050 2500
41.23 1100 2500 20.50 1100 2500
48.76 1150 2500 24.50 1150 2500
57.00 1200 2500 34.00 1200 2500
60.35 1250 2650 39.70 1250 2650
66.45 1300 2650 46.50 1300 2650
75.46 1350 2650 60.43 1350 2650
84.50 1400 2650 66.00 1400 2650
93.68 1450 2650 82.50 1450 2650
102.50 1500 2650 84.30 1500 2650
108.66 1550 2650 86.90 1550 2650
112.35 1600 2650 104.20 1600 2650
122.34 1650 2800 118.23 1650 2800
128.76 1700 2800 142.32 1700 2800
130.23 1750 2800 155.45 1750 2800
134.34 1800 2800 159.80 1800 2800
139.00 1850 2800 164.00 1850 2800
143.00 1900 2800 169.70 1900 2800
149.57 1950 2800 188.40 1950 2800
158.66 2000 2800 190.30 2000 2800
172.40 2050 2950 194.50 2050 2950
181.55 2100 2950 200.50 2100 2950
189.35 2150 2950 206.50 2150 2950
198.35 2200 2950 212.40 2200 2950
209.54 2250 2950 224.50 2250 2950
216.44 2300 2950 247.50 2300 2950
228.66 2350 2950 255.40 2350 2950
236.56 2400 2950 267.00 2400 2950
241.34 2450 268.40 2450
249.66 2500 270.00 2500
254.54 2550 271.50 2550
262.60 2600 275.40 2600
263.10 2650 277.40 2650
264.50 2700 279.50 2700
266.00 2750 281.40 2750
268.30 2800 282.30 2800
274.30 2850 285.00 2850
281.50 2900 286.50 2900
288.40 2950 288.00 2950
292.32 3000 290.40 3000
297.50 3050 296.50 3050
299.60 3100 299.70 3100
Auction: Fast 1 Auction: Fast 3
APPENDIX C 
SCHEDULE OF PRE-PROGRAMMED COMPUTER BIDS (BIN AUCTIONS) 
Table C.1 Pre-programmed “Buy It Now” sequences used for concurrent auctions  
 
 
 
. 
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APPENDIX D 
EXTRACT FROM TECHNICAL AND FUNDAMENTAL INDICATOR TABLES 
Table D.1 Extract of data with summary technical (price-based) indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Table shows participants the current price for each security along with a summary of 
performance over previous periods (1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 12 months). The 
technical indicators shown are:  
Rel.Str. a measure of relative strength, which measures the capital return of each individual 
security relative to that of the market over the prior 12-month period;  
RS Perc. expresses the relative strength score as a percentile of the relative strength scores for 
all of the available securities. RS.Perc. ranges from 0 (the security is in the bottom percentile 
on the basis of performance) to 1 (it is in the top percentile as one of the strongest performing 
securities over the period);  
Stoch measures a price stochastic calculated using data for the previous 60 days. This is 
computed from the general formula;   
 (Pt – Pmint.t-n) / (Pmaxt.t-n  –  Pmint.t-n) 
 where, Pmaxt.t-n is the maximum closing price over the period for which the stochastic 
is being calculated (from t-n to t), Pmint.t-n is the minimum closing price over the same 
period; Pt is the latest closing price.  The stochastic can therefore range between 0 (the 
Name Price 1 Mo 3 Mo 6 Mo 12 Mo Rel.Str. RS Perc. Stoch. P/MA20 P/MA50 P/MA100 P/MA200
Alsom 17.55 2.7% 9.5% 20.5% 35.1% 1.016 0.560 0.972 1.014 1.037 1.068 1.142
Aplian Healthcare 22.02 -3.2% -3.8% 1.6% 12.6% 1.003 0.160 0.205 0.984 0.963 0.955 1.008
Bard Healthcare 55.13 -5.3% -1.9% 6.1% 9.1% 1.000 0.100 0.274 0.967 0.981 0.996 0.989
Blake Oil & Gas 39.05 14.8% 22.9% 17.5% 46.4% 1.025 0.800 1.000 1.051 1.122 1.155 1.209
Bosphur Financial 44.82 13.2% 24.1% 30.6% 108.1% 1.032 0.940 0.917 1.033 1.117 1.150 1.255
Boulton Biotech 43.37 -18.4% -17.5% -11.6% -8.6% 0.986 0.020 0.022 0.870 0.836 0.827 0.844
Carlisle Banking 29.24 0.5% 6.2% 12.1% 10.5% 1.010 0.340 0.796 0.986 1.024 1.068 1.095
Catsom Industrials 68.54 1.9% 21.4% 54.8% 80.7% 1.035 0.960 0.925 1.023 1.058 1.157 1.318
Circle Q 42.80 -5.8% 8.4% 3.2% 16.0% 1.006 0.220 0.223 0.966 0.972 1.002 1.029
Conan Bio 19.88 -12.9% -16.9% -7.4% -15.1% 0.987 0.040 0.006 0.917 0.872 0.872 0.867
Console Freight 55.57 7.3% 28.1% 31.6% 63.6% 1.027 0.860 1.000 1.026 1.087 1.141 1.220
Return Data Summary Technical Indicators
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Name EPSG PE Forecast PE PEG DY Forecast DY P/BV P/CF ROE ROA
Alsom 21.4% 11.40 9.39 2.28 7.52% 8.32% 8.95 11.47 92.97 10.04
Aplian Healthcare -19.8% 5.97 7.44 -2.66 7.08% 7.81% 1.49 5.51 28.49 12.12
Bard Healthcare 6.2% 12.22 11.51 0.54 0.00% 0.00% 2.42 9.69 21.39 12.11
Blake Oil & Gas 135.2% 12.05 5.12 26.38 4.89% 5.51% 0.96 36.16 8.26 3.29
Bosphur Financial 117.5% 29.10 13.38 8.78 1.61% 1.61% 3.71 -121.14 16.23 1.7
Boulton Biotech -33.4% 12.08 18.15 -1.84 2.47% 2.72% 3.62 14.04 32.86 13.46
Carlisle Banking -276.7% -25.21 14.26 -19.40 1.74% 1.23% 1.22 -17.10 -5.04 -0.61
Catsom Industrials 141.8% 37.25 15.40 9.21 2.45% 2.45% 23.39 11.07 314.63 2.27
Circle Q 21.0% 13.21 10.92 1.92 5.23% 5.70% 14.13 11.63 95.97 18.78
Conan Bio 17.7% 14.10 11.98 1.48 0.00% 0.00% 5.62 12.99 50.11 31.53
Console Freight 44.9% 20.13 13.89 3.23 2.45% 2.52% 1.98 36.32 10.36 3.85
Fundamental Data
current price is equal to the lowest price over the period) and 1 (the current price is 
equal to the highest price over the period);  
 
P/MA20, P/MA50, P/MA100/P/MA200 refers to the current price divided by a moving 
average of prices. The period over which the moving average price is calculated is denoted by 
the numerical suffix applied (e.g. 20, 20, 100 and 200 trading days). 
 
 
Table D.2. Extract showing fundamental data table. 
 
 
The data items shown are:  
EPSG,  measuring the year-over-year percentage change in earnings per share;  
PE is the current share price divided by last reported earnings per share;  
Forecast PE is the current share price divided by next year’s forecast earnings per share;  
PEG measures the PE relative to earnings per share growth (ESPG / PE);  
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DY is the dividend yield (last year’s dividend per share divided by the share price, expressed 
as a percentage);  
Forecast DY uses forecast dividends per share in the calculation;  
P/BV measure the current share price divided by book value (shareholders’ funds) per share;  
P/CF represents the current share price divided by cash flow per share;  
ROE measures return on equity (pre-tax earnings divided by book value);  
ROA measure the return on assets (pre-tax earnings divided by total asset value). 
